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ABSTRACT 
This study provides a categorial analysis of the syntax 
and the semantics of the imperative in English, using two 
related grammatical models of Generalized Phrase Structure 
Grammar and Montague Semantics. 
With regard to syntax, aspects of Generalized Phrase 
Structure Grammar are extended to the construction. The 
analysis shows that possible imperative subject noun phrases, 
except where they are pronouns, contain post-modifiers. A 
noun phrase which lacks this characteristic does not there- 
fore occur as a subject in it. The examination of the verb 
phrases reveals that they constitute a unique category, as 
demonstrated by the nature of the constituents themselves, 
and the syntactic behaviour the elements that occur in them. 
The various imperative sentence structures and their major 
components are captured by a set of Phrase Structure rules. 
The analysis sheds light on many aspects of the syntactic 
nature of the construction. 
The semantic analysis of the construction, through an 
extension of Montague Semantics, identifies the kinds of 
semantic types that its major constituent categories are. It 
is observed that although the imperative subject noun phrases 
and the verb phrases are susceptible to a surface composi- 
tional analysis, the S-structures are not. The analysis 
shows that this is due to the nature of its subject-predicate 
relationship, and so identifies a significant aspect of the 
grammar of the imperative that has not been given adequate 
attention. For example, it is this aspect that excludes 
certain elements from occurring in the sentence, and also 
separates it from other sentences in certain respects. 
A special model-theoretic analysis provided for sections 
of the construction gives new insights into the semantico- 
ix 
pragmatic conditions surrounding it, especially with regard 
to the specification of the intended agent-of-action. Apart 
from identifying aspects of the "fulfilment conditions" of 
the imperative, the semantic analysis examines the issue of 
its "propositional content" and specifies the problems that 
need to be resolved in this regard. The present approach 
provides new ideas on the semantic organization of the impe- 
rative, and so makes it easier to understand. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the mid-fifties, the protagonists of generative 
grammar have taken a keen interest in the imperative cons- 
truction in English. However, it has remained a recalcitrant 
problem. The issues involved divide into two parts: (a) the 
theoretical assumptions used in major studies ön the construc- 
tion, and (b), the nature of the construction itself. Whe- 
reas the analyses under (a) are aimed at exposing generaliza- 
tions among all sentence types, (b) is singularly resistant 
to such generalizations. The result has been a list of 
claims and counter claims, which is rather vague and unsatis- 
factory. The fact is that many grammatical subsystems which 
appear to work well for, say, the declarative are often 
unable to resolve the problems presented by the imperative. 
With regard to methodology, a change of direction is 
highly desirable. It is now being realized in generative 
grammar that sentences should be analysed according to their 
respective types. The necessity for this has been slow in 
coming to the attention of linguists working within various 
models of generative grammar. There is the suggestion that 
in imperatives a semantic analysis should identify "fulfil- 
ment conditions" (see Montague, 1974: 248). McCawley (1981) 
directs attention to the need for grammar to relate to sen- 
tences as types. In the area of syntax, Generalized Phrase 
Structure Grammar allows categories to be created by rules 
which have nothing to do with transformations, and which do 
not derive all sentence types from declarative-like sentence 
structures. All the above aspects therefore provide an 
appropriate theoretical framework which I intend to use to 
approach the problems raised by the imperative. 
The issue of the nature of the constructicn itself is 
very controversial. The imperative has been referred to in 
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various terms, raising the question of whether it is a full 
sentence in its own right or an ordinary clause. In these 
two classifications of the construction, the issues are 
whether it is a sentence type and so a unique syntactic cate- 
gory, or a highly constrained indicative clause type, and 
also whether or not it should be distinguished from the 
subjunctive and the infinitive in certain aspects. 
The two aspects of the study of the imperative (i. e., 
(a) and (b) above) cannot however be neatly separated since 
the structural distinctions that are made may be constrained 
by the theoretical assumptions that are used. It is there- 
fore necessary to approach the imperative as a syntactic 
"mood" category, and so study it as it really is: an objec- 
tive that is pursued in the present thesis which is orga- 
nized in the following manner. 
Chapter one discusses the current literature on the 
imperative in generative grammar since its inception. It 
notes not only the direction of the thinking on both the 
topic and the grammatical theories used but also the problems 
that have arisen. 
Chapter Two contains a discussion of specific aspects of 
the theoretical assumptions which have been applied to the 
imperative and clarifies the issue of its classification. It 
then introduces the grammatical models to be used for the two 
parts of the study -- syntax and semantics -- and indicates 
some of the modifications that will be made in the models for 
the purpose of extending them to the construction. 
Chapter Three analyses the subject and vocative noun 
phrases that occur in the imperative. It examines their 
shapes, their syntactic functions and also their semantic 
nature. It identifies their relationships with the context 
3 
of use of the construction, and their roles as descriptions 
or specifications of the agent(s) of the action mentioned in 
it. 
Chapter Four examines the imperative verb phrase as a 
category, and discusses elements like be, do and not that 
occur in it. Phrase Structure rules are also provided for 
the verb phrases and S-structures. In addition to the analy- 
sis of the semantic aspects of the above elements, the seman- 
tic type which the imperative VP represents is also identified. 
Chapter Five, the final chapter, then takes up the 
imperative sentence structure itself. It discusses the dic- 
hotomy between its subject and predicate components, and the 
behaviour of adverbs in the sentence. The semantic aspect 
contains an analysis of how subject NP's receive denotations 
and how the nature of the context of use can be used to 
resolve the problem raised by the occurrence of you as sub- 
ject in the construction. It also examines not only the 
question of the fulfilment conditions of the imperative 
but also the issues raised by the analysis of its proposi- 
tional content. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE STUDY OF 
ENGLISH IMPERATIVE SENTENCES IN GENERATIVE GRAMMAR 
1.0 Introduction 
There has been a considerable amount of interest in 
imperatives in generative grammar since the mid-fifties. 
This is perhaps not surprising because there has been a long 
tradition in the philosophy of language that carved out non- 
declaratives as problematic to describe. This is probably 
due to the fact that predicate logic uses a structure of 
predicate and argument in a way that parallels the predicate 
and subject of a declarative sentence. This is a logical 
structure which imperatives do not seem to have. Further- 
more, whereas declaratives express propositions which might 
be predicated as true or false, this is not the case with 
regard to non-declaratives. 
These differences generated a great deal of controversy 
in philosophical logic and the philosophy of language before 
the emergence of generative grammar in the fifties. ' Quite 
understandably, the grammar bows to tradition and so repre- 
sents a basic sentence as consisting of two main parts -- the 
subject noun phrase and the verb phrase. This is of course 
the structure of a declarative sentence. The problem that is 
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raised is how to generalize this assumption to non-declara- 
tives, especially to imperatives. These sentences prove very 
recalcitrant in this regard. Alongside this is the problem 
of how to extend truth-conditional semantics to them. 
As the present study is about only one class of non- 
declaratives -- the imperative -- I intend, in this chapter, 
to concentrate on the literature on the syntax and semantics 
of the construction*in English. I begin with the syntax. 
Several linguists take issue with many of the proposals 
on the syntax of the imperative in English. Davies claims 
that the impression that the construction is "idiosyncratic" 
and that it differs from other constructions with regard to 
pattern "may well arise from too superficial an examination 
of the facts" (1981: 2). Schmerling, on her part, observes 
that the construction has been used to justify "a number of 
innovations in generative syntax" (1980: 1). She cites the 
analysis of English verb phrases by Akmajian, Steele and 
Wasow (1979) as one of the examples of this development. She 
also remarks that the imperative construction is "one clause 
type that has been generally ignored in recent discussion" 
(1983: 412). 
Issues like those raised above make it pertinent to give 
the discussion of the syntax of the imperative in this chap- 
ter a two-fold focus. The intention is therefore 
(i) to identify the major develpments in the study of 
imperatives in generative grammar, and, in so 
doing, map out the direction and orientation of 
" the multifarious studies which have been carried 
out on the subject, and, 
(ii) to try to highlight, very briefly, some of the 
areas of intense controversy and so provide an 
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over-view of the relevant literature as a 
background to the rest of the study. 
One implication of this approach is that in the end, we 
shall, perhaps, be in a position to know that the real 
problem is not that imperatives have been ignored, as Schmer- 
ling remarks, or that they are wrongly characterized as idio- 
syncratic, as Davies claims, but that most of the previous 
studies are seriously weakened by the limited explanatory 
potential of the grammatical model within which they were 
undertaken. 2 Consequently, there is a great deal of vague- 
ness about the nature and other aspects of the imperative 
sentence. It is today almost as mysterious as it was in the 
past (cf. Culicover, 1976: 144). 
1.1 The Beginnings of the Generative Analysis of the 
Imperative in English 
A) Chomsky"s Proposals on Subject NP's, Verbs and Adverbs in 
Imperatives 
Chomsky's (1955,1975) theory of transformational 
grammar (TG) appears to regard imperatives as perfectly 
normal sentences. They do not present any serious problem to 
the new theory. They are quite open to the operations of 
transformations, and his main finding is that imperatives are 
derived sentences, just like interrogatives. Furthermore, 
unlike interrogatives, they are characterized as elliptical 
sentences, having lost some of their parts in the course of 
their derivation. 
Chomsky goes on to give details of the transformational 
derivations of the sentences. They are kernel sentences in 
the deep structure for a start. They change into interroEa- 
tives and then into imperatives by dropping their subject, vou$ 
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and modal will under the influence of the Imperative Trans- 
formation. The incidence of reflexivization is said to 
provide justification for the postulation of you as the sole 
element that can be the subject. 3 His argument may be summa- 
rized thus. 
The Reflexive Transformation derives reflexives in the 
following manner: 
(1.1.1) You love you =====> RE FL 
You love yourself 
The Imperative Transformation then deletes the subject NP you 
and so we have 
(1.1.2) Love yourself 
He also contends that we do not have a sentence like the 
example in (1.1.3), 
(1.1.3) *Love myself4 
because first person pronouns cannot occur as subject NP's 
in. imperatives. His conception of the reflexive construc- 
tion therefore is one in which the Reflexive Transformation 
carries the pronoun X into X-self in the environment of X 
verb -- (see p. 554), and this must take place before the 
Imperative Transformation deletes the subject NP which must 
be you. 
With regard to do, he discusses the following 
imperatives. 
(1.1.4)(a) Do come to visit us. 
(b) Don't come to visit us. 
He claims that these sentences are derived from those in 
(1.1.5) by deleting you. 
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(1.1.5)(a) 'Do Ac - you - come to visit us 
(b) Do n't - you - come to visit us 
These structures are themselves derived from the following: 
(1.1.6) You -0- come to visit us 
by the process of applying the Not- or the Ac-Transformation 
to it, followed by the Question Transformation. The 
resulting phrase marker is the example in (1.1.7) -- (p. 555). 
Ac 
(1.1.7) 0 
not 
you - come visit us 
Do, which normally has a heavy stress, is then inserted to 
take the place of the displaced affix 0; and Ac (accent) 
assigns stress to the vowel of the preceding morpheme. 
Chomsky also claims that the same analysis applies to the 
following imperative sentences. 
(1.1.8)(a) You get it. 
(b) You be the first volunteer. 
(c) Don't you get it. (i. e., "Let him get it". ) 
He says that these sentences are derived uniformly by drop- 
ping the auxiliary. This is possible if they are derived 
from questions. He comments: 
Note that a further advantage in deriving imperatives from questions is that this treatment excludes them from the context that --. (Ibid.: 555). 
All this seems normal; at least it "proves" that TG is 
able to capture, for example, an assumption of traditional 
grammar, i. e., that in the imperative construction, the sub- 
ject (believed to be understood) is you. 
Chomsky also makes other proposals with regard to the 
auxiliary of the imperative. Like the interrogative, the 
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imperative accepts Do-Insertion and few more modals. But 
its VP cannot accept any past time adverb. 
In brief, Chomsky may be said to have 'made the following 
five main claims which have since generated a deal of inte- 
rest and controversy. They cover the following aspects: 
(a) the derivation of the imperative from a 
declarative-like deep structure; 
(b) the postulation of modal auxiliaries in the 
underlying structure of the sentences; 
(c) the restriction of the subject to the second person 
pronoun you; 
(d) the restriction on the type of adverbs that can 
occur in the sentences, and, 
(e) the insertion of do into imperatives. 
B) Reactions to Chomsky"s Proposals 
Chomsky'a proposals have attracted considerable attention. 
For example, Katz' and Postal (1964) question Chomsky's proposal 
on the derivation of certain sentences, including impera- 
tives. They claim that if transformations are allowed to 
change structures from one sentence type5 into another, then 
they can be said to have changed the "meanings" of such 
structures. They therefore suggest that the imperative 
should be marked in the deep structure (DS) with a phonologi- 
cally empty morpheme I. This may then prevent the transfor- 
mations, which it encounters in the processes of its 
derivation (as described above), from changing its meaning. 
The structure will thus not be derived as a question before 
it is derived as an imperative as Chomsky has claimed above. 
Thus, this proposal, which is now dubbed the Katz-Postal 
Hypothesis, makes the claim that by having phonologically 
10 
empty morphemes -like I marked on structures in the DS, the 
transformations which operate on the structures will become 
"meaning-preserving" (cf. Huddleston, 1976: 88-90; Baker, 
1978: 230, and Akmajian and Heny, 1976: 236-244). 
6 
Another of Chomsky's proposals that comes under review at 
this time is the one on the modal will. It is generally 
accepted that it is dropped along with TENSE, and so, accor- 
ding to Klima (1964: 259), it is example (1.1.9)(b), not 
(1.1.9)(c), that is derived from (1.1.9)(a) -- after "affix 
hopping". 
(1.1.9)(a) You will+TENSE be making a noise 
(b) Be making a noise 
(c) You are making a noise 
It is now made clear that TENSE is deleted along with the 
auxiliary. 
However, Lees (1964) finds it convenient to link the 
empty morpheme I (or Imp as it is sometimes used) with a 
"zero" modal which performs some functions. For example, it 
triggers transformational rules like Aux-Attraction and 
Preverb Particle Placement (cf. Stockwell et al, 1973: 661). 
This modal also attaches to the imperative main verb without 
any visible effect on its shape. 
Another view of the auxiliary that emerges at this time 
involves the claim by Postal (1964), Klima (1964), and Katz 
and Postal (1964) that the modal will along with the subject 
you is copied to the tag segment of a tagged imperative 
before the modal is deleted by the Imperative Transformation. 
We therefore have a situation in which the second sentence in 
each of the following pairs is derived from the first: 
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(1.1.10)(a) You will stop that =====> 
00 stop that, won't you? 
(b) You will not go there again =====> 
00 don't go there again, will you? 
Postal claims that the negative occurs either in the main 
part of the sentence or in the tag, but never in both simul- 
taneously. 
Nevertheless, the proposal that only you can be the 
subject of an imperative does not receive universal support 
among linguists. Thorne (1966) claims that the second person 
pronoun may not be the only subject NP which an imperative 
can have. He proposes an abstract element vocative which he 
says is phonetically realized as you. This element, accor- 
ding to him, functions as a definite article, and co-occurs 
with the subjects of imperatives. Such subjects, he claims, 
have both full and short forms as follows. 
(1.1.11)(a) You boys Boys 
(b) You John John 
(c) You somebody Somebody 
The sentences in (1.1.12) are thus possible imperatives, 
according to Thorne. 
(1.1.12)(a) You boys sit down. 
(b) John switch off the light. 
(c) Somebody keep quiet! 
He claims that since the vocative element stands in place of 
the definite article, the latter cannot occur in such sen- 
tences, as the following examples show: 
(1.1.13) *The boys sit down. 
It may be said that the sentence in (1.1.13) is defini- 
tely unacceptable, but, as we shall see in Chapter Three below, 
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Thorne seems to have failed to give the correct reasons for 
its ungrammaticality. The issue here is the degree to which 
the imperative subject is particularized in relation to the 
context of use. 7 
Huddleston (1971) rejects certain aspects of Thorne's 
claims. For example, on the elements that can co-occur as 
the subjects in imperatives, he criticizes Thorne for drawing 
a false analogy between you boy and you somebody, thus 
implying that the latter does not form a single unit as does 
the former (see pp. 50-51). He discusses the classes of NP's 
that can occur as subjects in imperatives and identifies 
three possible types of noun phrases: 
(a) second person NP, you; 
(b) third person (mainly indefinite) NP's, and, 
(c) first person plural pronoun. 
They are thus found in imperatives like the following: 
(1.1.14)(a) You say it. 
(b) Somebody clean his shoes. 
(c) Let's close the matter now. 
Stockwell, Schachter and Partee (1973: 642-646) intro- 
duce a new element into the controversy. What they think is 
crucial is the reference of the subject. Their fundamental 
thesis on this is that in all cases, the speaker is addres- 
sing the subjects of the imperative constructions. They 
observe: 
It seems to be necessary to recognize that while the 
referent of the subject NP of an imperative is addressed by the speaker, constraining the NP basically to the. 
second person nevertheless certain third person NP's 
can occur wits second person reference. (Ibid.: 646). 
Stockwell et al go further, in their analysis, to set up 
a device, the "SJC", which ensures that only imperatives in 
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which the subjects have the feature [+ II person] can be 
generated grammatically. 
It can be said that"the point at issue now is whether 
there are real third- and first-person imperative subject NP's 
after all, in view of the claim that when such NP's occur as 
subjects in the construction, they must have the feature [+ 
II person]. Is Chomsky therefore not right in suggesting 
that only you can occur as subject in these sentences? In 
other words, does his use of the incidence of reflexivization 
amount to presenting a pragmatic argument in which case the 
occurrence of an NP like somebody as subject in the impera- 
tive may be regarded as the same as that of you in the same 
role, in the context of use? It is therefore reasonable to 
ask, at this juncture, where we are to draw the line between 
matters pragmatic and matters syntactic or even semantic in 
the characterization of the subject NP in an imperative 
construction. 8 
There is no doubt that there is some vagueness in the 
current thinking on the topic in the literature. Schmerling 
(1980) expresses some new ideas about how to solve the above 
problems about the nature of the subject NP and the characte- 
rization of you as subject in the imperative. She suggests 
that it may be necessary to abandon You Deletion. But she 
adds: 
Giving up You Deletion is something of a frightening 
prospect, r essitatinq as it does a semantic account of 
understood you" with com atible semantic accounts of "control" phmena. (Schuierling, 1980: 27). 
This has not been attempted yet, as far as I know. 9 it 
is also important to find out why only a subset of NP's can 
cccur as subjects in imperatives, and how this fact relates 
to the occurrence of "understood mau" in the sentences. I 
shall suggest solutions to these problems in Chapter Three. 
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1.2 The Late Sixties and Early Seventies 
A) Tags in Imperatives 
The general interest which linguists take in the 
auxiliary in this period extends to tags. Many views about 
the structures are put forward. Negation, deletion transfor- 
mation, and do are also discussed. A number of analysts, 
including Postal (1964), Lees (1964) and Arbini (1969) make 
suggestions about them which I shall now consider along with 
those of others. 
What attracts the attention of the analysts in particu- 
lar is the formation of tags in both imperatives and interro- 
gatives. This issue has to do with the claim (cf. Postal, 
Op. cit.: 27) that will is the auxiliary that occurs in 
imperatives. Although Lees (1964) and Hartung (1964) support 
this claim, they express the view that tags are formed from 
conjoined sentences. Lees says that the second conjunct must 
contain the modal will and the first may not contain any 
negation -- an element which he claims optionally occurs in 
the second. The processes of deriving tagged imperatives, 
according to this proposal, may be simplified thus: 
(1.2.1)(a) You will accompany them 
(b) Will you accompany them 
After the conjoining of both sentences, we have 
(1.2.2) You will accompany them and will you accompany 
them. 
The deletion rules then apply to them to derive the following: 
(1.2.3) Accompany them and will you. 
A transformational rule will then delete and. Hartung makes 
15 
the same claim. He says the following structure is first 
brought about by a transformation: 
(1.2.4) Accompany them, will you accompany them. 
Deletion rules then drop those elements in the second segment 
which repeat items that have already occurred in the first, 
and so we have the following sentence: 
(1.2.5) Accompany them, will you! 
The questions raised by the occurrence and role of will 
in imperatives and the formation of tags in both imperatives 
and interrogatives are also'discussed by .. rbini (1969). 
What is important in his suggestions is his attempt to deter- 
mine the role of negation and negative preverbsl° in distin- 
guishing a tagged imperative from a tagged question. The 
thrust of his argument is that the presence of these elements 
in the main segments of tagged constructions makes it 
difficult to support the claim that the formation of tagged 
imperatives may involve the' deletion of you and will. Such 
constructions should therefore be regarded as tagged 
questions. 
Arbini, to begin with, agrees with Lees that a negative 
in the tag of an imperative is completely optional. He 
however points out that this is in clear contrast with what 
obtains in the tags of questions. 
(1.2.6) Show me your ticket 
will you 
! 
won t you 
He observes: 
In interrogatives the formation of negative tags 
appears to be influenced by the positive 
characterization of the source phrase-marker, whereas 
the formation of negative tog s in imperatives is 
obviously not. (Arbini, 1969: 207). 
For tagged questions, therefore, the situation is as follows: 
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(1.2.7) (a) Your son will be arriving here soon, won't 
he? 
(b) *Your son will not be arriving here soon 
won'' t he? 
Thus, the sentence in (1.2.7) (b) is starred because the tag 
cannot contain any negation since the main part of the sen- 
tence has one. 
Arbini also claims that negative preverbs cannot occur 
in tagged imperatives. He observes that sentences like the 
following (from Arbini, 1979) may therefore be expected "to 
evoke varying degrees of dissatisfaction" (Ibid. ). 
(1.2.8) Do not 
Never 
* bring me a slab 
will you 
Scarcely won't you 
-Rarely 
He puts the source of the unacceptability of the sentences 
down to the presence of negation and negative preverbs in the 
main parts of the sentences. He observes: 
... transformations producing tag-imperatives, unlike those producing tag-questions, (a) never operate on 
ne ative sources, and (b) where they do operate, 
optionally produce either positive or negative tags (Ibid. ). 
The point here is that the main segment of the impera- 
tive which has a negative element (i. e., not or a negative 
preverb), may become the source of a tag and so the entire 
construction may thus be a tagged question. This position 
reflects the claim of Lees (1964) that the first of the two 
"conjuncts" which make up a tagged imperative may not contain 
negation. It does appear therefore that Arbini thinks that 
an instance of such a construction, as in (1.2.9), is better 
regarded as a tagged question than as a tagged imperative. 
(1.2.9) You will not sit down, will you? 
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The problem he has with this construction is that he accepts 
Postal's (1964) proposal that a sentence like the example in 
(1.2.10) can be given an imperative interpretation. He puts 
it thus: 
the phrase-marker from which it derives terminates in a 
strip producing sentences which have legitimate inter- 
pretations as imperatives... (Ibid.: 208). 
(1.2.10) You will not sit down. 
We may note that the issue he really has to resolve is 
if the structure in (1.2.9) is indeed derived from the same 
phrase-marker as the construction in (1.2.10), why then 
should the former be interpreted as an interrogative whereas 
the latter is interpreted as an imperative. The only diffe- 
rence between them is the fact that the former is tagged but 
the latter is not. The presence of negation in the main 
segment of a tagged construction can no longer be used to 
tell a tagged question from a tagged imperative, since it is 
now obvious from the example in (1.2.10) that an imperative 
can contain negation; and may be tagged as well. 
Arbini however goes on to give his reason for regarding 
the construction in (1.2.9) as a tagged question rather than 
as a tagged imperative. He claims that if it is labelled as 
a tagged imperative, its phrase-marker will allow the optio- 
nal deletion of you and will (following Chomsky, 1955,1975), 
which will thus lead to the derivation of a deviant sentence 
like 
(1.2.11) *Do not sit down, will you! 
He points out that his rejection of the imperative interpre- 
tation of a sentence like the one in (1.2.9) has not been 
motivated simply by the presence of a negative element in its 
main segment alone. He says that sentences like the following 
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should also be rejected as tagged imperatives: 
(1.2.12)(a) you will sit down, won't you. 
(b) you will show me your ticket, won't you. 
(c) You wil listen to me, won't you. 
He claims that sentences like these as well as the one in 
(1.2.9) may well have been generated as interrogatives, and 
so, no elements in them are deleted by the Imperative Transfor- 
mation. If this is the case, he continues, none of them can be 
said to be the sources of the sentences in (1.2.13). 
(1.1.13)(a) Sit down, wont you! 
(b) Show me your ticket, won't you! 
(c) Listen to me, won't you! 
He then concludes that the transformation responsible for the 
production of tagged imperatives is 
BASICALLY a permutation transformation (optionally 
addin not to the tag), unlike the Tag-question trans- 
formatiowhich is an addition transformation. (Ibid.: 
209-210). 
'l 
It is perhaps correct to comment here that what Arbini 
has done, basically, is to test two claims in the literature 
against constructions containing tags. The claims are (a), 
that by Lees (see above) which says that the first conjunct 
of a tagged imperative may not contain any negative element, 
and (b), that by Chomsky which says that imperatives are 
derived from interrogatives by the deletion of you and the 
auxiliary which is now believed to be will (see Postal, 
1964). 
He does not really accept that the example in (1.2.9) 
may well be a tagged imperative. The point he has however 
brought out has to do with the deletion of the subject and 
the auxiliary in the sentence. He claims that if the sent- 
ence in (1.2.9) is turned into a subjectless, tagged 1m era- 
tive as in (1.2.11), it will be ungrammatical, since the 
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sentence does not conform with the proposal of Postal and 
others (see above) on the formation of a tagged imperative. 
He therefore concludes that only structures which can gramma- 
tically drop their subjects and auxiliaries as a result of 
the operations of transformations may be regarded as 
imperatives, and only those which can have their subject and 
auxiliary copied to the tags (as suggested by Postal and 
others) may be regarded as interrogatives. Since the 
sentence in (1.2.9) does not undergo the operation of a 
transformation involving deletion, as (1.2.11) shows, it 
may thus be regarded as an interrogative, formed as sug- 
gested by Postal and others. 
Arbini argues his point very strongly. He seems to 
say, in effect, that only imperatives can drop subject NP's 
and auxiliaries. This is true if we ignore the aspect of the 
auxiliary will. There is no evidence that will occurs in the 
imperative in the first place. However, the absence of subject 
NP's in the construction may not be due to the action of a 
permutation transformaton. This is particularly so in view of 
the fact that such a permutation transformation presuposses, 
rather incorrectly, that the subject of the imperative sen- 
tence must be mau. 
With regard to tags in imperatives and questions how- 
ever, Arbini fails to come forward with any reason why he 
thinks the sentence in (1.2.9) may be said to be ambiguous 
between question and imperative interpretations, although he 
prefers to regard it only as a tagged question. Chomsky, it 
may be recalled, claims that imperatives are better derived 
from interrogative-like, rather than from declarative-like, 
constructions. Postal -and others 
hold the view that if 
this is done, it will thus be possible to derive tags for the 
constructions, provided that negation does not appear in both 
segments in the case of imperatives. The position which 
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Arbini adopts, however, is that we cannot really know whether 
these tagged constructions are imperatives or not until we 
subject them to the operation of a certain deletion transfor- 
mation. This is a very narrow view to hold because although 
questions do not drop their subject NP's as imperatives do, 
it is not in all circumstances that subjectless imperatives 
can be used without ambiguity or loss of meaning. Further- 
more, although all imperatives may drop their NP's where 
necessary, this is not dependent on the absence of negation 
in them, as we shall see in Chapter Five below. 
Arbini also attacks the suggestion that the modal will 
occurs in the underlying structures of all imperatives. He 
claims that "complementized imperatives"12, for example, have 
no specific modals. He notes that the transformation rela- 
ting to the placement of the for-to complementizer does not 
allow the occurrence of modals in complement sentences, con- 
trary to what happens in the case of that. 
(1.1.14)(a) I command you to stand still. 
(b) I pray that he may be well soon. 
He points out, however, that his claim does not fully account 
for the distribution of the modal will in imperatives. What 
provides a full account, he observes, is Thorne's (1966: 72) 
structure index for imperatives: 
'Def N Imp VP, there being a rule Imp -----> 
will 
the forms with ýi, ý], always having the full form of the 
vocative those with 0 having either the full or the 
reduced form. (Arbini, Op. cit.: 212). 
Thus, imperatives like the following are predicte3 by the 
above rule. 
(1.2.15)(a) You girls will complete your assignment 
tomorrow. 
(b) You girls complete your assignment 
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tomorrow. 
(c) Girls, complete your assignment tomorrow. 
It rejects the following sentence: 
(1.2.16) *Girls, will complete your assignment 
tomorrow. 
The implications of the above rule, according to Arbini, 
are numerous. I summarize them as follows: 
(a) true third person imperatives do occur as 
complement sentences. In their embedded positions, 
imp has been rewritten as 0: 
(1.2.17)(a) He orders Kate to be here tomorrow. 
(b) I command the students to leave the room 
forthwith. 
(b) The modal will always occurs where there is a full 
form of the subject NP, and so it must occur in the 
tags of imperatives; 
(c) there is no deletion of you or will in the initial 
segment of a tagged imperative, as claimed by Klima 
(1964) as well as Katz and Postal (1964); 
(d) tagged imperatives are generated with the help of a 
permutation transformation which operates in the 
following manner (which fleshes out the rule he 
gives). (Cf. Arbini, Op. cit.: 213). 13 
(1.2.18) You - children - will - behave yourselves 
1234 
Behave yourselves, - will - you (not) children 
4312 
In sum, it may be said that Arbini's proposals, some of 
which reflect Thorne's rule, are as follows: 
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(a) a sentence like "You will leave tomorrow" may be 
an imperative; 
(b) to transform it into a tagged imperative, it will 
be necessary to switch around the elements in the 
sentence: "Leave tomorrow, will you". So, no 
deletion is required. 
(c) If the deletion of you and will is carried out as 
required by Katz and Postal when there is not in 
the DS, then it will inevitably generate an ungram- 
matical sentence as in (1.2.11) above; 
(d) As for the sentence in (1.2.12), you cannot regard 
them as tagged imperatives because they are not 
derived in accordance with the above principle of 
permutation. Thus, in each sentence, there are two 
you, s and two will's. 
This in itself raises an interesting question. What is 
the consequence of treating the sentences in (1.2.12) as the 
sources of the imperatives in (1.2.13)? The answer points to 
certain things which Arbini may, perhaps, not want to do: 
(i) he may be obliged to accept the proposal of Lees 
and Hartung that tagged imperatives derive 
from two conjoined sentences, for example, 
(1.2.19) You will sit down, will you sit down? 
(i i) he may also have to accept the deletion of 
certain elements in the sentence -- the initial 
you and will as well as the main verb in the 
second clause. 
So, in effect, we now have three separate, possible ways 
in which the tags of imperatives may be derived: 
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(1) the Katz-Postal proposal -- involving the copying 
of some elements which are deleted later; 
(2) the Lees-Hartung proposal -- involving the 
conjoining of two sentences, and the deletion of 
some of their elements,. and, 
(3) the Arbini proposal -- involving the switching 
around of the" elements of a sentence, and no 
deletion whatsoever. 
It is perhaps in place here to say that all of them 
cannot be correct. So, there is a problem in deciding which 
of them is explanatorily adequate, and which may be rejected. 
Nevertheless, what separates that of Katz and Postal from 
that of Arbini is the fact that the former accepts deletion 
whereas the latter does not. Arbini's proposal does not 
involve a deletion transformation because it does not derive 
its tag for an imperative by copying any element in the main 
part of the sentence to it. Since that of Lees and Hartung 
involves the conjoining of two separate sentences, deletion 
is required in order to derive the required surface forms. 
They all depend on transformations which also allow tagged 
imperatives to be formed by deriving, for example, the sen- 
tence in (1.2.20) through Chomsky"s Question Transformation. 
(1.2.20) Will you come here? 
1- 
This operation can then be followed by switching round the 
elements in the new structure to derive the imperative in 
(1.2.21), in the fashion of Arbini. So, when 1 and 2 inter- 
change positions, we have 
(1.2.21) Come here, will you! 
The tag may contain a negative. 
(1.2.22) Come here, won't you! 
There is no independent motivation for any of these propo"sals. 14 
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Huddleston (1970) supports the proposal which involves 
two conjoined sentences, saying that they are in a paratactic 
relationship (cf. p. 215). His main contribution is his 
suggestion of the kind of question which the second sentence 
is (a yes/no question), and the condition for their conjoi- 
ning (they must "make sense"). 
This suggestion appears to provide a motivation for the 
Lees-Hartung proposal. But this kind of motivation seems to 
be based on pragmatic and semantic considerations only, and 
does not appear to owe anything to the principles of TG. If 
the proposal and the defence of it are acceptable, it is 
probably as a result of their apparent departure from the 
fundamental conventions of TG. Indeed, the existence of two 
clauses in each of these sentences is superficially transpa- 
rent, and so we do not need to postulate underlying struc- 
tures and transformational derivations for them in order to 
capture this fact. I would like to end my discussion of tags 
in imperatives here. I have nothing further to say about the 
structures in the subsequent chapters of the present study. 
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B) The Performative Hypothesis 
The Performative Hypothesis (PH) is discussed here 
because it represents an attempt to investigate the nature of 
sentence types. Again, one of its primary concerns is the 
manner in which sentences are derived. It tries to draw a 
link between the verbs in the highest clauses in the senten- 
ces and the uses to which the sentences themselves are put. 
The postulation of the idea that such a link exists becomes 
the basis of a claim that the deletion of you may be attribu- 
table to its placement in sentences which are used to convey 
commands. Since the Hypothesis covers both syntactic and 
semantic issues, it seems reasonable to discuss it here so 
that it may be easy to make references to it in both parts 
of the chapter. 
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The PH attracts a great deal attention among linguists 
in this period. It is known to have been presented-in diffe- 
rent versions, but its central ideas include the following: 
(a) that the surface sentences of a natural language 
are derived from deep structures in which they are 
complement clauses; 
(b) that they are each dominated in the deep structure 
by a higher performative clause, that is, a clause 
containing a performative verb like order or ask. 
(c) that it is such a performative verb that conveys 
the illocutionary force of each sentence; 
(d) that the illocutionary force of a sentence should 
be treated as a part of the "logical structure" of 
the sentence, and, 
(e) that the higher performative clauses are deleted 
when various sentence types are derived. 
The above views are traceable to a number of linguists 
each of whom is emphatic on one or more of them. Ross (1970) 
is mainly interested in declaratives being derived in this 
way, but thinks that the same thing can still apply to other 
sentences. He comments: 
. every declarative sentence ... will be derived from a deep structure containing as an embedded clause what 
ends up in surface structure as an independent clause. (Ibid.: 224). 
His point is that the sentence in (1.2.23) (Ross's example), 
(1.2.23) Prices slumped. 
should be analysed as an implicit performative as follows 
(Ibid. ). 
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(1.2.24) S 
NP- "` VP 
IV NP 
v 
you 
NP 
S 
+ performative 
ion ä_ a 
t 
Mmul 
+ i }c a t NP VP 
+ rative eci 
prices v 
slumped 
G. Lakoff also shares Ross's views. He suggests that 
all sentence types -- for example declaratives, interroga- 
tives and imperatives -- should be derived from logical 
representations where they function as complements to higher 
performative clauses. With regard to imperatives, he says: 
It is clear that sentences like 'I order you to go home', 
in which there is an overt performative verb, namely "orderº, enters into the same logical relations as a 
sentence like 'Go home' in which there is no overt 
performative verb in the surface form. (G. Lakoff, 
1972: 560). 
It is not clear what he means by logical relations, but 
he appears to be referring to the ideas of Generative Seman- 
tics. He says that Generative Semantics claims that the 
underlying grammatical form of a sentence is the logical form 
of the sentence. If we accept that as correct, he goes on, 
we cannot setarate the study of the logical Loris of senten- 
ces from the study of grammar. The logical forms of sen- 
tences can then be represented in terms of phrase structure 
trees, and the illocutionary forces which they convey can 
also be represented as parts of the logical forms of the 
sentences in the phrase structure trees. However, the per- 
formative verbs may not overtly appear in the surface struc- 
tures of the sentences, he concludes. We therefore have 
trees like the following: 
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(1.2.25) S 
PRED ARG ARG ARG 
I 
1 
er Or d 
Ic 
YS1 
Ask 
State 
or I you (Ibid. ) 
Say 
McCawley claims that the higher performative verb in 
such a sentence, 
(1.2.26) 1 hereby request you to leave here at once 
"specifies the relationships the utterance mediates between 
the speaker and the person spoken to" (1968,1976: 84). 
Turning to the construction in particular, he suggests that 
the morpheme I or Imp should have "the meaning of a verb with 
first person subject and second person indirect object" 
(Ibid. ). His views on the subject may be summarized as 
follows: 
(a) all verbs of ordering are followed by a noun 
phrase you as an indirect object, and an embedded 
sentence, which also has you as its subject; 
(b) then the Equi-NP-Deletion transformation deletes 
the second you as it is preceeded by a co- 
referential NP, you; 
(c) the loss of the subject of the embedded 
(imperative) sentence is a special case of Equi- 
NP-Deletion, and so it is not due to any other 
syntactic operation. 
R. Lakoff seeks to provide independent motivation for 
the proposals on imperatives by referring to the case of 
Latin. Her arguments, according to Sadock (1974: 30), may be 
summarized thus: 
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(a) Latin imperatives use the second person 
subjunctive like VENIAS; 
(b) non occurs in subordinate clauses which 
function as subjects of higher sentences and ne 
in subordinate clauses which function as object 
clauses; 
(c) but ne is also found in independent subjunctive 
clauses with imperative force, and in negative 
imperatives; 
(d) it may therefore be concluded that such sentences 
with ne are subordinate object clauses earlier in 
their derivations, in accordance with (b) above. 
Finally, it appears that Sadock is so convinced by the 
various arguments (including his) that he suggests that the 
abstract label IMPERE should be used to capture the element 
of force shared by all types of imperatives: the elements 
that show that "they indicate that the speaker is prescri- 
bing with his sentence some future course for the addressee" 
(1974: 149-150). 
To comment briefly, I would say there is no doubt that 
the Performative Hypothesis is vigorously put forward by its 
advocates. This perhaps explains one of its weaknesses. It 
attempts to cover several aspects of all sentence types, 
without identifying, methodically, the differences that exist 
among them. As a result, it is vague on a number of issues. 
First, it does not state clearly what it means by the term 
"logical form" and how it is to be captured in a rule-gover- 
ned way. Second, the Hypothesis is not explicit on the 
distinction to be drawn between the meaning and use of a 
sentence; rather, it characterizes the illocutionary force of 
a sentence as if it was an inherent semantic feature of the 
sentence; a feature that the sentence possesses even after 
4 
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the higher performative clause is deleted. This therefore 
creates a very simplistic notion of the sentences of natural 
languages. 
The criticism of the Hypothesis in the literature is 
wide-ranging, and applies equally to all the sentence types, 
including the imperative construction. Nevertheless, I 
intend to concentrate on three of the critics who, together, 
may give us an adequate picture of the other aspects of the 
Hypothesis which many linguists find unacceptable. 
The central point of Anderson's (1971) criticism of the 
PH is that it is mistaken on its views on the nature of the 
notion performative. He thinks that the notion performative 
should be treated as a semantic feature [+ performative] or 
as a semantic category. He explains that the motivation for 
his proposal is the fact that performative verbs, which have 
the features of being 
(i) non-stative, 
(ii) able to appear in imperatives, and, 
(iii) able to appear in the present simple with 
habitual or generic interpretation, and also with 
the interpretation of historic present, 
do preserve their semantic reading of present simple under 
passivization. This claim is borne out by the following 
examples which are the types of structures that the PH 
regards as the source of the imperative: 
(1.2.27)(a) I order you to leave my office. 
(b) I command you to lead the workers out of 
the factory. 
(c) I request you to send for his father 
immediately. 
Under passivization, they become 
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(1.2.28)(a) You are ordered (by me) to leave my office. 
(b) You are commanded (by me) to lead the 
workers out of the factory. 
(C) You are requested (by me) to send for his 
father immediately. 
Anderson therefore accuses the advocates of the PH of 
ascribing to syntax alone what properly belongs to semantics 
as well. He comments: 
The only syntactic characteristic of these verbs[i. e. 
performative verbis their ability to disappear when 
unneeded (in Ross's analysis), and their existence 
remains to be demonstrated before this can be 
considered. (Anderson, 1971: 5). 
He questions the relevance of the Hypothesis to the 
performative/constative distinction. He notes that Austin, 
in his later lectures, draws the conclusion that there is "no 
consistent syntactic correlate of performative utterance" 
(Ibid.: 24). He points out that Austin therefore develops 
his theory of locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary 
forces of an utterance. Austin, he claims, identifies locu- 
tion with the meaning of a sentence or utterance without any 
regard to the context in which it is used, relates the illo- 
cutionary force to the action that is carried out by uttering 
the sentence and regards the perlocutionary force as the 
effect of the utterance on-the addressee. He observes that 
Austin intends the illocutionary and perlocutionary forces to 
be kept separate from the locutionary force -- the sense or 
meaning of the utterance. He explains: 
Locution having been identified with meanin"g, and 
illocution and perlocution with force, h e-TAustin, 19621 
emphasized (p. 100) that "I want to distinguish force 
and meaning in the sense in which meaning is equivalent 
to sense and reference, just as it has become essential to distinguish sense and reference within meaning". 
ti 
erlocutionary forces and the i tudy, I loc . 
t}pnaryand 
: 4). en- ne ong"to at eory of language use. (Ibid. 
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Anderson thus maintains all along that the phenomenon invol- 
ved in the performative analysis is of such a nature that it 
cannot be systematically described within syntax alone. He 
notes that some of the characteristics can also be explained 
within a theory of semantic structure. 
16 
Anderson, I would say, fails to explain a number of 
points. For example, he does not make clear what he means by 
the notion "performative" being semantic. The ability of 
certain verbs to appear in imperatives and retain their 
present simple and historic present under passivization 
cannot be what constitutes the semantic category performa- 
tive. These features clearly pertain to syntax. Again, I 
think that there is certainly no need to question the rele- 
vance of the Hypothesis to the performative/constative dis- 
tinction, for it is such a distinction that gives rise to 
Austin's conception of the notion of illocutonary force. 
Indeed, since the proponents of the PH claim that the illocu- 
tionary force of a sentence is part of the logical form of 
the sentence, it appears that Anderson, in his advocacy of a 
semantic status for the notion "performative", may not be 
saying anything different from what is claimed for illocu- 
tionary force. That this sort of thing has happened is 
perhaps traceable to the vagueness that surrounds most of the 
claims of the Hypothesis, especially with regard to their 
failure to specify clearly how to capture the semantico- 
pragmatic aspects of sentences. 
Fraser (1974), on his part, examines the relationship 
between syntax and the PH. His aim, he says, is to find out 
how the use that a speaker makes of the sentence which he 
utters can be expressed within the grammar of a language. He 
contends that the arguments which have been advanced in 
favour of the Hypothesis are inadequate. He says, for exam- 
ple, that the claim by Ross that the perf'ormative verb occurs 
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in the topmost clause in the sentence is not borne out by the 
following examples (1974: 3). 
(1.2.29)(a) I regret that I must inform you of your 
dismissal. 
(b) I am pleased to be able to offer you the 
job. 
(c) Let me point out that I admit you're right. 
(d) I would like to congratulate you. 
This argument can be extended to the structures which the PH 
claims to be the sources of imperatives. 
(1.2.30)(a) It has been decided to request you to ask 
for voluntary retirement. 
(b) I have been instructed to inform you to 
order the prostesters out of the hall. 
(c) It is interesting to note that the 
committee has decided to request you to 
command the soldiers for the time being. 
As in the examples in (1.2.29), the highest clauses in the 
sentences in (1.2.30) do not contain performative verbs. 
After examining other issues in the Hypothesis, Fraser 
comes to the conclusion that 
(a) no linguist has shown any evidence that the 
Performative Analysis has the capacity to pair 
sentences with their illocutionary forces; 
(b) contrary to what Ross claimed, the notion of 
Performative Analysis is not syntactically 
motivated, and that 
(c) although the Performative Analysis falls within 
Generative Semantics, what is really at issue is 
"how are the generalizations between sentence sense 
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and sentence force best captured? " (Ibid.: 38). 
I think that the criticisms by Fraser of the the PH are 
relevant. As for the force of a sentence, it has been 
pointed out that a sentence does not have any particular 
force attaching to it (see Huddleston, 1976). With regard to 
the sense of of a sentence, I shall indicate in Chapter Two 
how it can be captured, and the semantic sections in the 
present analysis, especially the Model Theoretic interpre- 
tations which I shall provide in Chapter Five, will provide 
examples. 
Gazdar criticizes the PH on the grounds that it fails 
to meet both "semantic and pragmatic standards of adequacy" 
as is required of all "semantic and pragmatic explanans 
for syntactic phenomena" (1979: 18). He attacks many aspects 
of the theory, three of which I shall summarize here because 
they are relevant to the imperative construction. 17 
He takes up the aspect he describes as follows (Ibid.: 
19): 
(i) "The clause contains I and you". 
Gazdar here restates the criticisms which other linguists 
level against the above claim. He refers to both Anderson 
(1971) and Matthews (1972) who note that performative verbs 
can accept singular or plural subjects and indirect objects. 
Gazdar also points out Matthews' observation that the sen- 
tence, * 
(1.2.31) You will go home 
will thus become four ways ambiguous. Lakoff's (1972) sug- 
gestion that variables which are marked as first- and second- 
person should be used for subject and indirect object respec- 
tively is also rejected by Gazdar. He recalls Dahl"s (1972) 
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remark that this suggestion does not change the situation 
because it is the contextual co-ordinates of I and you, which 
are thus eliminated, that decide the assignment co-ordinates 
that replace them. He adds that in any case there are many 
performative sentences where the first-person NP is not the 
subject and the second-person NP is not the indirect object. 
There is an example of this in (1.2.17)(a) above. 
I would say, despite Gazdar's criticism, that there is 
still some substance in Lakoff's suggestions, if we use the 
variables for strictly syntactic analysis of the phenomenon, 
and not for semantic or pragmatic analysis where contextual 
considerations are called for. It is very misleading to 
think that what matters about the subject and indirect object 
in an imperative construction is the referent of each of the 
NP's rather than the manner in which he or she is particula- 
rized. We shall learn very little about the nature of the 
imperative construction unless we can identify clearly how 
the subject NPs in particular are specified. 18 
Another aspect of the PH to which Gazdar directs his 
attention is the following claim (Op. cit.: 27). 
(ii) The performative verb represents the 
illocutionary force of the sentence". 
He claims that this proposal is the main semantic motivation 
for the PH. He points out that the alternative to main- 
taining it is to "revert to the use of merely syntactically 
motivated IMPERATIVE and INTERROGATIVE morphemes in the: -deep 
structures of a transformational grammar". (Ibid. ). But the 
question now, he argues, is how it can be supported. He 
gives a list of sentences with the illocutionary force of 
requesting. He observes that the proponents of the Hypo- 
thesis cannot explain how the sentences have come to have 
that kind of force. His list includes the following (Ibid. ): 
35 
(1.2.32)(a) Close the door. 
(b) I request you to close the door. 
(c) Why don't you close the door. 
(d) Will you close the door. 
Gazdar however concedes the point that a sentence like 
(1.2.32)(a) may be said to have derived from a deep structure 
containing a performative verb like the one-in (1.2.32)(b). 
He however notes that the other sentences are problematic for 
the PH. He then suggests many ways out of the problem. 
These include the attempt of Sadock (1970) to provide a 
schema for capturing the illocutionary force of request-type 
sentences like (1.2.32)(d) -- (p. 235). 
(1.2.33) ((I ASK you (you will (you close the door)) ) 
and (I REQUEST you (you close the door)) ). 
Gazdar observes (p. 28) that Green (1973) also sug- 
gests something similar to handle sentences like 
(1.2.32)(c). 
(1.2.34) (I REQUEST you ((you close the door) (or (you 
tell me (why you do not close the door))))). 
Gazdar rejects both proposals as unworkable, and declares: 
I do not intend to discuss how these proposals fail to handle the data because it seems to me that deep 
structures like ... [ (1.2.33, ) ] and ... [ (1.2.34) ] stand as their own reducio ad absurdum. (Ibid.: 28). 
He adds that even if they handle the syntax adequately, they 
should still be rejected, for example, on the grounds that 
they lack simplicity, generality and motivation. 
Gazdar explains that the advocates of the PH may even 
argue that sentences like (1.2.32) (c) and (1-2-32)(d) 
don't in themselves have-. the" iIlocut-ionary force of request 
but are, in fact, assertions or questions (according as 
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to whether they are declarative or interrogative respec- 
tively). Their "request" force is actuall a perlocu- 
tionary effect of their utterance. (Ibid. 1. 
He goes on to say that this kind of defence is "merely termi- 
nological" because there is no independent criterion for 
distinguishing perlocutionary from illocutionary forces. 
Consequently, the whole argument, he claims, is circular; it 
is something of a "misuse of Austin's terminology" (Ibid). 
I would say Gazdar is right in his criticism of the PH 
as indicated above. Indeed, the proposals by Sadock and 
Green are nothing more than attempts to create speech con- 
texts for the sentences concerned. This of course demon- 
strates in no uncertain terms the general orientation of the 
PH towards pragmatics. 
The last of the three aspects which I want to review 
here is set out by Gazdar (Ibid.: 29) as follows. 
(iii) "Illocutionary force is semantic". 
Gazdar totally rejects this proposal. He points out that no 
syntactic evidence or motivation has been advanced to support 
it. He also rejects G. Lakoff, s (1975) suggestion that some 
forms of model-theoretic apparatus may be able to handle 
matters relating to the truth conditions of performatives. 
He contends that there has been no attempt anywhere to pro- 
vide such a semantic representation which sets out felicity 
or truth conditions, let alone show that such a representa- 
tion can be adequate. 
Gazdar expresses the opinion that these claims cannot be 
supported. First, even if the connection between the illocu- 
tionary force expressed by a sentence and the felicity condi- 
tions (that is, the factors which make the uttering of a 
sentence appropriate) is semantic, the onus is still on the 
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proponents of the PH to prove that such a semantics will work 
for both deleted and undeleted performatives.. He concludes 
by conceding the fact that a great deal of work still needs 
to be done about finding out the interconnection between 
syntax and semantics before it can be decided which of 
the competing analyses of sentences will emerge as adequate. 
It is revealing to note that six years after Gazdar made 
the above observations on the study of sentence types, the situ- 
ation has remained pretty much the same. I am of the opinion 
that with regard to the study of sentence types, TG (the 
theoretical model assumed by the studies we have come across 
so far) is handicapped by these elements, deep structures, on 
which it heavily relies. Their existence necessitates 
deletion devices, and so, analyses which assume these two 
features of TG seem to lack the ability to capture the 
semantic aspects of the sentences of natural languages. It 
is necessary to make clear that a distinction is being drawn 
between sentences as single units which fall into differen- 
tiable types and the elements of sentences like subject and 
object NP"s. One of the explicit examinations of the role of 
deep structures in the literature is Huddleston (1976). It has 
been claimed for these structures that they can resolve 
syntactic ambiguities and show some paraphrase relations 
between sentences-- claims that have already come under 
attack; for example, there is the suggestion about a lexical 
or non-transformational approach to passive constructions. 
Huddleston gives this explanation: 
In saying that it is the deep structure functions that determine meaning we are making the weaker but neverthe- less important claim that the rules which relate the 
sy tactic structure of a sentence to its meaning will interpret the semantic role of an element on the basis 
of its funet}on in deep structure not in surface (or intermediate) structure. huddles on, 1976: 
W. 
tie then examines some sentences and observes that there 
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is "a constant semantic role" which can be identified with a 
particular NP which is either subject or object in the sen- 
tences. The Katz-Fodor (1963) projection rules also have 
this orientation towards individual lexical items and their 
syntactic functions in sentences in their account of the 
"meaning" of a sentence. 
The issue, it seems to me, is therefore not only that- 
illocutionary force is not semantic, but also that the ana- 
lysts fail to use appropriate theoretical models to provide 
such a semantic account even if it was semantic. What is 
involved here is not the identification of the behaviour of 
certain lexical elements in certain sentences as we have seen 
above, but the provision of a general framework within which 
the semantic representation of the sentences can be located 
according to their grammatical mood categories. 19 
The idiosyncratic nature of the various sentences cannot 
be seriously denied. The advocates of the PH, despite their 
mistaken notions about the nature of illocutionary forces, 
seem to have realized such a uniqueness among sentence types, 
hence their postulation of different illocutionary forces for 
different sentence types. There is reason therefore to 
regard the imperative sentence as unique (see Culicover, 
1976), 20 
1.3 The Second Half of the Seventies and the Early Eighties. 
A) Auxiliaries 
Of necessity, we first of all go back briefly to an 
earlier period in order to have a full picture of the main 
developments in the generative account of another aspect of the 
construction. One such development has to do with the analy- 
sis of Stockwell et al (1973) of auxiliaries in imperatives. 
39 
What is significant in this regard is the element "SJC" which 
they claim exists in the deep structure of imperatives. They 
say that this element is "distinctive with both modal and 
tense" and go on to explain: 
Thus, we do not qenerate a modal such as will in the 
deep structure of imperatives, but a separat s- form 
which behaves in certain respects like modals (in AUX- 
INVERSION) and in certain respects like affixes (in 
AFFIX-SHIFT and DO-SUPPORT). (Ibid.: 635). 
The SJC is said to occur in the AUX of imperative sen- 
tences and those of that-complements which follow words like 
suggest and move, and not to have any morphological effects 
on the forms of their main verbs: 
(1.3.1)(a) I request that the prisoner (SJC) be set 
free. 
(b) I move that the society (SJC) be disbanded. 
The main function of the SJC, they claim, is to prevent 
sentences from acquiring indicative forms. 
(1.3.2)(a) ?I request that the prisoner is set free. 
(b) ?I move that the society is disbanded. 
Stockwell et al also claim that the presence of the SJC 
in the AUX of imperatives makes it unnecessary to postulate I 
or IMP in sentence-initial positions, as Katz and Postal, as 
well as Thorne, suggest. They then construct a new rule, 
called IMPERATIVE-SUBJ-AUX-INVERSION, which follows affix- 
switching. They explain: 
Since SJC acts as an affix it will then be available for 
inversion with the sub ect only if there is a NEG or 
MPH present to prevent 5rom moving onto the verb. 
Stockwell et al, 1973: 
bb2 
. 
Therefore, in the derivation of 
(1.3.3) You sit down 
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we will have, after AUX-ATTRACTION, the string, 
(1.3.4) SJC you sit down 
only if there is EMPH present in the sentence. As an affix, 
the SJC is prevented from moving onto the verb by you in 
(1.3.4) and so, according to them, it triggers off DO-SUPPORT 
in order to form a string like 
(1.3.5) Do - SJC - you - sit - down. 
Consequently, we may have, as an imperative, the grammatical 
sentence in (1.3.6) (a), if you is deleted, or the ungramma- 
tical sentence in (1.3.6)(b), if it is not. 
(1.3.6) (a) Do, sit down. 
(b) *Do you sit down. 
It may be observed that we have so far seen nothing 
unique about the function of the SJC. But this will now 
change. The SJC is also given some blocking powers. It is 
not permissible to delete it (thus making the sentence in 
question ungrammatical) if (a), the imperative subject NP 
lacks the feature [+II person], as in the following exam- 
ples, 
(1.3.7) *Your wife stand up 
and (b), the referent of the subject NP is not an agent of 
the action indicated in the sentence. For example, 
(1.3.8) *Be short. 
Condition (b), I would say, takes the issue outside the 
realm of syntax. The point that is raised by (1.3.8) is not 
whether or not the referent of an imperative subject NP can 
be the agent of the action indicated in the sentence but that 
the whole idea conveyed by the sentence is simply incon- 
ceivable. Neither the referent nor any other person can be 
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the agent. As for condition (a), it is claimed, as we saw 
above, that other NPs, apart from the second person pronoun, 
can also function as the subjects of imperatives. I am 
leaving this issue open until Chapter Three where it will be 
examined in detail. 
Stockwell et al however point out that the constraints 
do not apply to what they call "embedded imperatives" which 
they say may still have, as subjects, NPs which do not 
possess the feature [+ II person]. 
(1.3.9)(a) I suggest that she drop the case. 
(b) It is obligatory that he go at once. 
It must be pointed out that Stockwell et el 
fail to give any reason why they think the nature of the 
subjects of imperatives varies between embedded and non-embed- 
ded imperatives. Since they claim that imperative subject 
NP's must have the feature [+ II person], they should also 
make such a constraint applicable to all varieties of the 
sentence, at least for the sake of the principle of genera- 
lity. Their failure to do so raises the question whether 
sentences like those in (1.3.9) contain embedded imperatives. 
Culicover (1976) also discusses AUX and the auxiliaries 
in imperatives, but in relation to You Deletion. His conten- 
tion is that imperatives lack AUX both in the underlying and 
at the surface structures. He comments: 
Notice ... that You. Deletion can apply only in the main clauses, and thatt cannot apply when either there is 
tense marked on the verb or there is a modal present; (Culicover, 1976: 149). 
He gives the following examples. (Ibid. ): 
(1.3.10) *Will 
*Can 
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*Must 
(a) 
*Might 
*Should 
*Ought to 
*Have to 
*Be going to 
(b) *Got off of my foot! 
(c) *Are polite. 
Be polite. 
He claims that since tensed verbs are not grammatical in 
(1.3.10) and the bare, infinitival form occurs in 
(1.3.10)(c), imperatives have no TENSE. He also claims that 
they are AUX-less. He then explains that this makes it 
possible for You Deletion to take place. He declares: 
The assumption that imperatives lack AUX would require 
us to state a special transformation to insert do in 
examples such as [(1.3.11)]. (Ibid. ). - 
(1.3.11) Do 
(a) Don't have a piece of pizza with your 
Do not beer. 
Do 
(b) Don't be here when the band begins to 
Do not play. 
Culicover also says that non-second person subjects may 
be accommodated within imperatives because they are AUX-less. 
(1.3.12)(a) Everybody look at me. (IMPERATIVE) 
(b) Everybody looks at me. (DECLARATIVE) 
He claims that do is not in the underlying structure of 
subjunctives. (Ibid.: 151). 
(1.3.13)(a) It is important that Bill be polite. 
(b) *It is important that Bill do not be polite. 
(c) It is mandatory that Mary have seen you 
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" before noon. 
(d) *It is mandatory that Mary do not have seen 
you before noon. 
With these kinds of examples, Culicover contends that 
the subjunctive lacks both TENSE and modals, and that Do 
Replacement does not apply to them, as indicated by the 
positions of not and have'and be. He therefore claims that 
the do of imperatives does not occur in the deep structures, 
just as the analysis of Stockwell et al implies. He then 
expresses the opinion that the Do Insertion transformation 
may be satisfactory, as far as imperatives are concerned, but 
adds that such a rule will be ad-hoc in nature. 
I would say however that the fact that imperatives 
lack modal auxiliaries is observable from the appearance of 
the constructions themselves. But the proposal that they 
also lack AUX node raises a theoretical problem for which 
there can only be a theoretical solution. There are several 
suggestions on how to resolve the problem. It affects many 
more sentence types than imperatives, but I intend to concen- 
trate on those aspects of it that relate to the imperative. 
As far as imperatives are concerned, the elements in 
question now (after the modals have been eliminated from such 
matters) are do, be and have. The position of do has hardly 
changed since Chomsky's original suggestion in 1955. TG ana- 
lysts may still insert it but it is not clear how this can be 
done in imperatives if they are regarded as AUX-less. The Do 
Insertion rule proposed by Emonds (1976: 211) is not applica- 
ble to imperatives since the rule requires the presence of 
TENSE in the sentence, and imperatives are believed to be 
tenseless. 21 This is a non-trivial matter for, as far as I 
lniow, nobody has proposed a rule for the insertion of do into 
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imperatives since they are characterized as tenseless and 
AUX-less. Culicover's observation that such a rule would be 
ad-hoc in nature simply acknowledges the problem. 
Underlying all this is the old problem as to whether or 
not imperatives have auxiliaries. Lees (1964), we may 
recall, thinks that they have a zero modal, Imp; Other 
devices have also been suggested. (See Culicover, 1971, 
Stockwell et all 1973, and Ukaji, 1978). What is significant 
here is that Davies (1981) sees in this situation some evi- 
dence that these linguists hold the position that imperatives 
have an AUX but are tenseless. On the basis of this, she 
characterizes the imperative sentence as having the features 
[+AUX], [-TENSE) in COMP, after the fashion of Pullum and 
Wilson (1977). So, in line with the treatment of auxiliaries 
as main verbs, she seeks to extend the Pullum-Wilson proposal 
to imperatives by suggesting that do, be and have should be 
capable of occurring in the "-THAT, -TO complement of a 
higher verb". (Op. cit.: 313). She concludes: 
Finally, to capture the fact that do will ultimately not 
appear before be or have except in"tmperatives, we can 
postulate a rum which will raise be or have to replace 
do in a tensed X. (Ibid. ). -- 
Her proposal, she claims, correctly predicts the generation 
of the following sentences (p. 312). 
(1.3.14)(a) Don't be silly. 
(b) Don't have eaten it all before they arrive. 
A brief comment is in place here. Davies's suggestion 
that the occurrence of do before be and have must be blocked 
for sentences which are not imperatives is significant. It 
must be pointed out however that it is not clear how impera- 
tives like those in (1.3.14) are predicted by her proposal. 
There must be a rule to capture the situation presented by do 
in imperatives (i. e., its ability to occur before be and have 
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in the imperative sentences only). Davies fails to provide 
such a rule. Furthermore, she fails to identify the conse- 
quences which her characterization of do as a main verb will 
have on its relationship with, for example, negation in the 
imperative. 
Another suggestion about do in imperatives is made by 
Schmerling (1980). She claims that the do of imperatives is 
unique to them. Her approach avoids the theoretical pro- 
blems which beset the analyses that seek generalizations 
between imperatives and other sentence types. She claims 
that one of the peculiarities of this do is the fact that it 
co-occurs with be. She however does not say that the impera- 
tive is AUX-less, but avoids the problem relating to Do- 
Insertion. 
As for don't, Schmerling claims that it is an imperative 
morpheme which occurs in colloquial imperatives. She 
observes: 
We have thus identified a special negative marker for English imperatives. (Ibid.: 23). 
This is similar to the claim of Gazdar et al working within 
the framework of GPSG. They comment: 
.. ize are following Cohen (1976) in assuming that the don t which shows up in imperatives is synchronically 
quit distinct from the tensed negative auxiliary verb found in declaratives and interrogatives. (Gazdar, 
Pullum and Sag, 1980: 36). 
(1.1.15)(a) you don't wrap it up. [DECLARATIVE] 
(b) Don't wrap it up. [IMPERATIVE) 
Interesting questions are raised here about the nature 
of do and TENSE in the imperative to which I shall return in 
Chapter Four. It will be necessary to find out not only the 
features of verbs that can occur in the sentence but also 
those of the VP-constituent itself in the construction. 
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To conclude-this subsection, I examine the general trend 
in the treatment of be and have within TG in this period. The 
tendency now is to "raise" them in the manner of Emonds 
(1976). However, Akmajian et al (1979) introduce some new 
ideas into the analysis of verbs. They postulate three 
levels of verbal elements -- V11 V2 and V3. Their base rule 
for sentences is as follows. (p. 21). 
(1.3.16) S -----> NP AUX V3 
AUX -----> 
Tense do t3 
Modal 
yn -----> 
+V 
Vrt-1 ... 
+AUX 
e feature complex is realized as have or be. 
([+\hi) 
Th 
They explain: 
Tke perfect have is strictly subcategorized tQ require 
V complements; the progressive be requires V 
complements; and the passive be must be immediately followed by a main verb. (Ibit1-: 21). 
So, they generate the verb phrase as follows: 
(1.3.17) V3 
(have) V2 
(be) Vi 
(be) 
Applying this proposal to imperatives, they claim that 
the relevant verb phrase is V2. They stress that V2, as an 
instance of the schematic PS rule in (1.3.16), is generated 
as follows: 
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V2 
(be) V1 
in which be is optional. The rule is able to generate an 
imperative like 
(1.3.19) Close your eyes 
if be does not occur. But if be does occur, the rule will 
generate imperatives like the following: 
(1.3.20) Be following me all along the way. 
They however claim that imperatives involving perfect have 
are grammatically unacceptable, although they are not seman- 
tically unreasonable. They would therefore star a sentence 
like the following. 
(1.3.21) *Have replaced the book before the day runs 
out. 
They also express the view that imperative sentences have no 
3 constituent AUX and cannot contain the verb phrase V. 
I would say by limiting the imperative verb phrase to 
V2, Akmajian et al restrict the element that can appear 
higher than the lexical verb in the imperative to be. Presu- 
mably, the negative would be inserted. But in the impera- 
tive, negation usually requires the presence of do. 22 Akma- 
jian et al accept Do-Replacement (see Emonds, 1976, and 
Culicover, 1976), but fail to say how this may be applied to 
imperatives since they are believed to be AUX-less. If the 
grammar is to generate sentences like 
(1.3.22)(a) Do listen to me. 
(b) Do sit down. 
some form of Do-Insertion rule may be necessary, and so we 
are back to the old problem of writing an "ad-hoc" rule for 
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the imperative construction. The reasonable attitude to 
adopt, it appears, is to recognize the uniqueness of the 
imperative construction, as Schmerling (1980) does, and so 
accept that the do that occurs in it is special. It however 
remains to be shown (see Chapter Four below) in what ways it 
is special. 
The treatment of do in the imperative is thus a serious 
problem for analyses which use the framework of TG. In order 
to resolve it, certain syntactic generalizations (i. e., the 
conditions for Do Insertion) may have to be abandoned. This 
may however have some upsetting effects on the grammar. For 
example, it is difficult, in the case of Akmajian et al, to 
support (as they now do) do replacement by be and have and 
then turn round to postulate a device which can replace be by 
do in imperative phrase-markers which contain do. In their 
rule schema, only be is allowed to occur before lexical verbs 
in imperatives. In fact, this special replacement of be by 
do would have to take place in the case of the sentences in 
(1.3.22). However, even if do replaces be in order to gene- 
rate such sentences, it may still be necessary to have a Do- 
Insertion rule in order to generate the imperatives in 
(1.3.23). 
(1.3.23)(a) Do be reasonable 
(b) Don't be lazy 
So, the problem of how to insert do into phrase-markers for 
imperatives in TG is again raised. Therefore, one of the 
major problems that the study of imperatives faces is not 
that it has been ignored in recent years as Schmerling (1983) 
claims, but that TG analysts find many aspects of the aenten- 
ces very problematic. 23 
B) Stative Verbs and Negative Preverbs 
The last topic I want to consider in this part of the 
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review relates to the treatment of certain verbs and adverbs 
in relation to the imperative construction. This is a topic 
that is first raised by Kiparsky (1963) in TG. The discus- 
sion must therefore begin from the early sixties. Kiparsky 
claims that verbs like want, hope and understand (which are 
commonly referred to as stative verbs) cannot also occur in 
imperative verb phrases. 
(1.3.24)(a) *Want a sports car. 
(b) *Hope Sam arrives today. 
(c) *Understand that times have changed. 
It must be noted, however, that this claim cannot be 
pursued very far because words cannot easily be marked Sta- 
tive or dynamic outside the context of use, as the following 
examples demonstrate. 
(1.3.25)(a) Understand my position. 
(b) Hope for the best. 
Kiparsky also claims that an adverb like surprisingly cannot 
occur in imperatives. 
(1.3.26) *Report in the office tomorrow surprisingly. 
There are also certain other adverbs noted by Katz 
and Postal (1964) as well as Lees (1964) which appear to 
support Kiparsky"s view that one of the features of 
imperatives is their inability to accept certain adverbs. This 
class of adverbs includes hardly, scarcely and almost. 
(1.3.27) (a) *Hardly close the door. 
(b) *Scarcely look at me. 
(c) *Almost come here. 
As noted above, Arbini (1969) claims they are not present in 
sentence structures from which tagged imperatives are 
derived. They are at times called negative preverbs; Emonds 
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(1976) calls them "scarcely adverbials" (p. 163), and one of 
their distinguishing features, which he notes, is the fact 
that they do not follow the verbs that they modify. 
(1.3.28)(a) He rarel goes late to work. 
(b) *He goes late rarely to work. 
However, they render the sentences in (1.3.27) ungrammatical, 
despite the fact that they occur preverbally. The question 
that remains to be answered, therefore, is why they are 
unable to occur in imperative sentences. 
Schreiber (1972) discusses the distribution of adverbs 
in imperatives. He identifies two categories of imperatives, 
(i) command imperatives, for example, 
(1.3.29)(a) Keep off from the main roads 
(b) I command you to keep off from the main 
roads 
and (ii), hortative imperatives, for example, 
(1.3.30) Be glad they have come back. 
This division, he points out, is not to be seen as 
clear-cut. Only hortative imperatives, he claims, admit 
"style" adjuncts, as in (1.3.32), 
Frankly j 
Honestly be glad that all is well Confidentially 
but command imperatives do not. 
Frankly ) 
(1.3.32) * Honestly ) report for work tomorrow. 
Truthfully 
Davies (1981) comments rather briefly on the case of 
hardly and scarcely. She says that their unacceptability in 
imperatives is perhaps caused by the "meaning relations" in. 
51 
0 
the sentences rather than by any general syntactic characte- 
ristic of such sentences. 
It is necessary, I should say, to specify what these 
meaning relations are. Davies does not specify them. She 
also fails to say what these meaning relations specifically 
have to do with the unique nature of these sentences, since 
it is not the case that these adverbs cannot co-occur with 
certain verbs in other sentences. 
(1.3.33)(a) *Rarely speak to her. (IMPERATIVE] 
(b) She rarely speaks to him. (DECLARATIVE] 
The co-occurrence relation between rarely and the verb speak 
is acceptable in the declarative sentence. The issues raised 
here will be investigated further in Chapter Five. 
To conclude this part of the chapter, it may be said 
that there have been many developments in the treatment of 
the syntax of the imperative in generative grammar. Thus, 
after the initial ideas of Chomsky (1955,1975) on certain 
aspects of the sentences, namely, his ideas on 
(a) the generation of the imperative structure; 
(b) the nature of the imperative subject NP which he 
restricts to the second person pronoun; 
(c) the presence and role of modal auxiliaries in 
imperatives; 
(d) the sort of adverbs that can occur in the 
construction, and, 
(e) the nature and behaviour of do, 
(see Section 1.1 above), there are now corresponding proposals 
suggesting that 
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(a') sentences may be generated on the basis of the 
claims of the Performative Hypothesis; 
(b") some other NP's, for example, the third person 
indefinite NP's, can also occur as subjects; 
(c') imperatives lack not only modal auxiliaries but 
also an AUX node; 
(d") certain adverbs which do not occur in imperatives 
have also been identified, and that 
(e') the do that occurs in imperatives is unique to 
them. 
The general orientation and direction of these proposals 
tend towards a rejection of Chomsky's original suggestions. 
For example, no modal auxiliary is ever known to occur in 
front of the lexical verb in an imperative sentence, and so 
such an auxiliary should not have been postulated in impera- 
tives in TG accounts in the first place. This also applies 
to the postulation of you as the only subject NP for all 
imperatives, when the observable forms of the sentences lend 
no support to such a claim. 
24 We have also seen that it is 
not unreasonable to conclude from all the available evidence 
so far (for example, the features of the verbs, adverbs and 
NP's occurring in the sentences) that imperatives are an 
idiosyncratic sentence type, contrary to the views that have 
been expressed by Davies (1981). 
The above developments xiotwithstanding, there are still 
many problems surrounding the imperative construction with 
regard to the structure of the sentence, the nature of its 
subject NP and the internal structural organization of its 
VP. Several of the current proposals on these issues in TG 
are vague and inadequate, and there is a serious doubt about 
the possibility of the TG model for syntax being exploited 
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fruitfully to deal with these problems. Chapter Two below 
examines, among other things, the problem of the choice of 
suitable grammatical models for the characterizaton of sen- 
tence types in natural languages, with special reference to 
the imperative in English. I now take up the semantic 
aspects of the construction. 
1.4 The Semantic Analysis of Non-Declaratives 
A) Frege and the Question of Truth 
As pointed out in the introduction to the present 
chapter, the controversy about the semantic nature of non- 
declaratives, including imperatives, antedates the advent of 
generative grammars. Frege (1892) argues that imperatives 
and optatives do not raise "the question of truth". They do 
not express any thought. He says that he does "not want to 
deny sense to an imperative sentence" (1952: 12); neverthe- 
less, he points out, it does not have any truth value. 
B) Constatives and Performatives 
The above controversy still goes on. For example, 
Austin (1962) classifies utterances into two broad catego- 
ries: Performatives and Constatives. He explains that the 
latter are mainly used to make statements. They can 
"describe" some state of affairs or state some facts", and 
they have to do this "either truly or falsely" (p. 1). 
Examples of these utterances are as follows: 
(1.4.1)(a) John is at home. 
(b) Human beings walk. 
(c) John has bought a house. 
In contrast, he describes Performatives as follows: 
A. they do not "describe" or "report" or constate 
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anything at all, are not "true or false"; and 
B. the uttering of the sentence is, or is part of, the 
doing of an action, which again would not normally 
be described as saying something. (Ibid.: . 
Such sentences include the following: 
(1.4.2) (a) I hereby order you to withdraw from the 
contest immediately. 
(b) I hereby request that this matter be closed. 
(c) I hereby request you to report for work 
tomorrow morning.. 
1.5 The Sentence-Radical and the Paraphrased Performative 
Approaches 
A) The Nature of Meaning 
Linguists and some philosophers now begin to take 
an interest in the debate (by the early sixties). In this 
period too, they also begin to apply the much older tradition 
of Categorial Grammar with some interesting results. Some of 
the issues that engage their attention are problems like 
(1) what sort of thing is a meaning? 
(2) What is the form of a semantic rule whereby 
meanings of compounds are built up from the 
meanings of their constituent parts? (Lewis, 1972: 
169). 
These sorts of questions inevitably confront linguists 
and semanticists with the problem created by the distinctions 
between declaratives and non-declaratives, and the attendant 
problem of deciding the sort of semantical object that an 
imperative is. With the great interest they now take in 
referential or model-theoretic semantics, in the sixties and 
the early seventies (see, for example, Carnap, 1963; Kripke, 
1963; Kaplan, 1964; Montague, 1960,1968 and 1970; Scott, 
1970 and Lewis, 1972); 25 with Cnomslty's (1955) characteri- 
zation of imperatives as 'derived, elliptical sentences; with 
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the claims of the Katz-Postal Hypothesis, and with the propo- 
sals put out by the protagonists of the Performative Hypothe- 
sis, as seen above, we can say that the analysis of the syntax 
and semantics of sentences, including the imperative, has 
become a major problem. It is now as much a linguistic 
issue as it is a philosophical one. There are several sug- 
gestions as to how to resolve it. 
Stenius (1967) and other researchers are inclined to 
think that sentences of different types possess something 
like a common core. Stenius calls it "the sentence-radical". 
Searle (1969) goes further to claim that this core meaning is 
recoverable in the that-clauses in structures in which the 
sentences -- declaratives, imperatives and interrogatives -- 
are complements. 
(1.5.1)(a) You are a boy I say that you are, a boy. 
(b) Stand up! I order that you stand uff. 
(c) Will you stand up? I request that you 
stand up. 
The fact that this idea also surfaces in the PH does indicate 
that it is very widespread in this period. In Generative 
Semantics, linguists use the notion of the logical form of a 
sentence in their analyses. 
Lewis (1972) claims that the first thing to know about 
"the meaning of the English sentence" is "the conditions 
under which it would be true' (p. 169). He describes the 
analysis of meaning as consisting of two topics: 
... first, the description of possible languages or grammars as abstract semantic sstems whereby symbols 
are associated with aspects of 
the 
world; and second the description of the psychological and sociological facts whereby a particular one of these abstract 
semantic systems is the one used by a person or a population. (Ibid.: 170). 
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The first is the referential or model-theoretic approach, 
with a long tradition dating back to Frege (1892), Ajdukie- 
wicz (1935), and Tarski (1936). It is Montague's version of 
it that I intend to use for the semantics of the imperative 
in English in the present study. It will be referred to as 
Montague Semantics (MS). 
Referring specifically to the treatment of non-declara- 
tives, Lewis modifies his earlier claim that the meaning of a 
sentence "was at least that which determines the conditions 
under which the sentence is true or false" (Ibid.: 205). He 
claims that only declaratives may be referred to as true or 
false and then concludes that if commands and questions (and 
others) do not have truth values, it will not be correct to 
say "that their meanings determine their truth conditions" 
(Ibid. ). 
B) The Representation of Meaning 
Lewis cites the sentence-radical theory of Stenius as 
one of the possible approaches to the representation of 
meaning in sentences. In it, he notes, all sentences are 
broken up into two parts. He says these are 
a sentence-radical that specifiep a state of affa rs and 
a mood nat deter ines whether the speaker is declaring that-the state of affairs holds, commanding that it hold, asking whether it holds, or what. (Ibid.: 206). 
Lewis then refers to the following sentences (Ibid. ), 
(l'. 5.2)(a) You are late. 
(b) Be late! 
(c) Are you late? 
as having a "common sentence-radical". This sentence radical 
thus identifies the state of affairs of "your being late';, 
except that the moods are different. He gives the base 
structure of the sentences as follows: 
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(1.5.3) SENTENCE 
MOOD S 
declarative S/N N 
ýimp e--ra ie in rögarive 
(S/N)/(C/C) C/C you 
.Il be late (Lewis, op. cit.: 206) 
He explains that S stands for the sentence radical, and that 
the different moods trigger off "different transformations of 
the sentence radical, leading to the different sentences 
above". He claims that the sentence is not declarative, 
although it may be represented on the surface as "that you 
are late" (Ibid. ). He then concludes: 
It is sentence radicals that have truth-values as 
extensions, functions from indices to truth-values as intensions, and meanings with the category S and an S- 
intension at the topmost node. (Ibid. ). 
Nevertheless, it is only the sentence radicals of dec- 
laratives that can have truth values; those of imperatives 
and other non-declaratives still cannot. The semantics of 
mood, he notes, is rather different for it pertains only to 
rules of language use. As Stenius puts it, if a person in an 
appropriate position of power addresses a sentence (which 
represents the form MOOD IMPERATIVE PLUS S-MEANING M) to you, 
it is the case that you may act in such a manner as to make 
M true in that state of affairs. 
Lewis says however that he prefers his own approach in 
which meanings are seen in terms of base structures. He 
gives the following examples: 
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(1.5.4) S 
SIN N 
II 
(SIN) INS NS 
command you 
ask whether 
(Ibid.: 207) 
He claims that meanings like these may be represented by 
performative sentences, in the style of Austin (1962), thus 
(P. 208): 
(1.5.5)(a) I command you to be late. 
(b) I ask you whether you are late. 
From these performatives, the following non-declaratives are 
transformationally derived (Ibid. ). 
(1.5.6) (a) 
(b) 
He declares: 
Be late! 
Are you late? 
I propose that these non-declaratives ought to be 
treated as paraphrases of the corresponding 
performatives having the same base structure, meaning, 
intension, and truth-value at an index or on an 
occasion. And I propose that there is no difference in kind between the meanings of these performatives and 
non-declaratives and the meanings of the ordi ary 
declarative sentences considered previously. 
(Ibid.: 
208) 
He also claims that if performatives are declarative in 
structure, the only difference between declaratives and non- 
declaratives will merely be a matter of "syntactic surface 
distinction". But he draws a distinction in sentential 
meanings between those represented by declaratives and those 
represented by performatives, and he describes the latter as 
"performative sentential meanings" (Ibid. ). Lewis acknow- 
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ledges, however, that non-declaratives do not express truth 
values (just like Stenius, who only assigns truth values to 
sentence radicals and not to full sentences). Lewis claims 
that the method of his paraphrased performative does allow 
sentences which are not performatives to have truth values. 
Explaining how this may happen, he says that such a truth 
value is not assigned to the embedded sentence (the that- 
clause of the sentence radical) but to the paraphrased per- 
formative. He observes: 
If I say to you 'Be late! and you are not late the 
embedded sentence is false, but the paraphrased 
performative is true because I do command that you be 
late. I see no problem in lettfrrg non-declaratives have the truth-values of the performatives they 
Para hrase; after all, we need not ever mention their 
rut1-values if we would rather not. (Lewis, 1972: 209- 210). 
I comment briefly here. The two approaches just summa- 
rized are quite significant in the literature on the seman- 
tics of sentences in English. Recent proposals have been 
organized around the ideas that emanate from the studies, 
e. g., the significance of the complement that-clause (as we 
shall see shortly). Nevertheless, it must be asked why these 
analysts adopt methods which practically do three things: 
(i) rephrase the original sentence, 
(ii) change non-declaratives structurally into 
declaratives, and then, 
(iii) claim that the "new" sentences have truth values 
in the same manner as declaratives (since the 
distinction between declaratives and non- 
declaratives has structurally been suppressed 
in the paraphrased "new" sentence forms). 
One may react to this by asking what choice they have. 
How can they avoid paraphrasing the sentences: '26 Are they 
simply to represent the meaning of an imperative like 
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(1.5.7) Advance! 
as 
(1.5.8) Move forward! 
or not? If they do something like this, they may only 
succeed in replacing verbs by their synonyms. But they will 
thus leave the syntactic configurations of the original sen- 
tences basically unchanged, and so we can still talk meaning- 
fully about declaratives and non-declaratives. Therefore to 
claim, as they do, that there is a core meaning, an S-meaning 
or a base structure representing "meaning" is simply to 
distort the point at issue, i. e., how to do the semantics of 
the sentences of natural languages as they are structurally 
-- declaratives and non-declaratives -- not as declaratives 
disguised as that-clauses or as paraphrased performatives. 
And it is possible to do this in a neutral and efficient way, 
i. e., by the use of an extension of the model-theoretic 
approach proposed in the writings of Richard Montague. I 
shall elaborate on this in the next chapter. 
1.6 The Syntactic Mood Approach 
A) Propositions and Clause Types 
The ideas raised by Stenius, Lewis and others generate 
considerable interest in the complement clauses that occur in 
sentences. Apart from the aspects that come up under the PH, 
there is also the question of what the form of the verb in a 
sentence may have to do with the proposition that the sent- 
ence may have. Huntley (1980) examines this issue and asks 
if it is the subjunctive form which some complement that- 
clauses have that prevents them from having truth values. He 
contrasts the complements in the following sentences which 
have subjunctive verb forms with those which have indicative 
61 
verb forms (p. 293), 
(1.6.1)(a) He requested 
demanded 
that he be sent to Coventry 
announced) is being (b) He ) that he sent to declared ) be 
Coventry 
and asks why a semantic difference that parallels the sub- 
junctive/indicative distinction appears to hold. He then 
raises the question as to whether or not there are two types 
of propositions. He notes that (i) the proposals of Stenius 
(Op. cit), Prior, Hare as well as that of Searle (Op. cit. ) 
contain the notion of a core meaning (or what he calls the 
"Same Content Thesis" (SCT)) for all sentences and regard 
proposition or descriptive content as capable of being true 
or false; and that (ii)' Lewis (1972) and others hold the view 
that propositions are functions from possible worlds to truth 
values. In (ii), Huntley points out, the indicative/ 
subjunctive contrast is irrelevant,, for it is a question 
of the "actual world either is or is not a member of the set 
of worlds which constitutes a given proposition" (p. 304). 
Huntley then goes on to say that it may be that the 
proponents of the SCT have the same conception of proposi- 
tions as that of Lewis and others, and so the proposition in 
a declarative sentence is true if the set of possible worlds 
which it contains includes the actual world. He observes: 
Where such a proposition is expressed imperatively, the 
very same set of possible worlds is again at issue as 
constituting the set of which the actual world has to, be 
a member in order for the order or demand to have been 
complied with. Assessing a command or order involves 
determining what has to te done in order to brio it 
about that the actual world i$ -a member of the sect in question. (Huntley, 1980: 305). 
Huntley then links indicative clauses with declaratives and 
propositions which relate to actual situations on the one 
hand, and on the other, subjunctive clauses with imperatives 
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and propositions referring to merely possible situations. 
A brief comment is in place here. In Huntley's propo- 
sal, two aspects can be isolated: (a) the question of what 
the notion of proposition embraces, and (b), how the indica- 
tive and subjunctive verb forms relate to the declarative and 
imperative sentence types with regard to propositions. In 
the (a)-aspect, he -surprisingly tries to link the notion-of 
possible world with verbal moods -- indicative and subjunc- 
tive moods -- making the subjunctive mood the medium; that 
refers to unreal (or merely possible) situations or worlds. 
But this is not necessarily the case. The notion of unreal 
situations can be conveyed by if-clauses which lack the 
subjunctive verb mood and are not in complement positions in 
sentences. Furthermore, the sense of unreality associated 
with such situations may be due to other lexical entities 
that occur in the sentences. 
(1.6.2)(a) If I lived on the moon, I wouldn't need a 
telephone. 
(b) If I see a unicorn, I'll be delighted. 
I reject the attempt, in the (b)-aspect, to associate an 
imperative with a subjunctive form of verb, even for the 
purpose of determining why it does not denote truth values. 
I am inclined to believe that Huntley fails to make a careful 
distinction between a subjunctive verb form and a base verb 
form. I shall return to the issue of sentences and their 
verb forms in the next chapter. 
Huntley (1984) also pursues the issue of truth values 
in imperatives. He seeks to examine the question as to 
whether or not an imperative possesses a "core meaning which 
will figure in any explanation of its various uses" (p. 105). 
He says he will thus find out whether this core meaning is a 
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proposition or something else. He assumes the position that 
structures with verbs in the indicative (like declaratives) 
express truth values. He then claims that structures like 
main clause imperatives, complement infinitival clauses and 
non-finite that-clauses (which lack both auxiliary modal and 
tense features) are not indicative clauses, and so cannot 
have any truth values. This, for him, means they all have a 
common semantic characteristic, i. e., they cannot have any 
proposition which may be said to be true or false. 
If we view this claim against the one contained in 
Huntley (1980), we can see that his basic thesis is that 
sentences which do not have their verbs in the indicative 
mood cannot have truth values. This is only too true. 
27 But 
he gets into trouble when he tries to draw up a list of such 
structures. He mentions "complement infinitival clauses" as 
an example of such clauses. He thus gives the incorrect 
impression that such a clause is in the same position as an 
imperative. 28 
(1.6.3) (a) Kate wants to go home. 
(b) John tried to stand up. 
At least on the basis of their surface forms, the complement 
clauses in (1.6.3) must be distinguished from imperatives. 
(1.6.4)(a) Kate, go home! 
(b) Stand up, John. 
As we shall see in Chapter Four below, the relationship 
between imperatives and tenses must be made very clear. 
I would like to add that Huntley fails to provide a 
concrete demonstration of the semantic representation of any 
of the structures in question, including the imperative, as 
Lewis (Op. cit. ) has tried to do. This is the real test for 
the correctness of the claims that link propositions with the 
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notion of clause types. I shall take up this problem in 
Chapter Five and then try to spell out an alternative way of 
going about it. 
B) Mood and Sentence Interpretation 
Hausser (1979) also discusses the imperative construc- 
tion. He tries to make a distinction between a syntactic mood 
and a speech act. He says that a syntactic mood refers to 
the formal properties of linguistic surface expressions 
whereas a speech act refers to the function that a linguistic 
expression is used to perform. (See also Lyons, 1968). He 
observes that the literal meaning of an expression remains 
the same no matter the number of different speech acts that 
are made with it. For example, the sentence in (1.6.5) can 
be used as a request, where the response will be the action 
of giving the speaker the salt; or as a mere question, where 
the response may simply be rimes or no. 
(1.6.5) Could you pass the salt? 
Referring specifically to sentence types, Hausser argues 
that both declaratives and non-declaratives can be semanti- 
cally interpreted with the help of the denotations of complex 
IV-phrases. The only difference between them, he continues, 
is that in the same model-theoretic, surface compositional 
analysis, a declarative receives a treatment involving func- 
tions from points of reference to truth values, whereas non- 
declaratives, including imperatives, are given a treatment 
involving a function from points of reference into functions 
from individuals to truth values, i. e., VP-meaning: 
(1.6.6)(a) (t) -----> { Of 1} [DECLARATIVES] 
(b) ( W, t) -----> (A -----> { 0,1 }) 
[NON-DECLARATIVE] 
To comment briefly on Hausser's proposal, I would say 
his representation of non-declaratives does not distinguish 
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them from declaratives. The denotation he gives them is no 
more than a set of properties of individuals in Montague's 
PTQ. (see Montague, 1974: Chapter 8). This does not capture 
the notion of imperatives as sentences. 
He goes on to claim that since declaratives have propo- 
sitions as their possible denotations, non-declaratives 
should have other kinds of possible denotations since it is 
obligatory in generative grammar that different syntactic 
moods should have different types of semantico-syntactic 
surface representation. He maintains that it is possible to 
do this within the framework of the grammar of PTQ. Accor- 
ding to him, a semantic analysis of an imperative therefore 
looks like this: 
(1.6.7)(a) Leave! E <e, t> 
When translated into intensional logic, it 
becomes 
(b) ''ý x [r2{x} leave' (x) ]E ME<s, <e, t» 
(I have modified some of the symbols used in 
Hausser ( 1979: 183. ). 
He explains the above translation thus: 
[(1.6.7A(b)] ... denotes the property of being the hearer r) an to be leaving. r is a context-variable 
etresenting the property -of being tie hearer ... 
The presence of the context-variable r2. he claims, is very 
crucial. It separates, semantically, imperatives ("which are 
complete expressions") from other IV-phrases which are not 
complete linguistic expressions. 29 The advantage of this, he 
points out, is that 
The 'propositional content' of im eratives finally is 
captured in the semantic representation without the 
counter-intuitive assumption that imperatives denote 
propositions and withou invoking putative speech-act 
properties. (Ibid.: 184 . 
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He then posits the fulfilment condition for imperative 
sentences as follows. 
If the hearer S utters f20 (a) (where a (- p) towards 
a hearer h at time in order to make a requisVt then 
this uttezance is, 
/f, 
9lfilled request if and only if 
there is a time ]7 > i, such thatLh =xn d(is true at 7. (Ibiä. S. 
I briefly comment on the proposal above. Hausser here 
tries to provide fulfilment conditions just as we have 
felicity conditions for declaratives (see Austin, 1962). 
Hausser, unlike Huntley (1984), attempts to give an indica- 
tion of what syntactic structure may be said to denote a 
proposition that will be true when the request is fulfilled. 
It is a(.. ). The problem here is that a(x) represents a 
declarative sentence in predicate logic. Since this struc- 
ture is the "semantic representation" of what he calls the 
"propositional content" of an imperative, it all comes down 
to saying that it is declarative sentences that denote 
propositions. In this regard, the unique contribution of the 
imperative construction relates to the "shift in time". This 
is perhaps what Schmerling (1982) means when she says that 
imperatives bring about states of affairs that are true. (See 
Chapter Three below). 
The problem with highlighting the change in time that is 
associated with imperatives with regard to their "meaning" is 
that it places too much emphasis on what they do (to bring 
about a new state of affairs). It is also necessary to 
account for how they are organized (for them to be able to 
indicate this shift in time). If imperatives are to be 
analysed as a syntactic mood category, it is crucial to be 
clear about this aspect of their nature. One of the aims 
of the analysis of the imperative to be provided in the 
present study, therefore, is to find out how they are orga- 
nized, semantically, as a syntactic mood category and so 
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account for how they convey meaning. 
In sum, it can be said that we have seen many different 
approaches to the semantics of sentences in English, inclu- 
ding the imperative sentence. Suggestions range from "common 
core" theories for all sentences presented in different forms 
-- complement that-clauses, sentence-radical and others -- to 
the derivation of non-declaratives from performatives and 
theories on how to make non-declaratives have truth values. 
It is fair to say that not one of them actually attempts to 
provide truth values for non-declaratives directly; their 
attempts do not go further than turning the sentences into 
declaratives in a variety of ways, and trying to make the 
notions of truth and falsity apply to the new structures 
rather than the original ones. 
It is the case that imperatives (and other non-declara- 
tives), in their original syntactic shapes, have no truth - 
values -- just as Frege said a long time ago. It is interes- 
ting that there are a few attempts to try to use the syntac- 
tic mood approach, as we have seen above. Although the 
proposals they make are inadequate, they are remarkable in 
that they give a great deal of attention to sentences as 
types, although the denotation of truth values still remains 
the exclusive preserve of declaratives. 
1.7 Conclusion 
In conclusion, I would like to say that what we saw 
above in the syntax of the imperative is the problem of how 
to extend generative syntax to it, and in- the semantics, the 
problem is how to extend truth-conditional semantics to it. 
This is so because both generative syntax and truth-condi- 
tional semantics have, for many years, been based on the 
Declarative sentence, not on the non-declarative. 
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Footnotes to Chapter One 
1. It is quite in place here to ask why I have limited this 
study to generative grammar only. There are two reasons for 
this. First, it is not desirable to include everything that 
has been said in the past in the study, even if it was 
possible to do so. Second, studies within the framework of 
generative grammar share certain common general principles in 
linguistic analysis, especially the view that the grammar of 
a natural language is the set of rules, the output of which 
is an infinite set of sentences (see Smith and Wilson, 1979: 
277). There are of course different versions of generative 
grammar. However, they are, by and large, sufficiently 
related enough for us to regard them as members, as it were, 
of the same family of grammars. So, it is relevant for me to 
concentrate on this grammar or set of grammars so that I may 
be able to present an integrated body of information (in 
this and subsequent chapters) on various aspects of impera- 
tive sentences. 
2. A great many of the studies on English imperatives 
undertaken in the generative grammar framework, which I shall 
review in this chapter, are related to the Transformational 
Grammar (TG) version of it. 
3. The role of reflexivization in the determination of the 
imperative subject and the general character of such a sub- 
ject are closely examined, in Chapter Three. 
4. A few sentences are marked with the symbols "*" or "? ". 
Those marked with * are to be regarded as "ungrammatical", 
and those marked with ? are to be regarded as "usually unac- 
ceptable", or "acceptable in certain contexts". Apart from 
sentences that are thus marked, the example sentences that 
I shall provide in the present study are to be regarded as 
"Standard English" sentences. 
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5. The phrase "sentence type" is used to refer to each set 
of sentence structures which is distinguished as the declara- 
tive, the interrogative, the imperative or the exclamative. 
What the individual sentences that constitute a type have in 
common are numerous. The main ones are (a), the verb form; 
(b), the syntactic structure, and (c), what has been des- 
cribed as the characteristic function of a sentence. The 
characteristic function of the imperative is to give orders. 
But, this function is not restricted to the imperative sen- 
tence type only. 
6. This Hypothesis is very often seen against the back- 
ground in which it is proposed. There is a tendency (albeit 
a misleading one) among grammarians to see it only in terms 
of syntax, although its authors referred to "meaning" in the 
sentence. Although they fail to say categorically what they 
mean by "meaning", a close examination of the problem concer- 
ning the derivation of sentences which the protagonists of 
the Hypothesis face leads one to the conclusion that they are 
also trying to characterize the relationships between the 
syntax and semantics of the sentences of natural language. 
7. This is an aspect that has scarcely been mentioned 
before, as far as I know. I must say however that other 
issues are involved also, as we shall see in Chapter Three 
later. The characterization of you as a definite article is 
also argued for by Postal who says tht "the so-called pro- 
nouns, I, our, they, etc, are really articles, in fact types 
of definite articles" (1966: 203). 
8. What I have found to be quite interesting is the evi- 
dence given in support of the reflexive argument. As it 
stands, it apears to be unassailable, although, as we shall 
see soon, You-Deletion may not be indispensible. 
9. The seriousness of the problems referred to above 
appears to be borne out by the remarks which Schnerling 
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makes in a footnote. She comments: 
It would be nice if the class of ac ep. able imperative 
subjects could be shown to be delimite on strictly 
ý ragmatic. grounds, qiven the rules I have proposed; . Schmerling, 1980: 56). 
The rules she is referring to (see Chapter Two,. Section 2 
below) do not actually preclude any particular account. 
10. These are adverbs like never, scarcely, hardly, and 
barely which can occur within the predicate of a sentence, 
before the main verb. (See Section 1.3 below for more discus- 
sion of these words). 
11. See the example in (1.2.18) for an illustration of 
how this "permutation transformation" operates. 
12. Arbini gives the following example sentences in which 
he describes the complement sentences as imperatives (1969: 
211). 
(1) I order you to bring me a slab! 
(2) I command you to remain here! 
(3) 1 request you to stand aside! 
He adds that the embeded sentences have roughly the 
following labelled braketing": 
(4) S( NP ( You )+ Imp (0)+ VP .... " (Ibid. ). 
13. The rule is as follows: 
Optional: You 
the 
- 
ýý A N°1 ... 
) 
will - VP 0 ... 2/34 
431 (not) 2 (Arbini, 1969: 213). 
14. They all fail to predict the type of tagged imperative 
noted in Emonds (1976: 213). 
(1) Do come in, won't you 
(2) Do be more polite, will you 
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15. I would however like to add here that another feature of 
Arbini"s analysis which Huddleston also criticized is its 
acceptance of the Katz-Postal view that only the modal will can 
occur in the tags of imperatives. The general opinion now is 
that many more modals can occur in such tags ( see Downes, 
1977). For example, 
won't you 
can "t you 
(1) Give us a ride in your car, 
would you 
could you 
16. G. Lakoff (1972) makes it clear that the PH indeed 
treats illocutionary force as an aspect of the semantics of a 
sentence. As we have noted earlier, he fails to indicate how 
this can be explicitly done. Even the suggestions by Sadock 
(1970) and Green (1973), cited by Gazdar (1979), on how the 
force may be captured are rejected. 
17. Gazdar's criticisms fall outside the period specified in 
this section. However, they are so relevant to the issues 
being discussed here that I have decided to include them. 
18. See Chapters Three and Five for an example of this. 
19. The term "grammatical mood" is used to refer to the 
structural form of the sentence. This must be distinguished 
from the use of "mood" in Traditional Grammar to refer to the 
form of the verb. See also Section 2.4 and footnote 11 in 
Chapter Two. 
20. Imperatives really do not have to have unique sets of 
verbs, adverbs, subject NP's etc, in order to be regarded as 
a unique set of sentences. We have to look deeper than the 
level of such features; to the overall shapes of the sentences 
and the nature of their semantic representations in order to 
discover their idiosyncratic nature. 
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21. With regard to Verb-Raising, Emonds explains that he is 
not making any reference to the do that occurs in 
imperatives. (See Emonds, 1976: 213, footnote). 
22. It is not generally the case that negation requires do 
in the imperative construction. An imperative like 
(1) Not to worry! 
has been attested to, especially among women, in parts of 
England. 
23. These aspects have to do, for example, with the subject 
NP's and VP's of the imperative construction. 
24. I am not claiming any unanimity of opinion among 
linguists on any of these developments. I however think that 
the developments which I have mentioned, and the directions 
to which they point, are significant enough to be noted in 
this review. Others which are equally important but not 
mentioned here will be referred to in the rest of the study. 
25. It is also the case that philosophers were also 
concerned, at this time, with issues like quantifiers, 
belief-contexts, the nature of meaning and others. 
26. It is not clear whether or not Lewis is here claiming 
that a sentence like 
(1) Sit down please 
will always derive in one way or the other from a sentence 
like 
(2) I order you to sit down please. 
In view of the oddity of please in the sentence in (2), he 
should have made clear whether or not both sentences should 
be seen as paraphrases of each other since they must have the 
same meaning. 
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27. The claims here must be weighed against the other ones 
in which he says that the imperative does not denote truth 
values. There must however be further evidence, other than 
its verb form, to support this general belief. (See Chapter 
Five below for this sort of evidence). 
28. The characterization of the imperative as a sentence is 
discussed in the next chapter. 
29, Hausser argues that propositions are actually possible 
denotations, for they occur as denotations of subordinate 
clauses. He explains: 
it is logic-wise conceivable that possible denotations- 
other than propositions may serve as denotation o 
complete linguistic expressions.... Hausser,. 1979: 179). 
He cites imperatives and interrogatives as examples of such 
expressions. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE IMPERATIVE CONSTRUCTION AND 
ASPECTS OF GRAMMATICAL THEORIES 
2.0 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we came across many proposals 
which apply to the imperative construction both directly and 
indirectly. Several of the analyses that contain such propo- 
sals tend to equate the imperative with certain other con- 
structions in ways that are very vague. For example, with 
regard to verb forms, Huntley (1984) draws a link between the 
imperative, complement infinitive clauses and subjunctives. 
Hausser (1979) characterizes imperatives as "complete IV- 
phrases expressions", a term which reflects the subjectless 
forms of the constructions. Schmerling (1982) refers to the 
imperative as a clause-type, reflecting a problem in genera- 
tive grammar which does not distinguish clearly between sen- 
tences and clauses. 
The aim of this chapter therefore is to examine the 
treatment of the imperative with regard to 
(a) how to characterize it -- whether in relation to 
the declarative, the infinitive and the 
subjunctive, or as a unique syntactic mood 
category, and, 
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(b) the general classification of sentences and the 
implication of this for grammatical analysis. 
It is hoped that all this will clarify not only the 
aspects of the imperative construction mentioned above but 
also the issue of how it may be given a satisfactory analysis 
in generative grammar. 
2.1 The Imperative Construction 
A) The Imperative as a Sentence 
In nearly all the studies discussed in the previous 
chapter, imperatives are treated as sentences. It is not 
difficult to find justification for this, as the following 
examples show. 
(2.1.1)(a) Mary loves her mother. [DECLARATIVE] 
(b) Do you like it? [INTERROGATIVE] 
(c) All of you stand up. [IMPERATIVE] 
(d) How nice! [EXCLAMATION] 
All but (2.1.1)(d) of these constructions have identifiable 
subjects and predicates. Even the absence of subject NP's in 
some examples of the imperative is explained by the tradi- 
tional view that "you is understood", a view which is rein- 
forced by Chomsky's Reflexivization thesis noted in section 
1.1 above. 
The structural shape of the imperative has however 
attracted comments from analysts, some of which deserve a 
close examination. The link that is often sought between 
imperatives and subjunctives has already been noted. The 
form of the verb that the construction has apparently makes 
it tempting to do so. The most noticeable aspect of all, the 
subjectiess form of the construction, is a problem since its 
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shape is hardly . different from those of VP's. Schmerling, 
for example, describes the imperative in the following terms: 
a broader perspective on clause-type variation leads to 
the conclusion that imperatives are formally primitive 
relative to indicative clauses .... (Schmerling, 1982: 203). 
Elsewhere, she describes it as 
an especially primitive or poorly elaborated clause type 
cross-linguistically. (Schmerling, 1983: 412). 
The fact that the imperative is thus compared to. many 
other structures -- VP's or IV-expressions, indicative 
clauses, infinitives, and subjunctives -- shows that its 
characterization as a sentence cannot be taken for granted. 1 
It also raises the question of how these structures may be 
considered as "relatives" of the construction. Opinion is 
divided between describing it in relation to some of these 
other structures (see Bolinger, 1977) and describing it as a 
sentence type in its own right (see McCawley, 1981). 
I begin with the distinction that needs to be made 
between "sentence" and "clause"; or between "sentence type" 
and "clause-type". I would say it is much better to refer to 
the imperative as a sentence than as a clause. Huddleston 
(1984) suggests that since units like imperatives, declara- 
tives and interrogatives can occur in structures as clauses, 
the term "sentence" may be applied only to an instance of 
such structures while the term "clause" may consistently 
apply to the imperative, the declarative, the interrogative 
and the exclamative, whether or not they are parts of larger 
structures. The problem with this suggestion is that it 
restricts the notion of sentence to a structure that has more 
than one clause; i. e., any one of what are traditionally 
referred to as "complex"p "compound" and ', multiple" sentences. 
I would say that the main ingredient of sentencehood is the 
ability of the structure to occur "alone" in a discourse 
A 
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0 
-- this is probably what is meant, in Traditional Grammar, by 
the idea that a sentence expresses a "complete thought". In 
this sense therefore, an imperative like the example in 
(2.1.2)(a) is a sentence since it occurs alone (i. e., it is 
not a component of another structure), but within (2.1.1)(b), 
it functions as a main clause. 
(2.1.2)(a) Sign those papers! 
(b) Sign those papers, if you don't mind. 
One advantage of this approach is that it allows the term 
"imperative" to be applied to "complex sentences" even 
though they contain other clauses also. 
(2.1.3)(a) The boy who found my cat yesterday come here 
please. 
(b) Hand over your papers before you leave- 
the room please. 
(c) If you don't like it, send it back to us. 
Furthermore, it is necessary to separate the function of, say, 
the construction, 
(2.1.4) who found my cat yesterday 
as a relative clause in (2.1.3)(a) from its grammatical 
function as an interrogative, when it occurs alone as in 
(2.1.5). 
(2.1.5) Who found my cat yesterday? 
Therefore, the imperative must be characterized as a sentence 
type, an instance of which may function as a main clause in a 
complex or compound sentence. The situation is such that 
where it is part of another structure, as the examples in 
(2.1.3) show, it usually functions as a main clause and so it 
gives its name to the whole construction. 
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If it is correct to regard the imperative as a sentence 
type, it is rather misleading to see the unique syntactic 
features of the construction from the point of view of "indi- 
cative clause type", as we, have seen above. I will have more 
to say in this regard in Chapter Three. 
B) The Imperative and the Declarative 
The characterization of imperatives as a sentence type 
leads to the issue of its relation with the declarative. I 
would say the generalizations that are often drawn between 
the two structures may not be as clear-cut as they are at 
times said to be. Let's consider the case of ellipsis. 
Zwicky (1985) claims that declarative and imperative senten- 
ces present cases of ellipsis which require contextual inter- 
pretations. However, if such cases are brought about by 
different factors, contextual interpretations alone may not 
explain both of them adequately. 
(2.1.6)(a) He goes to work early and ()returns late. 
2 
(b) ()go to work early. [IMPERATIVE] 
The sentences in (2.1.6) show examples of ellipsis which 
Zwicky says require contextual interpretations in contrast to 
the optional occurrences of NP's as objects in sentences 
which do not require such interpretations because there are 
transitive and intransitive verbs. 
(6.1.7)(a) Mike is driving the car. 
" (b) The children are sleeping. 
The problem with this generalization about ellipsis is 
that whereas it captures the situation presented by the 
imperative correctly, it plays down the syntactic motivation 
for the absence of subject NP in the second conjunct of 
(2.1.6)(a). This type of motivation is not apparent in the 
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case of the imperative. Let's have (for example, a conjoined 
sentence involving imperatives as in (2.1.8). 
(2.1.8) You go to school and<>come back late. 
In-spite- of the fact that imperatives do have subjectless 
forms, the example in (2.1.8) cannot be converted into the 
following compound in which the first conjunct lacks a sub- 
ject NP but the second has one. 
(2.1.9) *Go to school early and you return late. 
In the same manner, the declarative compound in (2.1.6) (a) 
cannot be changed into the following form: 
(2.1.10) *Goes to school early and he returns late. 
The problem therefore is that even though the two imperative 
conjuncts in (2.1.9) can occur separately without any lexical 
subject NP, unlike the declarative conjuncts, both sentence 
types do not possess the forms where a subject NP is speci- 
fied for the second conjunct but not for the first. 
A contextual interpretation may resolve the problem with 
the imperative conjuncts if the addressee for each conjunct 
is the same person. 
(2.1.11) (a) Ccso to school early and (y return late. 
(b) You go to school early and you return late. 
The context may perhaps determine whether or not the second 
conjunct is addressed to another person (I shall return to 
this issue in Chappter Five). 
The declarative conjuncts have their subject NP's refe- 
ring either to the same person, as I assume in (2.1.12)(a), or to 
different people as in (2.1.12) (b). 
(2.1.12)(a) He goes to school early and (he) returns late 
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(b) Tom goes to school early and Kate returns 
late. 
The conclusion to draw therefore is that whereas a 
contextual interpretation can explain why the imperative 
compound in (2.1.9) is starred, only a syntactic analysis can 
account for the starring of the declarative compound in 
(2.1.10). In the former it is necessary to be certain who 
the addressee is. In other words, after s(he) has been 
identified in one form, s(he) may not be re-identified in 
another form in the same sentence. In the latter, it is 
syntactically obligatory for any main clause declarative 
beginning a sentence to have a subject NP; the subject NP for 
another clause in a compound sentence cannot anaphorically 
apply to the first main clause, even if the context shows 
that both clauses have to do with the same person. There- 
fore, it is a syntactic problem in the case of the declara- 
tive compound in (2.1.10), but a problem of reference in the 
case of the imperative compound in (2.1.9), and so a contex- 
tual interpretation alone cannot resolve both problems. 
Subtle differences between declaratives and imperatives 
like the above cases of ellipsis do have far-reaching 
implications which are often missed in generalizations 
that are drawn between them. For example, we can conclude, 
from the example above, that what is significant in the issue 
of subjecthood in the imperative is the manner in which the 
referent of the NP is identified. But in the declarative, as 
it is well known, it is obligatory for the subject NP to be 
phonetically expressed, inspite of the phenomenon of sentence 
compounding. This may also be seen in relation to truth. 
values. A sentence type which grammatically needs subject 
NP's is more likely to denote truth values than one in which 
the contextual identification of the addressees is all that 
is required, basically. 
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2.2 Transformational Grammars 
A) The Derivation of Sentences 
S-Expansion Rules in a host of transformational grammars 
(see Chomsky, 1957: 26; 1965: 68; Huddleston, 1976: 35; 
Akmajian and Heny, 1976: 79; Baker, 1978: 36, and Radford, 
1981: 41) amount to one of the following: 
(2.2.1)(a) S -----> NP VP 
(b) S ----- > NP AUX VP 
Simple declarative sentences can be generated from any of 
these rules with a minimal use of transformations, for exam- 
ple, the AFFIX-SWITCH-RULE. The generation of non-declara- 
tives however requires a much greater use of transformations, 
for example, some interrogatives require SUBJECT-AUXILIARY 
INVERSION and imperatives require SUBJECT DELETION, as we 
have seen in Sections 1.1 and 1.2 above. (See Brown, 1984: 
Chapter Five, for a discussion of transformations and sen- 
tences). A variety of sentences like the following are thus 
derived, with the help of transformational rules, from any of 
the base rules in (2.2.1). 
(2.2.2)(a) Koko likes flowers. 
(b) Will Koko like flowers? 
(c) Give these flowers to Koko, please. 
The structures may be more complex than these ones. As 
we saw in the previous chapter, it is the manner in which the 
imperatives like (2.2.2)(c) is derived that has created a 
great deal of the controversy about the treatment of 
imperatives in TG. Despite the operations of rules as 
indicated above, a derivational analysis of sentence struc- 
tures does not tell us all we need to know about them. It is 
also necessary to examine the classificatory aspects of the 
structures that are derived either as clauses or as sen- 
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tences, and it is interesting to investigate how this is 
carried out in TG. 
B) The Classification of Sentences 
(1) DERIVATION AND COMP 
There are a number of devices in TG that treat aspects 
of sentence behaviour in complex structures where their 
classification as distinct units is very important. The one 
that immediately comes to mind with regard to S-structures is 
the device known as COMP. The elements that can be in the 
COMP node include clause-initial entities like as, that, 
than, for and WH (see Bresnan, 1979: 6-7). Their treatment 
varies from one method in which they are transformationally 
inserted into the Phrase Marker to another in which they are 
base-derived. In the former case, as Bresnan points out, 
they are believed to be semantically empty, and have to do 
with Movement Rules. This function of theirs in TG is quite 
significant, and so there is now a rule which establishes 
the COMP node in the following manner, 
(2.2.3) S -----> COMP S 
and into this node the entities above move. They may also 
move out of it, in which case they are said to leave traces 
behind. In this regard, we have transformations like COMP- 
TO-COMP Movement, and constraints on such movements -- for 
example, the SUBJACENCY CONDITION, the TENSED S CONDITION, 
and the SPECIFIED SUBJECT CONDITION (see Chomsky, 1977(a), 
and also (b): 144-153, and Bresnan, Op. cit.: Chapters Three 
and Five). 
The question that arises therefore is whether or not 
CONTP can be used in generative grammar to classify sentences 
into types so that syntactic analyses may be more relevant 
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to the conception of sentences as types. As observed above, 
the notions of sentence and clause are not clearly separated 
in many models of generative grammar. The X-bar convention 
establishes hierarchical structures within the NP and other 
non-sentential structures (see Chomsky, 1970 and 1972; Bres- 
nan, 1976 and 1977; Jackendoff, 1977(a) and (b), Hornstein, 
1977, and Radford, 1981), but the system in TG, in which the 
categories S and S stand for a host of sentence-structures, 
fails, for example, to capture the fact that imperatives 
function only as main clauses in complex sentences -- decla- 
ratives and interrogatives may function in different capaci- 
ties, as main as well as subordinate clauses -- despite the 
the existence of the COMP node and Movement Rules. In the 
examples in (2.2.4), an imperative is the main clause in each 
case whereas an interrogative and a declarative function as 
subordinate clauses in (2.2.4)(a) and (2.2.4)(b) respec- 
tively. 
(2.2.4)(a)' Find out whether it is correct. 
(b) Make sure you'rre there on time. 
There are however recent attempts to identify, for- 
mally, other types of S-Structures like the relative clause 
S[R], in addition to S and S. Generalized Phrase Structure 
Grammar (see Gazdar et all 1985) through its rule system,,, 
does allow a large number of structures to be identified, e. g., 
S[BSE] for the structure that occurs as a complement to 
prefer. 
There is also an attempt to refer to. Specific clauses in 
larger sentential structures in relation to the elements of 
COMP that introduces them. Bresnan (1979) provides examples, 
including the following (pp. 37-38). 
(2.2.5)(i) Object complementation 
(a) I know that is wise. 
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(ii) Subject complementation 
(b) For you to leave right now would be 
'inconvenient. 
(iii) Nominal complementation 
(c) The main question is whether they will 
support us. 
(iv) Adjoint complementation 
(d) Whether or not his son enjoys the army, he 
will try hard. 
. 
The use of COMP elements for the classification of 
structures is not extensive enough to be applied to many 
other structures. With regard to the different sentence 
types, it is pertinent to find out whether or not they can be 
identified as main clauses or otherwise within larger senten- 
tial structures by the so-called "empty complement izers". If 
there are such elements with respect to imperatives', for 
example, they should be able to identify the constructions 
just as the non-empty COMP elements identify the clauses that 
they introduce in (2.2.5). Schmerling (1982: 205) claims 
that 'clauses may have "empty complementizers" just as they 
may have "empty subjects"'. 
In order to pursue this point, it is convenient to use a 
sentence structure that is postulated under the PH as a 
probable source of an imperative by McCawley (1968,1976). 
(See Chapter Cne, Section 1.2 above). I reproduce his exam- 
ple in (1.2.26) as (2.2.6) here. 
(2.2.6) 1 hereby request you to leave at once. 
If the higher performative clause is dropped, the following 
structure will remain. 
(2.2.7) to leave here at once 
If to is treated as an auxiliary verb, as it is done in GPSG 
(see Section 2.3 below), the "zero complementizer" may be 
p 
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said to occur just before it, but the structure in (2.2.7) 
simply becomes an example of a VP[BSE] construction. This is 
a verb phrase with a main verb in the base-form. 
Although the imperative has the same verb form, it is 
difficult to conclude that the structure in (2.2.7) is an 
example of a subjectless imperative, similar in form and 
function to any of the following: 
(2.2.8)(a) You leave here at once. 
(b) Leave here at once. 
If the TG model is assumed, to may have to be dropped in 
order to derive a structure like the one in (2.2.8) (b), but 
this is difficult to justify, since it alters the verbal 
structure of the entire construction from an infinitival 
structure with a base form to one that is simply a verb with 
a base form. And there is nothing to suggest that the impe- 
rative verb form is infinitival in the underlying structure. 
(For the role of to in complement constructions, see Rigter, 
1982). 
The conclusion that may be drawn is that the use of COMP 
to identify or classify S-structures does not extend to the 
imperative, whether or not the "zero-complementizer" is pos- 
tulated. It has also been demonstrated that infinitival 
constructions must be separated from the imperative. The 
imperative neither has the syntactic shape that they have nor 
perform the same syntactic function as they do in larger 
sentential structures. 
(2) SYNTACTIC FEATURES IN COMP 
There is also an attempt in the literature to place 
certain features in the COMP node. In this approach, the 
node is defined as "+COMP" which is subcategorized as 
(2.2.9)(a) [COMP] -----> [+ THAT] 
(b) [+ THAT] -----> [+ TENSE] 
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(C) [+ TENSE] -----> [± PAST] 
(d) [- THAT] -----> [± TO] 
(e) [t TO] -----> [± FOR] 
(Pullum and Wilson, 1977: 773). 
Pullum and wilson use the above subcategorization to 
identify four complementation types. As TENSE is a feature, 
their system of specification provides [+THAT, -TENSE] for 
the "subjunctive" complement. For the imperative, they give 
the specification [+COMP, +IMP, -TENSE] in an example (p. 
765)4 and so imply that the notion of the imperative as a 
sentence (or perhaps clause) type may be captured by a set of 
syntactic features specified in the COMP node. If that is 
the case, it is quite significant. The objection that may be 
raised here is that the feature [+IMP] in COMP does not tell 
us much about the imperative construction. Its precise mea- 
ning is not spelled out. Some of the features may be marked 
on nodes other than the COMP node as we shall see soon. 
Nevertheless, while it is possible to associate some of the 
features with subjunctives like those contained in (2.2.10), 
(2.2.10) (a) I wish that you stop that noise. 
(b) He requests that the meeting be suspended. 
(c) The soldier pleads that he be re-engaged. 
where the features [+THAT -TENSE) are borne out by the pre- 
sence of that and the verb forms in the structures in ques- 
tion, it is difficult to identify the structures that are 
captured by [+THAT, +IMP, -TENSE], It is also difficult to 
claim . that the subjunctives contained in the examples in 
(2.2.10) are similar to the following imperatives in either 
form or function respectively. Also, the meaning of 
(2.2.10)(c), for exanpl e, is different from that of (2.2.11)(c). 
(2.2.11)(a) You stop that noise! 
(b) Suspend the meeting. 
(c) Re-engage the soldier! 
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It may be said therefore that the analyses of Bresnan, 
and Pullum and Wilson show that COMP may be used to identify 
complement types only. They fail to identify the imperative 
construction because it is not a complement type. 
(3) VERB FORMS 
It is also pertinent find out whether or not we can use 
verb-forms to link one structure with another. To examine 
the issue, let's take the following example. 
(2.2.12) 1 wish that you be examined the doctor. 
We may also have the imperative in (2.2.13) which may be said 
to have the "same" verb form as the subjunctive in the sen- 
tence in (2.2.12). 
(2.2.13) You be examined by the doctor. 
It is necessary to find out whether there is any reason to 
suppose that the example in (2.2.13) is derived from the one 
in (2.2.12) on the basis that they have the same verb form. 5 
In other words, to what extent can we associate the notion of 
the imperative as an independent sentence type with an "impe- 
rative" that is deemed to be derived from a subjunctive? 
I would say that the imperatives like the one in 
(2.2.13) should not be associated with subjunctives like the 
example in (2.2.12) because to do so would involve getting 
rid of that. As we shall see in Chapter Four below, getting 
rid of that involves changing the base form of the verb in 
the complement, subjunctive, structure itself. Such a change 
effectively removes all the features that may be specified 
for it (as in the Pullum-Wilson proposal). The construction 
in (2.2.13) is therefore an example of a sentence as an 
independent, syntactic'mood category, as I shall explain soon. 
6 
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(4) THE BY-CONSTRUCTION 
The construction in (2.2.13) also raises a semantic 
problem. This is whether or not the referent of the impera- 
tive subject NP must always be the the agent of the action 
specified in the sentence. This issue is discussed extensi- 
vely in the next chapter, but here, I restrict myself to the 
aspect that has to do with whether or not an NP can function 
as a subject in an imperative and also have its referent as 
the "agent" of the action specified in it if the verb has a 
form like be examined which involves the -construction. 
In order to examine this issue, lets take an imperative 
construction like the one in (2.2.14). 
(2.2.14) All of you be interviewed by a panel of 
judges. 
Certainly, this example does not in any way mean that the 
addressees are to interview themselves but that they should 
be in "a state of being interviewed by a panel of judges". 
It appears that since the people who are to be in this state of 
being interviewed are the addressees, and no other person can 
be involved in that state, they may be said (after being 
interviewed) to be "responsible" for the state, even though 
they are not responsible for "the action of interviewing". 
Their role in such an action can only be that of intervie- 
wees. 
Let's take another example. 
(2.2.15) The man who signed the contract be advised by 
your. solicitor. 
It may also be contended that the man who signed the con- 
tract, according to the sentence in (2.2.15), will be invol- 
ved only in the. state of being advised (i. e., after his soli- 
citor has actually given him the legal advice in question). 
In the light of the examples in (2.2.14) and (2.2.15), I 
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conclude that with regard to the imperative in (2.2.13), the 
following distinctions must be made: (a), the one-off action 
in which the doctor is the agent of the action of examining, 
and (b), the subsequent state of affairs of having been 
examined by the doctor which involves only his patient. The 
former relates directly to the presence of the "LZ-Construc- 
tion" in the sentence, but the latter is as a result of the 
presence of be as the main verb in the construction. So, I 
maintain that with respect to the verb be, it is a state of 
affairs that is in question. After you are examined by the 
doctor, in a one-off action, you, and nobody else, stay in 
that state of affairs of "having been examined by the doc- 
tor", and it is that state of affairs that is commanded by 
the example in (2.2.13), and not the action of examining 
itself. (For a discussion of the role of "agents" in sen- 
tences, see Wierzbicka, 1978). 
One aspect that emerges from the above discussion is the 
fact that the imperative construction cannot be captured by 
the devices that identify complement constructions in genera- 
tive grammar. Another one is the question of the extent to 
which the imperative should be related to the subjunctive and 
the infinitive. What we have seen suggests that neither the 
aspects of derivation nor those of verb forms justify the 
links that are usually drawn between the structures. Thus, 
after considering the generative treatment of aspects of 
sentence derivation, Bolinger observes: - 
It is valuable to point out that these resemblances 
among structures but deriving one from another, ene- 
ratively, is another matter. A spurious chopping of 
many essentially unitary phenomena is only one of the und 
sir able results, ..... The machine is geared to multiply . illusions. 
(Bolinger, 1977: 188). 
Although Bolinger suggests, in the same study, the treat. 
ment of all the structures as a single problem, I think 
there are more advantages to be derived from approaching the 
issue on the basis of sentence types, at least as far as it 
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relates to the imperative construction. First, this approach 
avoids the "illusions" that are created by deriving one 
structure from another, which is one of Bolinger's objections 
to äII such analyses in the TG framework. Second, it identi- 
fies clearly one major sentence type which can be analysed on 
the basis of its being a syntactic mood category. This type 
of approach is supported by the following observaton: 
An adequate account of the syntax of a natural language 
will have to distinguish somehow among different 
sentence types; declarative sentences, interrogatjv s, imperatives, exclamatory sentences, and the like. s 
one s scheme of linguistic description is that which I have assumed throughout this book, according to which a 
grammar of a language is a set of explicit rules that 
relate the sentences of that language to their meanings, it will be necessar to draw distinctions of meaning 
that correspond to 
the differences among the various 
sentence types. (McCawley, 1981: 210). 
Third, it permits a surface, model-theoretic, compositional 
analysis of the imperative in which its real syntactic and 
semantic nature can be captured by a system of rules in a 
uniform way. This approach thus involves the use of certain 
theoretical models which I shall discuss briefly in the next 
section. 
In sum, it may be said that the imperative construction 
has been shown to be a sentence type. With regard to the 
aspects of its syntactic functions, and structural shape, it 
must be distinguished from both the infinitive and the sub- 
junctive. Whereas devices in generative grammar like COMP 
can identify real complement structures, they cannot identify 
the imperative since it is not a complement construction. In 
comparing imperative with the declarative, it is important to 
note the differences between them as such differences may be 
symtomatic of more fundamental distinctions between them, for 
example, the fact that it is the declarative, but not the 
imperative, that denotes truth values. It is also shown that 
the base %for: rn: of theverbs 'in the subjunctive, the infinitive 
and the imperative is not an acceptable basis for treating 
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the structures together. The imperative raises certain 
unique questions, for example, whether or not the referent of 
its subject NP is always intended as the agent of the action 
specified in it. It must thus be concluded that the semantic 
and the syntactic phenomena presented by the imperative can 
best be approached by treating the construction as a unique 
syntactic category. 
2.3 Alternative Grammatical Models 
The alternative grammatical models that I have in mind, 
as indicated in Chapter One, are Generalized Phrase Structure 
Grammar (GPSG) and Montague Semantics (MS). The former-will 
be used for the syntax of the sentences and the latter for 
their semantics. The relevant aspects of these models will 
be discussed briefly in this section, and the models will be 
extended and applied to the imperative construction in the 
rest of the study. I start with GPSG. 
A) Generalized Phrase Structure Grammar 
GPSG is a context-free phrase structure grammar. In it, 
syntactic categories are complexes of features, and PS rules 
are set out by rewriting the left-hand symbols as a set of 
right-hand symbols. It also uses meta-rules as a system of 
relating one rule to another, for example, the relationship 
between a sentence and its passive counterpart is expressed 
through such rules. It does not use transformations and 
coindexý! s. (See Gazdar and Pullum, 1982; Gazdar, Klein, 
Pullum and Sag, 1985). 
As I said above, this model allows many structures to be 
created. So, its rules are also used to identify certain 
sentential structures. Since these are base rules which just 
expand syntactic categories, they are sensitive only to the 
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constituent structures of the categories to which they 
relate. 
There is a good chance that I can successfully tackle 
the syntactic problems presented by the imperative construc- 
tion in English through an extension of this model. For one 
thing, the problems relating to the derivation of sentences 
are no longer relevant. For another, it is all a question of 
accounting for the surface forms of the construction. Never- 
theless, with regard to the imperative, this approach will 
present a certain amount of complexity which the TG approach 
does not have, since I will have to formulate distinctive 
rules to capture distinctive imperative sentence structures. 
It is necessary to stress here that doing the syntax of 
the imperative in the manner suggested above does not mean 
that the syntactic features and elements which it shares with 
other sentence types will be missed. These are the kinds of 
features which Davies (1981) has tried to highlight. The fact 
is that as S-structures, all sentences are bound to have 
certain characteristics and elements in common. They all 
have, for example, subjects, verbs and adverbs. These are 
generally captured by base rules. What is not easy to do, 
however, is the identification of the ways in which these 
general properties of sentences are organized in each sen- 
tence type. It is these aspects of the sentences that sepa- 
rate them one from another. The task which the extension 
of GPSG here will be directed at is the analysis of the 
element-s of the imperative in a manner that can capture its 
distinctive characteristics. 
It is pertinent to see how the authors of this model 
have tried to make it as explanatory as they can. In this 
regard, I shall direct attention to two main aspects, (i), 
its rule system, and (ii), -its feature system. The rule 
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system of the grammar serves as an input into the translation 
of constructions into intensional logic. Thus, a rule may 
have the following shape: 
(2.3.1) < 1, [ý NV], V' ( ýN' )> 
(Gazdar, Pullum and Sag, 1982: 594). 
The rule in (2.3.1) consists of three parts -- the rule 
number (serving the purpose of identifying the nature of the 
subcategorization in question), the PS component (giving the 
constituent stucture of the construction) and the part con- 
taining the translation into intensional logic (giving a 
rule-based logical representation of the construction on the 
basis of the surface compositional analysis of the middle 
part). It employs, among other things,. a few other devices, 
e. g., the CONTROL AGREEMENT PRINCIPLE (CAP). (See Klein and 
Sag, 1981, and Lapointe, 1981). CAP is described, formally, 
thus: 
(2.3.2) If p` controls Fj then AGR (AL) = AGR (a, j). 
(Gazdar and Pullum, Op. cit.: 31). 
Its organization of rules as in (2.3.1) is reminiscent 
of Montague (1974). (See Halvorsen and Ladusaw, 1979: 188). 
I would like to say that only segments of the 'i'mperative. '. ' 
construction are open to such translations as we shall see 
below. So, certain modifications are necessary in the way the 
rules are set out. It is not necessary, I would say, to set 
out the syntactic and the semantic aspects of a construction 
in a single rule consisting of three parts. So, I shall 
dispense with numbering as a unit of the rule, and so allow 
the aspect of subcategorization to be subsumed under the PS 
rules. I shall therefore formulate rules to show the struc- 
tural and the semantic aspects of the sentences separately, 
treating the aspects that have to do with semantics within 
Montague Semantics. As we shall see later, all these modifi- 
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cations are fully motivated by the imperative construction 
since, for example, they are not open to translations into 
intensional logic as single sentential units. 
The feature-system of GPSG is quite extensive. It 
encodes syntactic information about Person, Number, Case, 
Syntactic Category itself, Phrases, Verb Forms as well as 
notions like Aspect, Finiteness, Passive and Null Terminal. 
These and a few others are treated as syntactic features. 
(See Gazdar and Pullum, OP. cit.: 1-14, and Gazdar, Pullum 
and Sag, op. cit.: 596-598). The features however fail to 
mention the elements that can be used to capture the fact 
that a particular sentence is a member of a particular sen- 
tence type. This is necessary because the syntax of the 
imperative must provide information not only about the con- 
stituent structure of the sentence but also about the entire 
structure itself. This is in conformity with the need to do 
the syntax and the semantics of the sentences of natural 
language according to the sentence type to which they belong, 
as pointed out above. I shall therefore propose a new fea- 
ture to fill up this gap in the feature-system in the next 
section. The use of these syntactic features in conjuncton 
with the rules expanding the imperative S-category will, it 
is hoped, enable us to capture certain facts about the con- 
stuction which are either ignored in the literature or diffi- 
cult to account for in the transformationalist approach. I 
now turn to Montague Semantics (MS). 
B) Montague semantics 
Montague Semantics is a term used to refer to the 
writings of Richard Montague, especially as contained by his 
papers "Pragmatics", "Pragmatics and Intensional Logic", 
"English as a Formal Language", "Universal Grammar=" (UG) and 
"The Proper Treatment of Quantification in Ordinary L gliah'" 
(FTQ). (See Montague, 1974: 95-147,188-270). T'y brief 
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discussion of MS. here will be limited to those aspects that 
are directly relevant to the task of providing an adequate 
semantic analysis of the imperative construction, and explai- 
ning why it can be successfully related to GPSG for the study 
of the semantics and syntax of the imperative. 
I would like to put the relevant proposals into two main 
groups, (a) and (b). Group (a) has to do with the technica- 
lities of identifying basic expressions of category A, sets 
of phrases of category A, the manner in which complex expres- 
sions are formed from basic ones, the analysis trees and 
translation rules. Group (b) is concerned with the semantic 
interpretation of English expressions on the basis, of a 
model-theory involving indices of worlds and times or 
7 possible worlds and the contexts of use. 
It is these characteristics of this model that make it 
particularly relevant to the semantic analysis of the impera- 
tive. However, important modifications must be made. For 
example,, the model has no specific categories for the major 
components that make up the imperative construction. So, 
these must be proposed in addition to those in Montague (Op. 
cit.: 237). This thus ensures that imperatives are given the 
same semantic interpretation. I shall also have to identify 
the unique expressions which they may have and the relevant 
syntactic and semantic rules. 
The incorporation of a model into this theory is impor- 
tant. Such a model, however, has to be constructed on the 
basis of the data that I am confronted with. Thus, in the 
imperative construction, there is need to have a model which 
contains information not only about aspects of the actual 
world but also about certain features in the context of use. 
This is why an adequate semantic analysis of the imperative 
cannot be achieved by using a PTQ-style approach alone. An 
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outline of how some of these aspects will be organized in the 
present study is given in the next section. The details can 
only emerge from the analyses that are given to different 
components of the imperative in subsequent chapters. 
It is in place here to comment on the combination of 
aspects of GPSG and MS in the present study. It should be 
made clear from the start that since the use of these two 
models itself presents a unique approach, only their general 
assumptions will be exploited here. My intention, therefore, 
is a basic one -- to develop fully two aspects of one con- 
struction, its syntax and semantics, which are so intertwined 
that only grammatical models (or model) which have access to 
both aspects can be of use. It is thus the case that in this 
regard, both GPSG and MS are compatible with each other in 
many respects -- in their conceptions of syntactic catego- 
ries, in their compositional orientation to grammar, and in 
their organization of rules. The proposals which I shall 
make are also compatible with both models, and since they 
complement each other with regard to my purpose here, it 
makes sense, I suppose, to use both of them. 8 
2.4 Grammatical Notions 
The aim of this section is to indicate how certain 
notions and subsystems which are contained in the grammatical 
models assumed in the present study will be extended or 
modified in order to make them quite adequate for the purpose 
of analysing the imperative construction. 
A) Imperative and Grammatical mood 
Mood in Traditional Grammar is a term that is used to 
refer to the morahologicel shape of a verb. Terms like: 
indicative, imperative and subjunctive are used to describe 
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the distinctions. that are found in the shapes of the verbs. . 
But in generative grammar, "mood" has acquired a much broader 
meaning. We now have the notion of grammatical mood which is 
used to refer to the distinctive grammatical structure of a 
sentence. (See Huddleston, 1971: 5,1976: 127-128; Lyons, 
1977: 745, and Hausser, 1979: 174). In this sense, the mood 
of a sentence does not change even when the latter is used to 
express illocutionary forces which are not typical of it. 
Mood is therefore seen as an abstract, inherent property of 
the sentence which is co-extensive with it. There is however 
a problem when mood, in this sense, is identified with the 
term "imperative" as a syntactic category in contrast with 
declarative and interrogative, even though none of the latter 
terms refers to the form of the verb as the former does. 
Lyons, noting the problem, describes it as a probable source 
of confusion. (See Lyons, Op. -cit.: 748,1981: 115). The 
terms are used to refer to verb forms and sentences in diffe- 
rent syntactic contexts, and this creates a great deal of 
complexity. The first three tables below illustrate the 
problem thus created and the last two (which come up later) 
show the proposals put forward as solutions to it. 
TABLE ONE 
VERB FORMS 
MOOD indicative, subjunctive, imperative, etc. 
As stated above, the terms in TABLE ONE identify verb forms 
in relation to their moods. 
TABLE TWO 
SENTENCES 
VERB FORMS indicative, subjunctive, imperative, etc. 
In TABLE TWO, the terms identify sentences according to their 
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verb forms. (See Lyons, 1977: 747-748). 
TABLE THREE 
SENTENCE TYPES 
DECLARATIVE I IMPERATIVE I INTERROGATIVE 
indicative indicative imperative 
In TABLE THREE, the terms (in lower case letters) refer to the 
forms of the main verbs of their respective sentence types as 
well as the individual sentences in each sentence type. Here 
lies the confusion. Declaratives and interrogatives have 
"indicative" verb forms, but imperatives have an "imperative" 
verb form. This means that imperatives as members of a 
distinctive mood category (i. e., as a sentence type as set 
out in TABLE THREE) are identified by their verb form, which 
is in the imperative mood (as in TABLE TWO). As a sentence 
VERB FORMS 
type, the imperative stands in contrast to the declarative 
and the interrogative, but these last two sentences are not 
identified by the names of their verb forms as the impera- 
tive is. This is certainly not a terminological problem. It 
is interesting to note that both the declarative and the 
interogative have the same verb form, "indicative"; a fact 
that does not readily come to mind when we speak of "indica- 
tive" sentences or clauses. Now, if the mood of the main 
verb. of the sentence is what decides the kind of semantic 
analysis that it can take, then the imperative is on its own 
indeed. The declarative and the interrogative are united by 
the fact that they have identical verb forms as illustrated 
in TABLE THREE. 9 
The attempt to restrict the imperative to TABLES ONE and 
TWO by putting it on a par with subjunctives and infinitives 
(see Section 2.1 above) creates additional problems because, 
as we can see in TABLE THREE, the occurrence of an identical 
99 
verb form (or a superficially identical verb form, to 
be exact) in two or more sentences (or clauses) does not 
necessarily make them identical. 
'° And as pointed out above, 
both subjunctive and infinitive clauses do not stand in iso- 
lation as the imperative does. However, the level of classi- 
fication among the sentences represented in TABLE THREE is 
well motivated, and the particular problem that the term 
imperative poses there can be resolved. 
Two possible ways of removing the confusion -created by 
"imperative" now exist. First, Lyons (Op. cit. ) proposes the 
term "jussive" in place of "imperative" for referring to 
sentence types along with "declarative" and "interrogative". 
This would then free "imperative" for referring to the verb 
form only on the level of TABLE THREE, as follows: 
TABLE FOUR 
SENTENCE TYPES 
DECLARATIVE JUSSIVE INTERROGATIVE 
VERB FORMS indicative imperative indicative 
Second, there is aa new term for referring to the verb 
form of an imperative sentence and so the term "imperative" 
is used without any confusion in contrast to "declarative" 
and "interrogative" (and "exclamative"). This is illustrated 
in TABLE FIVE. 
TABLE FIVE 
SENTENCE TYPES 
DECLARATIVE IMPERATIVE INTERROGATIVE 
IVERB FORMS indicative base-form indicative 
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This term, "base-form" has appeared in recent studies in 
generative grammar. (See Gazdar, Pullum and Sag, op. cit.: 
596). It is generally used in GPSG, and so it is adopted 
here. 
The use of "imperative" in the above sense (i. e., as a 
grammatical mood) has certain important consequences for the 
present approach. Since the imperative sentence is not fully 
identified by the name of its verb form, it should not be in 
TABLE TWO, and so should not be related to, or placed on the 
same level as, subjunctive or the indicative clauses -- 
structures that are actually known by the kinds of verb forms 
which they contain. The term "indicative" is thus not syno- 
nymous with the term "declarative", and it would be much 
clearer to reserve indicative clause for a dependent clause 
which has its main verb in the indicative verbal mood than to 
use it on the level of TABLE THREE, as if it meant the same 
thing as declarative sentence. We do not have "base-form 
clauses" because the term "base-form" does not refer to any 
clause which occurs in a dependent position in a sentence. 
(See Sections 2.1 and 2.2 above). 
Since mood in generative grammar refers to the dis- 
tinctive grammatical structure of the sentence as pointed out 
above, it is reasonable to capture this information in the 
form of a syntactic feature as in GPSG. I therefore propose 
a syntactic feature, [MOOD], which may be extended in the 
following manner to cover the various sentence types: 
" 
(2.4.1) [MOOD {DECL, INTER, IMP, EXCL}] 
For the imperative, this feature is realized as 
(2.4.2) [MOOD IMP] 
Similarly, we would have other realizations in the case 
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of each of the other mood categories. 
12 In the style of 
GPSG, the specification in (2.4.2) may be abbreviated as 
follows: 
(2.4.3) [IMP] 
without any loss of meaning. The S node which dominates an 
imperative sentence in a Phrase Marker can therefore be 
marked LIMPI. What this means is that each PS rule for the 
imperative construction must be subclassified as 
(2.4.4) S[IMP] 
with a full specification as 
(2.4.5) S[MOOD IMP]13 
Since the imperative consists of many subsets of sen- 
tences, I would like to adopt a method (see Halvorsen and 
Ladusaw, op. cit.: 221) in which the PS rules are set out as 
follows: 
(2.4.6) S[IMP] 
S[IMP] 
S[IMP] 
S[IMP] 
-----> ... 
-----> ... 
-----> ... 
----->.. . 
(for subset (i)) 
(for subset (ii)) 
(for subset (iii)) 
(for subset (iv)) 
The details are given in Chapter Four, following the discus- 
sion of aspects of the verb phrase. 
The above proposal is motivated by the need to allow 
each PS rule to relate to each sentence structure directly, 
since I am doing a one-level, surface structure analysis. 
Furthermore, this approach is in consonance with the methods 
of both GPSG and MS as explained above. Each sub-type of 
S[IMP] is thus a sub-type of the imperative mood category and 
so will receive a translation into intensional logic within 
the general pattern that has been established for the impera- 
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tive construction. [IMP) is a syntactic feature and so must 
be distinguished' from the use of MODALITY by Ransom (1977) as 
a semantic entity in sentences. 
It is pertinent to compare the present proposal with 
others that have to do with the imperative construction and 
other sentence types. Schmerling proposes the following rule- 
schema for the imperative. 
(2.4.7) IMP -----> (NP) 
do 
(AUX) VP 
(not) 
(Schmerling, 1980: 27) 
One serious objection to this rule schema is its failure to 
define or explain the meaning of IMP. Schmerling does not, 
however, use the feature-system in her paper. She does not 
raise the issue of syntactic mood at all. A possible defini- 
tion of IMP may therefore have to incorporate a mood feature 
as I have suggested in (2.4.5) above. A second objection is 
the fact that she has no device in the rule-schema for mar- 
king each single rule as a rule that can predict an impera- 
tive sentence rather than a declarative, since IMP is not a 
feature on the imperative S-category. This defect is quite 
noticeable in a Phrase Marker for the following instance of 
the rule-schema, 
(2.4.8) IMP -----> NP (AUX) VP (Ibid.: 24). 
where IMP has replaced S, unlike (2.2.1) (a) above, but the 
rest of the PM is hardly different from that of (2.2.1)(a) 
for a simple sentence. Since Schmerling"s proposal assumes 
some operations involving transformations, it seems only the 
occurrence of IMP in the rule differentiates it from classi- 
cal TG rules. As demonstrated by the alternative proposal 
above, IMP must be in the rule as a feature defined on the S- 
node, and since it represents the syntactic mood category of 
the imperative, it is used as part of the PS rule to predict 
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each imperative sentence directly. It trickles down the 
trees through the Head Feature Convention (HFC) (see Gazdar 
and Pullum, 1982: 4). The mood feature [IMP] thus lends 
itself, within the rule-system, to the syntactic charac- 
terization of the imperative as a sentence with a structure 
that is distinct from those which may be possessed by any 
other syntactic mood category or sentence type. So, the 
absence of the feature [MOOD] on the S-node in Schmerling's 
proposal makes itýinferior to the alternative proposal that I 
put forward above. 
In another proposal, rules are provided on the level of 
"meta-grammar", as follows: 
(2.4.9) S -----> DEC / QUES 
QUES -----> Qu-Do/Qu-Modal/Qu-Have/Qu-be 
(Krulee, 1982: 125). 
This proposal is a slight improvement on that of Schmerling 
in that S appears somewhere in the rule. But this has been 
done at a high cost. S is now being rewritten as sets of 
sentences rather than as sets of constituent categories as is 
customary in generative grammar. The creation of two levels, 
meta-grammar and pseudo-grammar, in which the former subclas- 
sifies the sentences of a language while the latter provides 
context-free rules (see Krulee, Ibid.: 121-130) complicates 
the grammar of natural language unnecessarily. Apart from 
the problem of how to interpret the meta-grammar which Krulee 
himself mentions (p. 131), there is also the problem of how 
the intricate relationship between the meta-grammar and the 
pseudo-grammar can really be integrated into a system which 
involves translation into intensional logic as GPSG does (see 
Gazdar, 1982: 148-151). I'believe the alternative proposal 
presented above is much simpler. It attains the same level 
of adequacy in the prediction of sentence structures without 
the complication of another level of analysis. It uses the 
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notion of grammatical mood and so it is rooted in the tradi- 
tion of generative grammar and linguistic philosophy. (See 
the introductory paragraph of the present section, and Chap- 
ter One, Sections 1.1 and 1.6 above). Above all, the present 
proposal is completely open to surface, compositional analy- 
sis and logical interpretation in both syntax and semantics. 
It is therefore the case that the representation of the 
imperative construction as 
(2.4.10) S -----> IMP 
cannot improve the situation since it is indeed an instan- 
tiation of the meta-grammar in (2.4.9), i. e., the first line 
of the rule. So, the proposal has all the theoretical inade- 
quacies that have been identified with (2.4.9) above. But 
when IMP is regarded as a syntactic feature, then we are 
faced with another complication. Syntactic features are 
elements in the node., as explained above, and so cannot be 
used to expand an S, or any category for that matter. Conse- 
quently, it will be unacceptable to allow IMP to be a feature 
defined on an imperative S-node after it has been used to 
expand an S. Furthermore, to use IMP as a syntactic feature 
without relating it to the feature [MOOD] looks arbitrary, 
for it robs the PS rules predicting imperatives of their 
affinity with similar rules predicting other types of sen- 
tences as we have seen in (2.4.1) above. 
In sum, we can say that the term "mood" has a wide range 
of uges and interpretations in the literature on the grammar 
of English. I follow a broad approach by using it in the 
present study as a grammatical element which uniquely iden- 
tifies the distinctive syntactic structure of any sentence. 
In this sense, therefore, I propose that it should be treated 
as an element that functions as a syntactic feature, and so 
can be extended to all mood categories in a natural language 
which has mood distinctions. 
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For the _ 
imperative- in Thglish, as pointed out above, the 
full specification is S(MOOD IMP] and it may be abbreviated 
as [IMP]. This therefore takes us to the choice of the 
method of setting out the PS rules which predict imperative 
sentences. It is suggested that S[IMP] should be repeated as 
many times as there are subsets of imperatives to predict in 
the language. 
The current suggestions discussed above lack many of the 
important features that the present, alternative proposal 
has. One of them has completely eliminated the S-category 
from its rule-system; another complicates its arrangement by 
creating a second level of analysis, and yet another has no 
efficient way of treating IMP. They all lack the syntactic 
feature, [MOOD] (and any use of the notion of syntactic mood 
category) and so either that the structures which they pro- 
duce cannot be translated into intensional logic or their 
semantic representation of the imperative cannot be separated 
from those that declaratives generally have. 
B) Indices and Context of Use 
In a model theory, a model by and large consists of co- 
ordinates like time, place and situation which are referred 
to as indices, states of affairs or possible worlds. (See 
Montague, op. cit.; Carnap, 1947 and Kripke, 1963 and 1972). 
Although this notion has been traced back to Frege, it has 
been developed in rather different ways, depending on the 
specific problem in question, e. g., modal contexts and belief 
contexts. Of particular relevance is the dichotomy between 
sense, intension, meaning, thought or rromosition on the one 
hand, and on the other, reference or extension, in relation, 
to expressions. '. (See Dowty et al, 1981: 144). The relation- 
ships between these notions revolve around the claim that 
the meaning or intension of an expression is determined by 
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its "extension" (or "reference") in a state of affairs (i. e., 
in a model with the indices of time, place and situation). 
What Montague presents is a rather formal approach to refe- 
rential semantics. In PTQ, he uses the notion of denotation 
(of an expression) which is obtained relative to the indices 
of possible world, i, moment of time, j, and 
.2 
assigning 
values to the variables, i and j. In UG, he explains how 
these entities relate to meanings. He comments: 
Thus meanings are functions of two arguments -- a possi- ble world and a context of use. (Montague, 1974: 728). 
He explains that the index, i, consists of "pairs of a pos- 
sible world and a moment of time", while the index j consists 
of "the set of all complexes of remaining relevant features 
of possible context of use" (Ibid. ). Such features of con- 
text include speaker, addressee, objects, etc. (See Lewis, 
1972: 185). 
Montague's approach to semantics is therefore closely 
related to aspects of pragmatics which he interprets as 
indexicals. (See Thomason, 1974: 63). In his "pragmatics and 
Intensional Logic", he observes: 
An indexical word or sentence is one of which the refe- 
rence cannot be determined withput knowledge of the 
context of use; .... Consider Caesar will die . This sentence cannot be considered either true or false inde- 
pendently of th context of use; before at uth value can 
Ge dete ined, . 
he time' of utterance, wnici is one ss- 
ýp ect o the context of use, must be specified. (Montague 
tic. ci . 
the 
119-120). 
I have discussed the notion of indices or context of use 
in Montague semantics at some length in order to emphasize 
its importance in the semantic analysis of the imperative 
construction. Almost all the recent studies on the impera- 
tive (see Section 1.6 above) have tried to identify the 
nature of the "proposition" or "denotation" that should be 
associated with the imperative, but almost all fail to recog- 
nize the vital role that indexical elements play in the 
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construction, especially in the identification of the refe- 
rents of the subject NP's in the context of use. 
The representation of the meanings of sentences is a 
complicated business. Many different issues are called for 
in it. For example, there is the problem of how to distin- 
guish between the "meanings" and the "senses" of sentences. 
(See Austin, 1962: 100). Montague however makes such a 
distinction as follows: 
The intuitive distinction is this: meanings are those 
entities that serve as interpretations of expressions (and hence if the interpretation of a compound is 
always to be a function of the interpretation of its 
components cannot be identified with functions of pos- 
sible worlds alone), while senses are those intensional 
entities that are sometimes denoted by expressions. (Montague, Op. cit.: 228). 
This is interesting since it raises the question of 
intensionality. For the imperative, it has to do with either 
identifying its nature on the basis of its surface form or 
attempting to isolate what is understood when the sentence is 
uttered and this probably involves intensionality. The con- 
cept of model contained in MS can be exploited in both direc- 
tions. However, it is mainly the concept of the model as 
described in UG that will be adopted in the present study. 
This becomes necessary as a result of the unique nature of 
the imperative, especially with regard to the entities that 
are involved in the type of "context of use" which it 
entails. Within the UG subsystem, it will also be possible 
to discuss fully the aspects of pragmatics, or identify the 
manner in which the context of use is exploited, in the 
organization of the imperative. Since the principle of 
compositional analysis will be upheld, I contend that knowing 
the conditions surrounding the organization of the imperative 
is part of knowing the meaning of it. It is thus the case 
that a compositional analysis of the imperative cannot pursue 
the notion of sense or proposition since it it does not 
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denote truth values. Any attempt to capture the so-called 
"propositional content" of the imperative must thus resort to 
the identification of a formula. A formula and a proposition 
are defined as follows. 
A formula denotes a truth value at each index. Hence 
the in ension of a formula is a function from indices to 
truth values, and such an intension will be called a 
prop osition. Since a function from any set into {O, 11 
is the characteristic function of some subset of that 
set, a proposition as just defined "characterizes" a set 
of indices; i. e. a roposition maps all the indices at 
which a formula is 
true into 1 and maps all other 
indices into 0. (Dowty et al, 1981: 147). 
Such a formula can then be related to the new situation, 
following the execution of the action specified in the sen- 
tence, and so capture the "sense" or the "propositional 
content" of the sentence. Since such a "formula" is not 
derived from a compositional analysis of the imperative sen- 
tence itself, no attempt will be made in the present study to 
provide a detailed, formal analysis of the "new" state of 
affairs that is achieved when the action is carried out. The 
emphasis in the present approach, as indicated in Section 1.6 
above, is to examine the conditions that determine the seman- 
tic nature of the imperative construction. After the criti- 
cism of a recent proposal on the issue of propositions and 
the imperative in Chapter Three, I shall comment, in Chapter 
Five, on why the issue of propositions in relation to the 
imperative is raised at all and how the quest for them has 
to move away from the actual surface forms of the imperative. 
The-use of a model-theoretic approach that will be under- 
taken here thus means that an imperative sentence will be 
seen as a token only, i. e.,. an instance of the construction 
which is interpreted in relation to the indices which make up 
the relevant context of use in which it occurs. An examina- 
tion of it in this sense will provide an insight into the 
kind of semantical object that it is. 
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Another aspect of the proposed approach is that it will 
be possible to use the notion of semantic type to capture the 
denotations of the specific syntactic categories that make up 
the imperative construction. All this will make it possible 
to build up the "meaning" of the imperative sentence on the 
basis of the programme that I have outlined above. 
I would like to point out that the present approach will 
have nothing to do with the "uses" of the imperative. This 
is as a result of the fact that in it semantics is seen as an 
aspect of generative grammar (see Wilson, 1975, and Kempson, 
1977). Extra-linguistic elements will be incorporated only 
to the extent that they shed light on the meaning of the 
imperative construction. (See Halvorsen and Ladusaw, op. 
cit.: 185). Notions like presuppositions and entailment will 
apply, again only as far as they relate to the determination 
of the semantic nature of the sentences. 
2.5 Conclusion 
We have seen that a great many of the problems that 
surround the imperative construction can be resolved by the 
use of an adequate theoretical model. Although such devices 
like COMP have their uses in generative grammar, they prove 
theoretically inadequate with regard to the identification of 
the. imperative in a larger sentence and its function as a 
main unit in such a structure. The tendency to view the 
construction as a "relative of the indicative clause" is a 
bit of over-generalization since a great many of the unique 
features of the construction can be independently accounted 
for. In this regard, it is pointed out that a blend of 
appropriately modified GPSG and Montague Semantics can be 
used to reveal the real nature of the construction. 
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The syntactic feature [MOOD] has been proposed to cap- 
ture the distinctive syntactic structure of the sentence, and 
it has given rise to S[IMP] being identified as the symbol 
that should occupy the topmost node in a Phrase marker for an 
imperative. 
With regard to the semantic aspects, the model thoeretic 
approach is introduced, and the crucial role that the context 
of use plays has been explained. Therefore, instead of using 
indices of a possible world and a moment of time, we will 
now apply those made up of a set of contextual features like 
"speaker", "addressee", "objects" and other aspects of the 
analysis, including the use of the device of semantic type 
to identify specific categories in the imperative construc- 
tion, and so give it a more satisfactory treatment than it 
has had hitherto in grammatical theories. 
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Footnotes to Chapter Two 
1. Aspects of the imperative referred to in 'the above quota- 
tions will be accounted for in the subsequent chapters. 
2. The symbol <> is used to identify the position of a 
"missing" element. In the examples in this section, the 
missing elements are subject NP's. 
3. So, if these complementizers existed, they would proba- 
bly have occurred in larger sentential structures from which 
imperatives would have been derived. They would also have 
been dropped in the original structures along with other 
elements. They would thus have become "empty complementi- 
zers" in the parts of the original structures that would 
remain, i. e., imperatives, probably leaving their traces 
before them (imperatives) in the deep structure. 
4. Davies (1981: 310) describes the use of IMP in this 
example as an "ad-hoc feature". I think this is not correct. 
IMP here should be distinguished from the empty morpheme IMP 
of Katz anf Postal (1964), or of any other study of that 
period (see Section 1.2 above). The presence of II7P 
in CUi"LI seems to indicate that the different sentence types 
can be directly captured by base rules, and it is just that 
the authors mention only the case of the imperative. Others 
can be identified, as we shall see in Section 2.4 below. 
5. The claim about the derivation of the imperative in this 
manner was fashionable during the late sixties as we saw in 
Chapter One. (See Katz and Postal 1964, and McCawley, 1968). 
But the association of the imperative with the subjunctive 
still goes on, as we have seen in Section 1.6 above. The 
comparisons that are made concern their verb forms as well as 
other aspects (see Culicover, 1976). There is also the issue 
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of propositions which are said to be expressed by such com- 
plement constructions and the imperative (see Huntley, 1982). 
So, even if we disregard the issue of derivation, it is still 
tempting to relate the following sentences to each other. 
(1) I order that you pass it on. 
(2) I order you to pass it on. 
(3) Pass it on. 
6. It must be admitted that imperatives do have grammatical 
features which are very difficult to identify and describe. 
However, it is equally true that the general TG approach of 
treating the declarative sentence structure as a norm, and 
trying to generate all other sentence types from that struc- 
ture (see Section 2.2 above) has had the undesirable effect 
of making those unique features of the sentences look defec- 
tive and deformed. An adequate grammar of the imperative 
must therefore account for these features and so increase our 
understanding of the construction. 
7. Montague's ideas about indexical expressions and the 
context of use are closely related to his formal approach to 
co-ordinate semantics, as we shall see in the next section. 
8. Relating Montague Semantics to a model of generative 
grammar is not new. Cooper (1975) identifies some parallels 
between it and TG, and Partee (1975: 203-300) discusses how 
MS may be approached through transformational syntax. How- 
ever, it can be contended that no model of generative grammar 
has as much similarity with Montague Grammar (as it is some- 
times called) as GPSG, especially with regard to their assum- 
ptions on categories and rules. 
9. This does not mean that we may now conclude that both 
sentences should have identical syntactic analyses. 
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10. The notion. of the characteristic use of sentences as 
reflected in the forms of their main verbs (see Lyons, 1977: 
746) is of considerable use in separating one sentence from 
another. However, it cannot do so in the case of the depen- 
dent clauses in the following examples: 
(1) The man who will go there has arrived. 
(2) The man to go there has arrived. 
since the main verbs in both clauses are the same in form. 
What we know for sure is that both clauses have different 
structural configurations. So, even if certain syntactic and 
semantic similarities exist among sentential structures, the 
differences in their structural configurations should not be 
ignored. For sentences, as represented in TABLE THREE, the 
notion of grammatical mood category is meant to capture such 
over-all structural configurations, irrespective of the verb 
forms. 
11. [MOOD] in this sense identifies a "sentence shape" in 
the same way as [BSE] (for base-form) identifies a "verb 
shape". None of these entities has undergone any visible 
structural change which the feature assignment could have 
tried to reflect. What is relevant here is the shape of each 
of them. It can thus be argued that generative grammar must 
concern itself not only with the categories that make up a 
sentence, but also with the over-all shape of the sentence. 
12. For these categories, the situation is as follows: 
[MOOD DELL] (for DECLARATIVES) 
[MOOD INTER] (for INTERROGATIVES) 
[MOOD EXCL] (for EXCLAMATIVES) 
... ... 
and as in the case of imperatives, they may be abbreviated as 
[ DECL] , [INTER] and [EXCL] respectively. 
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13. Since the contrasts which exist among the extensions of 
the feature [MOOD] are fully specified, I see no need to 
attach the values, + and -, to them wherever they may occur 
in the present study. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
SUBJECT AND VOCATIVE NOUN PHRASES IN IMPERATIVES 
3.0 Introduction 
As pointed out in the previous chapter (Section 2.1), 
the imperative construction has a constituent structure which 
is quite different from those of other sentence types. This 
difference has to do with the apparent separation between the 
subject and the predicate elements in the sentence. The 
situation is such that we cannot regard the predicate as a 
functor which accepts the subject NP as an argument. To do 
so would amount to denying the diference between the 
following sentences. 
(3.1.1)(a) The boy in the corner runs. (DECLARATIVE] 
(b) The boy in the corner run! [IMPERATIVE] 
Only the VP in (3.1.1) (a) can function as a functor which 
accepts its subject NP as its argument. The reference to the 
verb of the imperative as having a "base-form" does not 
obstruct the fact that there are no discernible grammatical 
relationships between the subject and the predicate elements 
of an imperative as there are between those of a declarative. 
As we shall see later, it is this aspect of the imperative 
that underlies some of the features that it has. 
As a result of this state of affairs, it is pertinent to 
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find out 
(a) why only a subset of the NPs in English can occur 
as subjects or as vocatives in these sentences, 
(b) what syntactic, semantic and pragmatic features 
characterize the NP's that do occur in these 
positions in the sentences, and, 
(c) what insight we might gain into- the nature of the 
imperative construction itself from the analysis of 
these NP'S. 
This chapter is aimed at resolving these problems. The 
issues I want to pursue are thus more fundamental than many 
of those that concerned linguists who have looked at subject 
and vocative NP's in the imperative before. As we saw in 
Chapter One (Sections 1.2 and 1.3), they were mainly 
interested in the classes of NP's that could occur in these 
sentences as subjects and vocatives, and the type of semantic 
features which they should possess in order to occur. (See 
also Thorne, 1966; Huddleston, 1971; Stockwell et al, 1973, 
and Davies, 1981). I would also like to show that a purely 
syntactic approach to these problems (like those of these 
linguists and others) is grossly inadequate, if not 
misleading, and so it would be worthwhile to examine the 
various issues that arise within the broad framework that has 
been outlined in the previous chapter. 
3.1 The Grammatical Relation of Subject 
I would like to begin the analysis with a close look at 
the concept of grammatical relations in order to see if it 
can be extended to the notion of subject in the imperative 
construction. I shall make passing references to the vocative. 
I consider two, of the recent theorieaaabout the concept of 
grammatical relations in the sentences of natural languages. 
Cne is contained in Chomsky (1981) and the other in Dowty 
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(1982)(a) and (b); ' They both claim to have a universal 
application across natural languages. In relation to 
imperatives in English, we expect these proposals not only to 
identify the NP's that are subjects in these sentences but 
also to resolve the controversy about their role as agents 
of the actions specified in the sentences. I examine the 
proposals in turn. 
Chomsky claims that NP's are particularly affected by a 
number of subsystems, including the 8-theory, the binding 
theory and the control theory. He explains: 
8-theory is concerned with the assignment of thematic 
roles such as a ent-of-action, etc. ... . einding theory is concerned with the relations of anaphors, pronouns, names 
and variables to possible antecedents .... Control theory determines the potential for reference of the 
abstract pronominal PRO. (Chomsky, 1981: 5-6). 
In this system, subject NP's are obligatory for clauses as 
demonstrated by the following rule (p. 25): 
(3.1.1) S ----> NP IPNFL VP. 
2 
Chomsky contends that notions like "agent-of-action" have to 
do with semantic description and so belong to the Logical 
Form (LF). Therefore, expressions like "the man", "John" and 
"he" are assigned 8-roles (i. e., thematic roles) at the LF. 
According to him, the head of the VP does not subcategorize 
an NP as subject. It is the entire VP that 6-marks it as 
such. This system thus, postulates that subject NP's are 
derived from the D- and S-structure in line with the rule in 
(3.1.1), but they become A-marked later' at the LF. , 
Chomsky gives the following construction (p. 40) as an example 
of an expression in which NP's are assigned 8-roles. 
(3.1.2) persuade John to leave 
If we provide the example in (3.1.2) with a referring NP as 
its subject and treat it as an imperative sentence along the 
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lines of Chomsky's proposals, we will derive the sentence 
in (3.1.3). 
(3.1.3) The lady in front persuade John to leave. 
Chomsky's system thus appears to have made a correct 
prediction with regard to the ability if the entire VP to 6- 
mark an NP in subject position (in this case, "the lady in 
front") for the role of agent-of-action. The traditional 
assumption is that the subject of an imperative is the agent 
of the action mentioned in the rest of the sentence. Chomsky 
(Ibid. : 35) compares this assumption with the notions in the 
case relations of Fillmore (1968), the semantic relations of 
Katz (1964) and the thematic relations of Jackendoff (1972) 
and Gruber (1967). Nevertheless, I would say the ability of 
the Q-theory to account for the problems presented by the 
imperative subject NP ends here. 
The theory leaves many questions unanswered. For 
example, it fails to tell us under what conditions the VP of 
a sentence assigns 0-roles to its subject. In other words, 
it has nothing to say about the phenomenon that allows only a 
small subset of NPs to occur as subjects in a sentence like 
an imperative. It could be said therefore that the problems 
we are facing here are more complex than what can be treated 
under the 8-theory. 
Chomsky's subsystem also fails to account for the role 
of the vocative NP in the imperative (as well as in other 
sentence types). If the semantico-thematic role of agent-of- 
action must be assigned to the subject of an imperative, so 
must it be assigned also to the vocative in the sentence. 
The reason for this is the fact that on purely semantic 
grounds, the vocative NP does nothing in the sentence but 
identify the addressee of the sentence and so the agent of the 
intended action. Mut since the vocative NP does not stand 
in any grammatical relation to the verb, it does not get 
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6-marked, yet it. occurs in the imperative as the agent-of- 
actiori. The theory does not seem to have anything in the D- 
and S-structure to distinguish* between an NP that ends up 
as a subject and one that becomes a vocative. 
Perhaps it should be assumed that the vocative NP is not 
transformationally inserted into the structure. If so, 
it must then be present in the D- and S-structure along with 
the subject NP. What is not known therefore is how the 
theory can sort out the complex relationships between these 
two elements at its various levels of analysis in view of the 
fact that they both refer to the same entity in the world 
when they co-occur in the same sentence, as the examples in 
(3.1.4) show. 
(3.1.4)(a) John, you come over here. 
(b) You stop that taxi, John. 
(c) Don't you behave like that again, John. 
Therefore, even if we were to accept that subjecthood is a 8- 
role assigned at the LF, we would still be left wondering how 
the vocative NP would be treated at the various levels -- the 
D- and S-structure and the LF. 
This question of the relation of "subject" was earlier 
discussed by Chomsky when he observed: 
It might be suggested that Topic-Comment is the basic 
grammatical relation of surface structure corresponding 
(roughly) to the fundamental Subject-Predicate relation 
of deep structure. Thus we might define the Topic-of 
the Sentence as the 
left-most 
NP immediately dominated 
by S in the surface structure .... (Chomsky, 1965: 221). 
There is considerable doubt about treating imperative subject 
NP's as Topics and the predicates as Comments. However, it 
does appear that only those sentences in which sv. bject and 
predicate elements are syntactically linked are open to 
Topic-Comment analysis. Again, declaratives fit into this 
class, but imperatives do not. (See Keenan, 1976; Schwartz, 
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1976, and Givon,, 1976, for the notion of Subject with regard 
to Topic and Comment). Nevertheless, this earlier suggestion 
by Chomsky gives no clue about the factors that qualify NP's 
to occur as subjects in these sentences. 
Dowty, for his part, channels his proposals via the 
general theory of Montague Grammar. His main contention is 
that the relations of "subject", "indirect object" and 
"direct object" are simply the results of the inter- 
relationships between syntactic categories in the sentence. 
His argument hinges on a principle which states that 
a function of N arguments can always be equivalently 
represented as a function of one argument that yields a 
function of N-1 arguments as its value. (Dowty, 
1982(a): 84). 
According to this principle, a verb that takes N arguments 
will be able to produce, with the help of a rule of one 
argument, the same phrase as a verb that takes N-1 
arguments. In order to find out how the principle actually 
works, we first of all look at the rules that are involved. 
They possess two important aspects: their structure and their 
operation. Here are some examples (Dowty, Ibid.: 85). 
(3.1.5)(a) Si : <F1, <IV, T>, t> [Subject-Predicate 
rule). 
(b) S2 : <F21 <TV, T>, IV> (Verb-Direct object 
rule]. 
Each rule has three main sections. The first contains Fl or 
F2, and represents the syntactic operation of the rule. This 
specifies the relevant relationships that obtain between the 
categories in question. The second contains the categories 
themselves which are the inputs to the rule. The third 
contains the result of the syntactic operation of the rule, 
i. e., the phrase that the rule yields as its value. Let's 
take Dowty's illustration of this with loves, a verb 
of two arguments (p. 86). 
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(3.1.6) (Mary loves him) t 
Mary T (love him] IV 
love TV he T 
The combination of loves and him yields the category IV (i. e., 
a VP, as is usually the case in generative grammar) 
We now take another verb, the intransitive verb snores, 
which is a verb of one argument. 
(3.1.7) Samson snores. 
Since loves represents a function of N arguments, snores is 
thus a function that yields N-1 arguments. 
(3.1.6) [Samson snores] t 
Samson T snore IV 
What the analysis trees in (3.1.6) and (3.1.3) have revealed 
is that whereas you need two syntactic operations to capture 
the predicate relation (represented by IV) in the To=er, you 
need only one in the latter. As rule Sl in (3.1.5)(a) 
shows, the combination of T and IV phrases yields a t, a 
sentential expression. It thus appears that a function of N 
arguments (represented here by the analysis in (3.1.6) has 
the same value (i. e., t) as a function of N-1 arguments 
(represented here by the analysis in (3.1.8)). It is the 
relationships between the categories, that is, the way and 
order in which they combine, which, according to Dowty, 
determines the relation of "subject" and others. The subject 
NP is thus the category that is an argument to an IV as a 
functor. 
Like that of Chomsky, Dowty's system recognizes the 
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Subject-Predicate dichotomy, although they arrive at it in 
different ways. Also like that of Chomsky, it does not in 
any way help us to resolve the problem of selecting NP's for 
subjecthood in the imperative construction. We are not 
simply interested in identifying the NP that is subject in an 
imperative sentence, we also want to know what such an NP can 
reveal about the imperative construction itself, as explained 
above. 
On the question of the functor-argument relationship (in 
this case, the combination of IV-and T-phrases) as the basis 
for the creation of the relation of subject, we would like to 
say that the imperative construction appears to present a 
counter example. It seems necessary to distinguish between 
sentence types where there are grammatical relations (see, 
for example, Bach, 1979, and, Klein and Sag, 1982) between 
subject-and predicate elements on the one hand, and on the 
other, those where there seem to be none. 3 One can cite a 
declarative as an example of the former and an imperative of 
the latter. 
It can also be noted that Dowty's proposals make no 
attempt to describe the internal structure of each NP, an 
aspect which, I suppose, is quite significant in determining 
whether or not an NP can occur as a subject or as a vocative. 
Of equal importance is the nature of the constituents that 
make up each NP, as the examples in (3.1.9) indicate. 
ß. 1.9)(a) *The boy come here! [IMPERATIVE]. 
(b) *He, what are you doing? 
(c) *John, he must go there. [DECLARATIVE]. 
As we shall see in the next Section, the subject NP in 
(3.1.9)(a) must be specified further for it to be subject 
in the imperative sentence. As for the vocatives in 
(3.1 
. 9) 
(b) and ( 3.1 . 9) 
(c) 
,I am assuming an identity of 
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reference between them and the subject NP's in each case. ;_ 
cept in the case of you, vocatives are not pronominalized as 
(3-1-9)(b) shows, and what is more, any NP that will be 
subject, where the above identity of reference is relevent, 
must be such that can reflect this identity. Thus, there is 
more to the organization of subject than the syntactic 
relationship between subject and predicate that Dowty has 
tried to describe. 
From the point of view of the imperative construction, 
we can say that Dowty"s system, like that of Chomsky before 
it, is grossly inadequate as a model for the treatment of the 
notion of "subject" and "vocative". The issues raised by 
these entities in the imperative are more wide-ranging than 
can be handled by both theories, with all their emphasis on 
syntax. 
Cn this issue of grammatical relations, Gazdar, Klein, 
Pullum and Sag (1985) make a number of suggestions in relation 
to the incorporation of aspects of semantics. ? irstly, they 
point out that notions like "subject", "direct object" and 
"indirect object" should be related to sentences which 
express truth values. Secondly, they propose a system in 
which NP's playing these roles in sentences should be 
identified as subject, direct object and indirect object 
according to the order in which they become arguments to 
functors in structures which express truth values under 
translations into intensional logic (IL). On this principle, 
therefore, they identify the subject of a sentence as a "1 - 
argument". (The direct object and the indirect object are 
thus 112 - argument" and "3 - argtment" respectively). 
It is also significant to consider the issue of S-mean- 
ing, apart from that of proposition's, in the characterization 
of Subject.. Therefore, it appears that Dowty's proposal 
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can only be realistically applied to sentences which clearly 
express truth values in translation. The issue that arises 
now is which sentences actually express truth values in this 
way. This has thus thrown back at us the question as to 
whether or not imperatives express truth values. 
What we are now beginning to see for the first time is 
the fact that the notions of subject and vocative NP's in the 
imperative are closely. related to the long-standing contro- 
versy about S-meanings, truth. -values and propositions ' 
in sentences. As we have seen in Chapter One (Sections 1.5 
and 1.6), there has not been any satisfactory solution to the 
problem that the question raises. 
The present analysis has tried to demonstrate the 
inadequacies of approaching the issue of grammatical 
relations of (and other notions about) subject and vocative 
solely from the point of view of syntax, whether or not it 
tries to incorporate thematic notions like "agent-of-action" 
which I shall examine more closely later in this chapter. We 
must now try an alternative approach which can take account 
of the fact that subject and vocative NP's in imperatives are 
distinct syntactic categories which, in the same sentence, 
would have an identical referent and perform the same 
semantic function. In order to cover as many aspects of the 
problem as possible, it is pertinent to allow the present 
approach to include certain aspects of pragmatics as 
suggested above. All this, I hope, will lead us to a fuller 
understanding of the imperative construction than before. 
3.2 Syntax 
A) Structural Configurations of Imperative Subject NP's. 
We can identify about four subsets of NP's which can be 
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subjects in the imperative construction. Most of them 
contain indexical expressions which capture the fact that the 
referent in each case must be present in the context of use. 
ONE: The common features of this sub-group are that 
each NP must 
(a) begin with a definite article, and, 
(b) end with a post-modifying expression. 
There is an important aspect of the structure of these NP's 
which must be made clear. This has to do with certain 
elements which function as adjectives in them. Let's begin 
with an adjective like tall, as in the following examples. 
(3.2.1)(a) A tall boy is waiting for you. 
(b) Jackson is quite tall. 
It occurs in a pre-nominal position in (3.2.1)(a). In 
(3.2.1)(b), it is used predicatively. This is however not 
exactly the way that the expressions like in the corner 
behave. We have, 
(3.2.2)(a) The girl in the corner is sitting down. 
(b). The girl is sitting down in the corner. 
and there is no case where any such expression can occur in a 
pre-nominal position like tall. With regard to the 
imperative subject NP, it is necessary to draw a distinction 
between adjectives like tall which occur in a pre-nominal 
position, as in (3.2.1)(a), and expressions like in the 
corner which occur in a post-nominal position, as in 
(3.2.2)(a). The point is that this expression can only be a 
post-modifier of an Np, not a pre-modifier, with a unique 
relationship with the rest of the NP in which it occurs as we 
shall see soon. 4 Therefore, the term "qualifier" (QUA] can 
be used to describe an adjective which occurs in front of a 
noun and is a sister to it, and the term "modifier" [MOD] for 
any expression which occurs in a post-nominal position in a 
noun phrase and is a sister to. the Head N. 
5 
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The significance of the above characterization consists 
in the distinction it makes between elements which are 
sisters to nouns and those which are sisters to noun phrases, 
without referring to the possibility of their occurring 
predicatively. Imperative subject NP's which contain the 
post-modifiers thus have the following configurations. 
(3.2.3)(a) The boy who arrived late yesterday 
(b) The lady to be crowned 
(c) The men standing the window 
(d) The students in the room 
We can represent these noun phrases in the following NP- 
expansion rules. 
(3.2.4) NP -----> Det H 
-----> H ({S[+R], VP[+INF), VP[+PSP], 
VP[+PRP], VP[+PAS), PP, ADVP}) 
where "H" is a symbol representing the head 
daughter. (See Gazdar et al, 1985). 
Examples of expressions which constitute these 
categories are as follows. 
S[+R] who arrived late yesterday, 
and other relative clauses. 
6 
VP(+INF] to be crowned, and other 
infinitival expressions. 
VP[+PRP] standing the window and 
similar participial phrases. 
PP . in the room and similar expressions. 
N boy, driver, and similar nouns. 
Det the, some, etc. 
We may represent them in the tree diagrams in (3.2.5). 
We can note that although the post-modifying expressions are 
varied, the over-all configurations of the NP's are similar. 
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(3.2.5)(a) NP 
Det 
the NS [+R) 
K who a--rived yesterday 
boy 
(b) NP 
Det 
the N VP r+IT Fj 
N' to be crowned 
I 
lady 
TWO: This sub-class of NP's is composed of expressions 
some of which are traditionally referred to as partitives. 
They include the following: 
(3.2.5)(a) Some of you. 
(b) Five of you. 
(C) The tallest of you. 
(d) Somebody among you. 
(e) The youngest (boy) among you. 
There are many varieties of these expressions but most of 
them are not truly-or fully partitive in nature. For 
example, Selkirk (1977: 302-303) distinguishes between those 
she calls "simple noun phrases" like 
(3.2.6)(a) a number of objections 
(b) three pounds of that stew meat 
(c) a bushel of the apples 
(d) loads of them 
fron those she regards as "quantifier phrase partitives". 
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Her examples of the latter include the following (Ibid. ): 
(3.2.7) 
many of 
the 
apples 
I quite agree with these distinctions and I would like to say 
that it is not always the case that an of-phrase modifying a 
quantified noun would turn it into a partitive NP, as the 
examples in (3.2.6) show. A tree diagram for an example with 
of you looks like this. 
(3.2.8) i. P 
Det 
Five N PP 
A} of you 
Proper partitives tend to have ordinary nouns in the 
positions where we have you in (3.2.8), as we can see in the 
examples in (3.2.7). As Selkirk has also indicated (p. 303), 
true partitives do tend to have the options of simple forms. 
(3.2.9) many apples 
but we cannot have 
(3.2.10) *Many you. 
We must accept though that all of these NP's are what 
have been called "measure phrases". However, it may be con- 
tended that with regard to the imperative construction, the 
of- and among-phrases are mere modifiers of the noun phrases 
that go with them. They are thus on the same footing as the 
modifiers we came across in sub-group ONE of imperative 
subject NP's above. It is the initial N''s that are heads of 
the phrases; it is they too that carry the quantification, 
where that is relevant. We shall see later in the chapter 
what all these modifiers can tell us about the semantic and 
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pragmatic conditions in which the imperative occurs. 
We can therefore represent these NP's in tree diagrams 
that are quite similar to those provided for sub-group ONE. 
(3.2.11)(a) NP 
Det 
i 
some N PP 
<> lip 
of the boys 
(b) NP 
Det 
the Ad j p1 
1 
tallest N pp 
<f>P NP 
li of you 
A curious aspect of these NP's is the absence of the Head 
N "'s in expressions like the strongest of you, Live at you 
and many of you, as the examples in (3.2.11) show. 
THREE: This subset comprises NP's like those in 
(3.2.12) which ordinarily have the syntactic features 
LNP +PRO, -DEF, +PER] 
(3.2.12)(a) Everybody 
(b) Someone 
I doubt very much if these NP's should be distinguished from 
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some of those treated under TWO above. Although it appears 
to be the case that the phrase among you is presupposed or 
understood (see Schmerling, 1982: 208) when they are used, 
each of them now seems to have an individuality of its own as 
a possible imperative subject. If this is correct, it will 
be pertinent to examine the semantico-pragmatic conditions 
that warrant this development in order to determine, among 
other things, whether or not it is obligatory for the 
addressee of the speech event to be present in the context of 
use. We shall return to this in the next section. 
FOUR: This last subset consists of the following: 
(3.2.13)(a) You boy 
(b) You 
As we saw in Chapter One, Thorne (1966) has argued that you, 
as it occurs in (3.2.13) (a), is behaving as a definite 
article, and so, it is a replacement for the in that 
environment. Postal (1966: 203) has also expressed a similar 
opinion. I would however like to say that the issue raised 
here is more subtle than is generally realized. There 
appears to be a strong connection between you boy and you 
as subjects of imperative sentences. The you in (3.2.13)(a) 
seems to be a pre-modifier that enables its NP to play the same 
grammatical role as the structure [the +N+ MODIFIER] does 
in the case of the NP's in sub-group ONE. That this should 
happen is a reflection, I believe, of the nature of the* 
imperative itself. We can therefore say that in that 
environment, you is more than a definite article, contrary to 
the views of Thorne. It still carries with it that aspect of 
it$ nature which enables it to occur alone as a subject in a 
position where other NP's would require identifying modifiers 
to do so. This is a feature of you that makes its characteri- 
zation as subject in the imperative very problematic. 
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Therefore, It is clear that in this position, being a definite 
article or functioning as a part of a definite description is 
only one of the requirements for imperative subjecthood, as 
we have seen in the structures (3.2.3) above. 
We look at a number of NP's which are similar in 
structure to some of those we have examined above but which 
cannot occur in the imperative construction. Our first 
observation is that the following structure 
(3.2.14) [the +N+ MODIFIER] 
seems obligatory for NP's which look like "identifying 
descriptions". Consequently, the NP's in (3.2.15) are 
incapable of becoming subjects in imperatives. 
(3.2.15)(a) A girl who likes swimming. 
(b) A man to plant the flowers. 
(c) Some people looking at it. 
(d) Two men in the car. 
it may also be cbserved that NP's containing demonstratives 
cannot occur as subjects in the sentences 
(3.2.16)(a) *This boy come here. 
(b) ? That girl sit down. 
That these NP's cannot be subjects is not strange because, as 
noted above, a structure configured as (Det + N) is incapable 
of occurring as subject unless the first element in the 
structure has the same grammatical role and se::. antic 
interpretation as the example in (3.2.14) above. Similarly, 
NP's like the (tall) girl do not nor:, -, ally occur as subjects. 
We can also note that whereas the addition of modifiers 
to the structure [the + N] enables the resultant NP's to 
occur as subjects, this cannot happen in structures like 
(this/that + N], except perhaps in the dubious case of 
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(3.2.17). 
(3.2.17) ? Tb at boy looking at me come here! 
The last group I want to consider cannot also be helped 
by any post-modifying expression: for example, 
(3.2.18)(a) * son stand there. 
(b) * son in the room come out! 
(c) *Your children listen to him. 
(d) *Your children here keep quiet! 
(e) *Their students report for games later. 
(f) *Their students with us keep quiet! 
All these NP's raise an important question about the nature 
of the imperative which I shall return to in Chapter Five. 
The above patternings of the NP's are given in TABLE ONE. 
TABLE ONE 
SUB-SET DET QUALIFIER NOUN MODIFIER 
who came late, 
to sit there, 
ONE the boy 
looking at it, 
in front/there 
the tallest of you 
the youngest boy among you 
TWO SOME of you 
one of you 
nobody 
THREE 
everybody 
(here) 
you boy 
FOUR 
you 
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B) Vocative NP's. 
Vocative NP's. usually constitute separate tone groups in 
sentences. They are traditionally regarded as "nouns of 
address"; and, as we have seen in Section 3.1 above, they do 
not enter into grammatical relations with the verbs of the 
sentences in which they occur. They seem to divide into two 
groups. Group (i) consists of proper nouns, personal names. 
(3.2.19)(a) Sue, put on your hat! 
(b) Wait a minute, Mr. Anderson. 
Group (ii) comprises common nouns used as "titles" either in 
a derogatory manner, as in (3.2.20)(a), where they seem to 
occur only in sentence-final positions, or as a mark of 
respect, as in (3.2.20)(b), or for the purpose of showing 
affection, as in (3.2.20)(c). 
(3.2.20(a) Keep quiet, fool. 
(b) Your Excellency, send them away! 
(c) Leave that to me, my son. 
Vocative NPs are very simple in structure. They rarely 
exceed two words in length, and so constructions like those 
in (3.2.21) are unacceptable. 
(3.2.21) (a) *A group of boys, stand up! 
(b) *Stop that, some boys over there. 
However, some expressions which begin with wh-words stand out 
as clear exemptions to this simplicity of form. ? 
(3.2.22)(a) Open the door, whoever yoou may be. 
(b) Whoever wants to buy one, call 
KOKO, freephone 000. 
The above expressions contrast with the following, which 
have to do with actions or words identifying not the addres- 
sees of the imperatives but some other objects that partici- 
pate in the connanded events. 
(3.2.23)(a) Whatever you're doing, stop it. 
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(b). Don't listen to him, whatever he says. 
C) Similarities and Differences between Subjects and 
Vocatives. 
It may be argued that as structures used for the purpose 
of address, vocatives need to have short, simple forms. A 
preponderance of possible vocative NP's seem to have these 
forms. However, subject NPs also have such forms, as sub- 
sets THREE and FOUR in TABLE ONE show. Therefore, simplicity 
of form is not restricted to vocative NP's. If the 
structures in (3.2.22) are anything to go by, the similarity 
in form between subject and vocative NPs is greater than 
may. be expected. (See Davies 1981). 
(3.2.24)(a) Alfred, kick that ball away. 
(b) Somebody kick that ball away. [SUBJECTJ 
(c) The captain of the team, take it! 
(d) The man at the back come forward. [SUBJECT] 
Despite the similarities observed above, the differences 
between the two groups of NP's are remarkable. Still on the 
question of form, there is no doubt that subject NP's have a 
wider range of configurations than vocative NP's. Of 
particular interest is the nature of the elements that make 
up each category of NP. Whereas vocatives invariably choose 
non-locative post-modifiers like on calf in charge 
and of the tea;, in examples where such expressions occur, 
subjects regularly choose locative ones. 
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(3.2.25)(a) The owner of this bike, come here! 
(b) The lady in the room answer that call, 
please. 
(c) The man in charge, come back tomorrow. 
(d) The boy in front stop shouting! 
This takes us to the use of comma to mark off the 
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vocative NP from the rest of its sentence -- one of the most 
obvious features separating it from a subject NP. The 
presence of this punctuation mark in the imperative tells us 
a great deal about the nature of the imperative. It carries 
the strong impression that the vocative is natural to 
the imperative construction with regard to fore. The 
nature of this sentence type is such that it does not need to 
have the subject NP or the vocative NP overtly expressed. 
The form without any of these is thus said to be the basic 
form of the imperative. If that is the case, the presence of 
these two entities in these sentences must be in response to 
certain needs. It will suffice to claim here that the 
conditions that necessitate the existence of the vocative are 
just as strong as those that call for that of the subject, 
even though it is the latter that has got all the attention 
in generative grammar. 
Another area where there are differences between subject 
and vocative NP's has to do with intonation patterns. What 
is significant here is the extent to which they modify the 
range of intonation contours of a variety of imperatives. 
Generally, imperative intonation contours vary in 
accordance with the specific attitudinal meaning that the 
speaker wishes to convey. (See O'Connor and Arnold, 1973; 
Schubiger, 1972, Bolinger, 1977 and 1982). it appears that 
vocative NPs more readily fit into the pattern that 
O'Connor and Arnold call the High Drop than subject NP's, 
except, of course, you. 
(3.2.26)(a) \Burn it. (O'Connor and Arnold, Ibid.: 56). 9 
(b) 'John, t'burn it. 
(c) The lboy who arrived today \burn it. 
Although burn still receives the nuclear stress in the 
sentence, the scope of the pitch fall seems to be smaller. 
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It is however doubtful whether any subject NP with a shorter 
structure would have been suitable. Those like nobody and 
everybody do not seem quite appropriate in such a context. 
This thus brings us to the case of you. 
In most cases, no matter which tone is used (O'Connor 
and Arnold have identified ten of them), the imperative verb 
receives a primary stress. But the presence of you as a 
subject does, at times, shift stress prominence away from the 
verb to the subject, a feature that vocative NP's do not seem 
to have. This is often referred to as 1"contrastive 
stress". The contrast is believed to exist between the 
referent of the subject and another entity in the context of 
use. It could be the speaker, but it need not be. 
(3.2.27)(a) (You °fight your ^own °battles. (O"Oconnor 
and Arnold, Ibid.: 81, using the "Jacl ife". 
(b) You suggest an a1^ternaýtive: 
This kind of stress also represents a significant 
feature that intonation has in the imperative. It shows 
the uniqueness of this sentence type. For example, it is 
probably the only means of separating the declarative in 
(3.2.28)(a) from the imperative in (3.2.28)(b). 
(3.2.28)(a) You ldrive your car to %work. 
(b) 1You °drive°your &car to %work. 
The contrastive stress on you combines with the falling tone 
on work to mark out the sentence in (3.2.28)(b) as an 
imperative. The declarative in (3.2.28)(a) has some of 
the general intonation features generally associated with 
imperatives: a primary stress on the verb and a falling tone. 
To summarize, I would say that by and large NP's that 
can occur in imperatives as subjects tend to have certain 
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structural configurations and use certain post modifying 
expressions in order to do so. Other NP's which have similar 
configurations, but lack the appropriate post modifiers, 
cannot occur as subjects. (See TABLE ONE above). Quantifiers 
associated with such modifiers, even though they are not 
overtly expressed, can also function as subjects. Vocatives 
do not have these post modifiers and so it is not the case 
that subject and vocative NP's can inter-change positions in 
the imperative. 
Like subject NP's, vocatives also come from a highly 
restricted set of NP's which are made up of those which are 
either personal names, or nick-names or other forms of 
address used for a variety of reasons. 
There is a great deal of similarity in form in some of 
the NPs. But the differences are notable. They occur not 
only in their syntactic functions but also in their 
deployment of the intonational conventions of English. It 
has also been noted that the use of contrastive stress by 
the imperative subject NP you is one of the means by which 
the imperative sentence type can be distinguished from other 
sentence types. 
3.3 Semantics 
A) Compositional Semantics of Subject and Vocative NP's. 
The principle of compositional semantics rests on the 
claim, noted in Chapter Two, that the meaning or sense of a 
complex expression is a function of the meanings or senses of 
its parts. One consequence of this principle is the need to 
identify the parts that make up such complex expressions. 
They are then assigned logical TYPES which serve as inputs to 
the rules gor forming such a complex expression. 
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I intend to apply this principle here mainly to subject 
NP's in imperatives. The vocatives of the sentences will 
also be considered, at least for the purpose of ascertaining 
the kinds of logical TYPES which they are. Nevertheless, it 
is the subject NP's that present the main problem in this 
aspect of the analysis. 
(1) CATEGORIES 
Montague Grammar has a set of expressions for some non- 
empty expressions, which include the following (see Montague, 
1973). 
(3.3.1) e= {an individual or entity} 
t= {sentence category) 
IV = {run, walk, talk, rise, change) 
TV = {find, lose, eat, love, date, etc. } 
IAV = {rapidly, sowly, voluntrarily, etc. ) 
T= {John, Mary, Bill, ninety, heg, etc. ) 
CN = {man, woman, park, fish, pen, etc. ) 
DET = {every, the, an} 
All of these expresions, except the first two, are basic 
expressions. One interesting aspect of the expressions is 
that most of them are categorially defined to combine with 
certain categories only. For example, the category T is 
defined as t/IV. By the rule of functional application, it 
can combine only with IV expressions to produce an expression 
of category t, as in Dowty's Subject-Predicate Rule in Section 
3.1. Another example is the relationship between the basic 
expressions man and the. The category DET is defined as T/CN 
whereas man belongs to the category CN. The complex expres- 
sion the man will then be a member of the category T, again 
by the rule of functional application as follows: 
(3.3.2) T/CN . CN =T 
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For example, from the members of categories T and IV (see, 
(3.3.1) above), the following sentences can be produced 
through the rule of functional appliction: 
(3.3.3)(a) John sings. 
(b) The man smiles. 
I have gone into some detail about the formation of 
complex structures in Montague Grammar in order to show that 
its rules (which relate to declaratives) are unsuitable for 
the imperative construction. This is not a rejection of the 
theory itself, but a realization that the imperative is 
unique (and problematic) among sentence types, especially 
with regard to the categorial analysis of its subject NP's 
and VP's. I elaborate. 
(a) It does not appear to be the case that imperative 
subject NPs combine with their verbs as Tos and 
IV's to produce t-expressions. Combinations of 
this sort, as pointed out in Section 3.1, are 
suitable for sentences that express propositions 
which may be described as true or false. 
(b) T-phrases in Montague Grammar can be subjects, 
objects etc., but this is not so in imperatives; 
e. g., a boy. 
(c) Although it is the convention in this theory to see 
NP's like the man, and John as members of the 
same category, it fails to capture the situation 
in the imperative where such expressions do not 
perform exactly the same range of syntactic func- 
tions as. they do in declaratives. The gra matical 
relation of subject in imperatives is an example. 
We are again confronted with the fact that grammatical 
principles and devices that are suitable for declaratives may 
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not be so for imperatives. It is thus pertinent to find out 
the nature of the categories that make up possible imperative 
subject NP's on the basis of the principle of surface compo- 
sitional analysis. (See von Stechow, 1980, and Janoeen, 1981). 
I would say that a compositional analysis of imperative 
subject NP's must reflect two features of the constructions, 
(a) the fact that they are related to the context of use of 
the sentences, and (b) the fact that they do not enter into 
any functional relationship with their co-occurring VP's as 
it is the case in declaratives. To simplify the discussion, 
I shall analyse only the following construction 
(3.3.4) the man in the corner 
as a possible imperative subject. The consequence of having 
the feature (a) is that the translation of the (which exists 
in MS and some varieties of predicate logic) as 
(3.3.5) AP[ItQ3y[Vx[P{x} <-> x= y]A Q{y}]] 
(Dowty et al, 1981: 195). 
must be ignored since it fails to capture the semantic nature 
of the the that occurs as the first component of the above 
expression. So, this translation, which reflects Russel's 
(1905) characterization of the, does not make any reference 
to any particular context at all. On the contrary, it 
appears to be just suitable for the interpretation of the 
where it occurs in sentences which express truth values, as 
the last section of it shows (see also Strawson, 1950, and, 
Johnson-Laird and Garnham, 1980). This brings in the feature 
(b) above, i. e., that the NP's are not defined to function as 
arguments to predicates as functors. The immediate conse- 
quence of taking the above aspects of the NP's into account 
is that it justifies the treatment of imperative subject NP's 
as partial functions. In this sense, they are interpreted 
here as functions from the Context of Use, designated by the 
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symbol s, to a set of individuals. 
Lets regard the set of possible imperative subject NP's 
as members of a set represented by the semantic type Tim, for 
the sake of convenience. (Other symbols representing two 
other components are given in TABLE TWO below). It can then 
be said to belong to the semantic TYPE defined as <s, e>. As 
explained in Chapter Two, Section 2.4 above, the notion of 
the Context of Use is crucial for the imperative construc- 
tion. It is for this reason that I hesitate to characterize 
the TYPE <s, e> simply as a denotaton of an individual concept 
as it is done in MS. The analysis desired here is the type 
which will not only be sensitive to modifiers like 
(3.3.6) who came here yesterday looking at the window in front of the door 
to take up the posts 
but also the semantic features that mark out the imperative 
in the following sentences. 
(3.3.7)(a) The man in the corner sweeps the roads. 
(b) Will the man in the corner sweep the roads? 
(c) The man in the corner sweep the roads! 
Whereas the NP the man in the corner is subcategorized in the 
declarative and, probably, the interrogative in (3.3.7)(a) 
and (3.3.7)(b) respectively to combine with their VP's, it is 
a different matter in the example in (3.3.7)(c), as I shall 
explain further in Chapter Five. 
We now have to provide a categorial definition of 
possible imperative subject NP's on the basis of the rule of 
functional application. l° The essence of the present 
description of the phrases which are members of the Category 
Tim consists in the fact that they will not be defined to 
combine with IV-phrases in imperatives as T-phrases do in 
other sentences. 
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The various elements in the NP's of the imperative which 
we have been discussing are set out, with their categorial 
definitions, in the following table. 
TABLE TWO 
category l Semantic TYPE 
Tim 
K 
<s, e> 
Cs<e, t» 
Exilres si on 
the man in the corner the shortest man among you 
the prettiest of you 
Five of you 
Soil IeboQ among you 
nobody among you) 
everybody here 
etc. 
man who came here yesterda; 
woman to sit on the chair 
man sleeping on the sofa boy in the kitchen 
<> of you 
girl among you 
girl here 
etc. 
XI <s<e, t>><s, e>> the 
We would like to put vocative NP's under a similar 
category as those of subject NP's. This cateory may be 
called Category Vim. The significance of this will become 
obvious later. Members of this category are normally not 
defined to combine with any verbal category by any rule. 
FORMATION RULE 
Although the rule of functional application has been 
rejected as a means of capturing the subject-predicate 
relationship in the imperative, it is quite adequate for 
defining the internal structural set-up within each subject 
NP. I can therefore provide a recursive definition of the 
categories as follows: 
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(3.3.8) If A is a syntactic category, and B is a syn- 
tactic category, then A/B is also a syntactic 
category. 
In the present proposal, the definition in (3.3.8) ensures 
that expressions of the various categories are combined in 
appropriate manners in algebraic operations similar to the 
example in (3.3.2) above. 
Quite unexpectedly (in view if their restricted syntac- 
tic functions in imperatives), vocative NP's present a tricky 
situation here. I do not want to claim that a proper noun 
like John has a different meaning as a vocative in impera- 
tives from what it has as a vocative in declaratives or some 
other sentences. At the same time, it is not the case that 
when you say, 
(3.3.9) John, wait for me. 
you may possibly be using the sentence within an "oblique 
context" in the sense that in any possible world in which 
there is John, you want him to wait for you! Therefore, the 
indekical conditions which surround the use of NP's like John 
as vocatives in the imperative, as pointed out in Chapter 
Two, Section 2.4, must therefore be considered. I therefore 
represent vocatives by the syntatic category Vim as stated 
above. ll I shall return to the issue of what semantic type 
which the category Vim should have shortly. I shall consider 
the notion of the context of use, and how the above logical 
TYPES fit into them, when I attempt a model theoretic inter- 
pretaton of these sentences in Chapter Five. 
The above formation rule is a rule of functional appli- 
cation that applies to subject NP's in imperatives. it 
cannot be applied to vocative NP's like John and Sue if they 
do not form complex expressions with other entities. 
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The rule also motivates the analysis tree in (3.3.10) in 
which the semantic TYPES are specified. 
(3.3.10)(a) The boy in the corner Tim 
<s, e> 
the boy in the corner 
<<s<e, t»<s, e» <s<e, t>> 
boy in the corner 
<s<e, t>> «s<e, t»<s, <e, t»> 
in the corner 
«s, e>«s<e, t>><s<e, t» > <s, e> 
the corner 
<<s<e, t>><s, e>> <s<e, t>> 
The name of the category that represents expressions 
which function as vocatives in imperatives is given as vim. 
There is reason, however, to suppose that the semantic TYPE 
of vocatives may not be different from that of subjects in 
imperative sentences. The reason for this is the fact that 
although the two sets of NPs are distinguished syntac- 
tically, they perform the same semantic role in imperatives 
(i. e., that of agent-of-action). Furthermore, since Group 
(ii) vocatives (see Section 3.2 above) are related to the 
Context of Use in the sense that their specifications may be 
dictated by the state of affairs in such a Context, e. g., the 
leader of this team, it may be claimed that their semantic 
TYPE is the same as that of Tlm, i. e., <s, e> -- functions 
from the contexts of use to individuals. Group (i) voca- 
tives, i. e., personal names, are problematic since names are 
fixed designations and so are not determined by the Context 
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of Use. It is therefore uncertain whether they have the 
semantic TYPE <s, e>, like Group (ii) vocatives, in view of 
the fact that they may not refer to possible worlds as stated 
above, or (since they are fixed designations), the semantic 
TYPE «s, <e, t», t> -- a set of properties of individuals -- 
which T-Phrases have in Montague Grammar. Consequently, The 
category name Vim is used here as a convenient device for 
referring to both sets of vocatives; otherwise, at least 
Group (ii) vocatives are subsumed under the same semantic 
TYPE as Tlm, for different categories may have the same 
semantic TYPE in Montague Grammar. 
(3) SEMANTIC INTERPRETATIONS 
As stated above, the sort of semantic TYPES which we 
assign to these NPs demonstrate the types of semantical 
objects which they are. Let's consider, in some detail, why 
these NP's cannot correctly be said to have been quantified 
into intensional contexts. 
(i) none of them obligatorily occurs within the scope 
of 9, ý, P or F: entities which are known to have 
the capacity to create intensional contexts. 12 
(See McCawley (1981: Chapters 10 and 11) and Dowty 
(1981: 162-170). 
(ii) It is generally agreed that the imperative does 
not denote truth values (see Chapter One, Section 
6). Therefore, its propositional content is not 
as definite as that of the declarative. 
(iii) It is obvious, from the members of Category Tim 
that the imperative can only be interpreted at 
CURRENT INDEX and so any NP that is to be 
subject or vocative in it must be related in some 
way to this current index which has to do with 
the Context of Use. 
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(iv) Finally, I must thus give subject and vocative 
NPs in imperatives extensional, not intensional, 
interpretations, as I have done with the nature 
of the semantic TYPES which I have-assigned to 
them, where (a) subject NP's refer to indivi- 
duals that are indexically specified, and (b), 
where vocative NP's refer to entities which do not 
exist in every possible world or at every index, 
but at the current index (or in the context of 
use). Consequently, official or affectionate 
forms of address and, possibly, personal names are 
to be given such interpretations as are described 
above. 
The semantic interpretation of the imperative is there- 
fore a problem which requires a modification of the tradi- 
tional approach to doing a model-theoretic analysis. If the 
issue is to be pursued, it must be clear that the conception 
of the nature of the relevant intensions that will be charac- 
terized for the purpose of determining the propositional 
content of the imperative is distinguished from the concep- 
tion of the nature of the intensions which are characterized 
where the entire sentence is susceptible to a surface compo- 
sitional analysis as in the case of the declarative. It may 
be observed that whereas the identification of the propo- 
sitional content of the imperative seeks to capture the way 
in which the imperative may be said to be understood or the 
semant-ic function it is used to perform, a surface composi- 
tional analysis of the construction seeks to identify not 
only how the various parts of the sentence are interpreted, 
but also how the sentence organizes the denotations of such 
components, as the example in (3.3.10) shows. Whereas the 
notion of the Context of Use is given prominence in the 
latter approach, it is not so in the former, an we shall 
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see in Chapter Five, Section 2 below. 
B) Semantico-Pragmatic Characteristics of Subject NP's. 
Some of the aspects of imperative subject NP's that an 
adequate account of imperatives cannot ignore concern the 
rather dominant role that you plays in the imperative and the 
ever-present issue of the so-called zero-subject. As for the 
first issue, I tried, in Chapter One, to cover the arguments 
about the involvement of you in Reflexivization, Deletion, 
Tag-Construction and the claim that it might perhaps be the 
only real subject NP for imperatives. (See Sections 1.1-1.3). 
What most of the views expressed lack is an attempt to consi- 
der the semantico-pragmatic features that may at least in 
part be associated with the role that You plays in the sen- 
tences 
Examples like those in (3.3.12) have been used to try to 
justify the claim that you was indeed the "understood" sub- 
ject in subjectless imperatives. (C. f. Chomsky, 1955,1975; 
Wasow, 1979; Helke, 1979). 
(3.3.12)(a) Love yourself. 
(b) *Love myself. 
(c) *Love himself. 
(d) *Love herself. 
A semantico-syntactic approach to these sentences cannot 
hold, as the syntax-based approaches of the above-mentioned 
linguists have done, that only you could have been subject in 
(3.3.12)(a). In the first place, the subject of this impera- 
tive sentence does not have to be you for yourself to occur 
grammatically as the object of love in the sentence as the 
following examples show. 
(3.3.13)(a) The boy making that noise behave yourself. 
(b) The girl who broke the glass present 
yourself to your teacher. 
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The question we really have to ask is why does yourself occur 
in these sentences even though the second person pronoun you 
has not been used. I agree with Hausser (1981: 251-258) that 
the occurrence of the as in each sentence in (3.3.13) induces 
an existential presupposition. As : I: have argued above, this 
means, in the present case, that the referent of the NP must 
be present in the context of use. It follows therefore that 
in relation to the speaker, such an individual occupies the 
position of second person. So, the subject does not have to 
be you for the object of the verb to be yourself. Since the 
referent of the subject is present, the form of the subject 
is thus determined by the manner s(he) is identified by the 
speaker. 
The significance of this analysis lies in the fact that 
it resolves the problem of requiring every subject of every 
imperative sentence to have a [+ II person] feature (see 
Stockwell et al (1973: 646), a condition which raises the 
problem of how to make third-person NP's have second-person 
features and at the same time keep their identities as third- 
person NP's. Furthermore, it exposes the inadequacy in the 
suggestion of Culicover (1976: 149) that you deletion was 
possible in imperatives because they were AUX-less. The 
examples in (3.3.13) cast a serious doubt upon the correc- 
tness of this claim. (See Chapter One, Section 1.3). 
The problem raised by zero-subject can be resolved in 
the same way. Since the presence of the speaker and the 
addressee in the context of use is no longer in doubt, it is 
pertinent to find out if we can see some logic or some prag- 
matic necessity in the manner in which the former selects the 
members of the set of possible imperative subjects. In this 
sense, it is useful to view possible imperative subjects as 
if they constituted something like a semantic field. Let's 
assume that this field is divided into three sets of subjects 
-- (A), the fully specified 11F's, (B), the pronoun you and 
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(C), the so-called zero subject. (See example (3.3.14) 
below). It is claimed that with regard to descriptive speci- 
ficity, there is a relationship between the subjects such 
that the subjects that form (A) are the first choice and that 
in (C) is the last choice. The implication of this is that 
the speaker is likely to use the zero subject only when there 
is no need to use you. It is thus the case that the speaker 
has two main sets of choices: (i) that between full NP's and 
you, and (ii) that between you and the zero-subject. We 
therefore do not have a situation where the speaker is con- 
fronted with the choice between the full NP and the zero- 
subject in any one token of the imperative sentence. 
However, if such a choice were to be made, and the 
speaker used the full descriptive subject NP where the zero- 
subject would do, and perhaps be expected, it would be rather 
odd, at least, from the point of view of the addressee, 
because the zero-subject could only have been sufficient 
because there was no danger of ambiguity with regard to the 
identity of the addressee. Where the zero subject is used, a 
personal name may also be used as a vocative, if a specifica- 
tion of the addressee is required for any reason. All this 
is possible because both the speaker and the addressee(s) are 
present in the context of use, as I have explained above. 
The semantic field showing the relationship between the sets 
of subjects with regard to this desccriptive specificity may 
be set out as follows: 
(3.3.14) A 
The lady in a red gown 
The student to push it 
The boy who came today 
The girl sitting there 
_B 
C 
You Zero-Subject 
We now have three levels of identification (A-C) in response 
to the sein ntico-pragmatic relations between the speaker and 
the addressee, or in accordance with the factors at work in 
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the context of use. Level A represents "descriptive identi- 
fication" (see Searle, 1969: 86); B, what may be called 
pronominal identification and C, contextual identification. 
The three levels of identification need not take place 
in that order in the same speech context, although this is 
not impossible. But it is certainly the case that you have 
to introduce your addressee into the imperative speech event 
with Level A identification, where it is relevant to do so, 
BEFORE you can use the Level B option, thus utilizing a 
system that parallels the anaphoric use of pronouns. In the 
imperative, the emphasis is on the identification of the 
addressee and so the notion of a speaker's discourse model in 
which the speaker simply gets another person to take part in 
his or her speech event (see Johnson-Laird and Garnham, 1980) 
does not apply. It must be noted that where Level A is 
desirable (say in a situation where you have to pick out your 
addressee from a large audience), the need for contrast or 
emphasis cannot allow the B option to take precedence over it. 
So, there is some logic governing the use of the various 
choices that are available. 
The position of the Level C option, the so-called zero 
identification, is now becoming clearer. It can ONLY be used 
when there is no need (pragmatic, socio-economic or communi- 
cative) for the B option to be used, as stated above. The 
common view on this, that the C option is used when there is 
no danger of ambiguity, is thus subsumed under the conditions 
for the-use of this option. This is perhaps the pragmatic 
condition. As I have said before, I shall return to this 
topic in Chapter Five. It is then I shall account for how 
subject NP's receive denotations in the context of use of 
imperative sentences. 
I now take up the issue' of the scope of reference 
of imperative subject- NP's. On this matter, Davies 
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observes: 
It was seen that an overt subject is provided in an 
imperative only if it provides some information which 
could not be inferred from the corresponding subjectless imperative, and that this helps to explain why such 
subjects are typicall understood to designate some set 
of people other than 
that 
of all and only the 
addressees. (Davies, 1981: 400-401). 
This observation illustrates how difficult it is to be 
accurate about the things that happen in the imperative 
construction. Davies"s observation does cover the case in the 
following examples: 
(3.3.15)(a) Gather in the hall tomorrow. 
(b) The people of this village gather in the 
hall tomorrow. 
The inclusion of an overt subject in (3.3.15)(b) widens the 
scope of reference of the zero-subject in (3.3.15)(a), as 
Davies has said. But this is not often the case. Other 
elements in the sentence may come to the aid of the zero 
subject to widen its scope of reference from all and only 
the addressees". In addition, we must not forget the 
important role that is played by the cultural norms of the 
society, an aspect that should also be covered by the 
principle of "mutual knowledge" (see Smith, (1982)), and also 
by the fact that certain adjectives have presuppositions (see 
Kiefer, 1978), as we can see in the example in (3.3.16). 
(3.3.16) Keep your village clean. 
This injunction may be addressed to a group of villagers by a 
government health officer. But the presence of your in the 
sentence not only specifies the village but extends the 
injunction to each and every person who lives in it, 
even though s(he) may not be present in the speech situation. 
This interpretation is reinforced by the cultural 
presupposition that the business of keeping the village clean 
is the business of all the people of the village, and even 
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beyond. So, again, the cultural presuppositions surrounding 
the word clean (encapsulated in the saying "Cleanliness is 
next to Godliness" ) enjoins the message in this sentence 
(3.3.16) on everybody -- those who live in the village as 
well as those who visit or go across it. This simply 
illustrates the magnitude of the problem of accounting for 
the nature of the imperative and the scope of its 
interpretation. 
In sum, I would like to say that the semantico-pragmatic 
interpretations that can be given to the NP's that function 
in imperatives as vocatives and as subjects are more complex 
and varied than we generally suppose. It is therefore not a 
mark of under-development (see Schmerling 1982 and 1983) that 
this sentence type does not deploy as wide a set of NP's as 
other sentence types do. This has to do with the semantico- 
pragmatic conditions surrounding the nature of the 
construction, and the context in which it is used. We have 
seen that a purely syntax-based approach cannot capture ' all-it e 
sfgnifi'c7ant- factors that are at work in the organization of 
this sentence type, and in some cases, like the claim about 
you deletion, could be quite misleading. 
C) The Notion of Agent-of-Action 
Of increasing interest in the study of imperatives in 
English is the issue of whether or not the referent of the 
subject NP must be the agent of the action specified in the 
sentence. As this topic has to do with both, the main topic 
of this chapter and those of the subsequent chapters, I shall 
try to discuss the appropriate aspects in each of the 
chapters. Here, therefore, I shall limit myself to those 
aspects that relate to the NP's in question as well as to 
general matters relating to the topic. 
Schmerling (1982) refers to many of the illocutionary 
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forces that imperatives are used to convey. She seems to 
make two broad distinctions in these constructions with 
regard to these forces: on the one hand there are those that 
constitute orders or impose directives, and on the other, 
there are those that do not involve "the imposition of an 
obligation on some listener" and those she describes as 
"hocus-pocus commands [in which] we cease to find any 
notion of Subsequent intent or cognition of any sort on 
a listeners part, if indeed the notion of an actual listener is at all relevant". (Ibid.: 211). 
The first group consists of imperatives as in (3.3.1'6). Her 
examples of the second include the following (p. 211) : 
(3.3.17)(a) Sleep well.. [WISH] 
(b) Walk! [HEALING] 
(c) Hear! [HEALING] 
(d) Please don't rain. [HOCUS-POCUS] 
I 
She refers to the possible use of (3.3.17)(b) in a ritual and 
the use of (3.3.17) (c) to heal deafness without the addressee 
hearing it, and imagines a situation in which someone may 
utter (3.3.17)(d) when preparing for a picnic. She argues 
that compliance is not possible BEFORE the imperative in the 
(b) case is uttered, thus suggesting that it is the speaker 
(or even the sentence itself) that brings about a cure in 
such a situation, since the addressee cannot be said to have 
cured himself or herself. I should say that this case bor- 
ders on the supernatural, and so, cannot even be related to 
one of the felicity conditions for the use of the imperative, 
i. e., that an addressee may not be given an order which s(he) 
cannot carry out (see Searle, 1975). Schmerling also seems 
to claim that the imperative in the (c) case can produce a 
cure without the addressee being able to hear it. This is 
not"a strong point to make because it is self-evident that 
the sentence would not have been used in the first place if 
the addressee was expected to' hear it. What the facts of life 
demand on such occasions have been complied with, since the 
deaf person is present and the person with the POWER -co heal 
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(see Austin, 1962) is there too to pronounce "the words". 
Finally, she used the (d) example to argue that an imperative 
may be addressed to an inanimate object or an object that 
does not exist. Indeed, this is a good example of the use of 
a figure of speech: an apostrophe. It is certainly not the 
case that imperatives cannot be used in this way. 
The trouble with Schmerling's examples is that they 
depart from the day-to-day use of the imperative in inter- 
personal communication for its use in areas that are not 
clearly understood. She thus seeks to base her linguistic 
theory of the imperative on data which operate on princi- 
ples which she fails to explain. For example, the power to 
use an imperative like (3.3.17)(b) in a context similar to 
the one which she describes, and with the same result, does 
not belong to ordinary human beings, and this is an aspect 
she fails to consider. Therefore, with regard to the use of 
imperatives in cases that have to do with matters like mira- 
culous healing, it is necessary to realize that the aspects 
that pertain to language and those which relate to the super- 
natural seem to overlap and so it will be incorrect to base a 
linguistic theory them. While Schmerling concedes in one 
sense that the addressee may be present (as the deaf person 
is), she claims in another that their presence or absence 
makes no difference as long as the sentences serve their 
13 purposes. She declares: 
The uttering of a (categorical) imperative is an attempt 
thereby to bring about a state of affairs in which the 
proposition expressed by the imperative is true. (Sch- 
merling, op. cit.: 212). 
Serious questions are raised here. What proposition is 
expressed? I-, 'hat state of affairs is to be brought about? 
How and when is such a proposition true (or false) if it can 
be? Schierling provides no answers to these questions. 
However, I shall take up the issue of the propositional 
content of the imperative as well as other matters rela- 
ting to it in Chapter Five later. 
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As we saw in Chapter One (Sections 1.5-1.6) nobody has 
claimed that imperatives have no meanings. But this is a 
different matter from saying that they have propositional 
contents or that they express propositions that are true. 
The analysis in Chapter one has shown clearly how 
unsatisfactory it is to turn an imperative into a declarative 
in order to capture this proposition said to be expressed'by 
the former. As we shall see Chapter Five, it is more 
satisfactory to determine the "fulfilment conditions" for the 
organization of these sentences, which can reveal their real 
nature, than to suppress the grammatical mood category of the 
imperative in order to identify their "propositional 
content". 
One aspect about the imperative that has been ignored 
concerns the relationship between the specification of an 
action to be executed and the actual performance of the 
action. There is nothing in the categorial structure of the 
imperative which ensures that the action specified in it must 
be carried out. You may well ask someone to do any of the 
foil owing : 
(3.3.16)(a) Mike, wash my shirt. 
(b) Close your eyes, Mike. 
but the addressee may simply disobey the order. But 
the sentences are not less of imperatives because the 
addressee has not made them "true". This explains why a 
categorial analysis of imperatives must be kept distinct from 
'a speech acts analysis of them. In the latter, we can 
identify the exact illocutionary forces that have been 
expressed, the extent to which they have been complied with, 
and on the Pragmatic Principle of Relevance, (see Sperber and 
Wilson (1982)) draw conclusions like this: 
the pro ositional content of a re uest is any 
proposition; however, a request, 
(as 
opposed to a mere 
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wish) is an explicit attempt to get the requestee to behave in such a way that the proposition will be true. (Sperber, 1982: 47) 
and the propositions that would be""true" in the cases of the 
sentences in (3.3.19), I dare say, would be denoted by decla- 
ratives like the following: 
(3.3.19)(a) Mike washes my shirt. 
(a') Mike has washed my shirt. 
(b) Kate closes her eyes. 
(b') Kate has closed her eyes. 
I shall return to this topic later. 
To summarize, I would say we have seen that-the 
addressee, where it is physically and pragmatically feasible, 
is always the agent-of-action. This is so because the 
imperative is related to the context in which it is used. It 
is true that an action or a set of actions may or may not 
follow its use, but none of these can add to, or subtract 
from, its form as a sentence type, nor from the motivation of 
the speaker in using the sentence in the first place. It has 
also been argued that the identification of a propositional 
content of the sentence involves tracing it from source to 
execution, and that this entails the use of declarative 
sentence form to convey. It has been stressed that the state 
of affairs that is achieved when the specified action is 
carried out does not form a proper part of the study of 
imperatives as a syntactic mood category. It is thus the 
case that we must interpret imperatives like declaratives, 
broadly speaking, if we intend to compute the set of possible 
worlds in which they may be true or false. 
3.4 Conclusion 
We have seen in this chapter some aspects of the 
imperative construction which have proved that they properly 
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belong to a unique sentence type. For example, we have seen 
that the 6-theory of Chomsky and Dowty's theory of 
grammatical relations are quite incapable of handling the 
situation presented by the imperative construction. It has 
been revealed that the ability of referring NP's to occur as 
subjects or as vocatives'is constrained by certain 
conditions. These include the need for commom nouns to ne 
either preceded by a definite article and then post-modified 
by mainly context-related expressions or to be indefinite 
third person nouns with a capacity to accept some addressee- 
related post-modifiers. It has also been observed that you 
can occur either alone or as a determiner to a common noun 
because it satisfies the condition of relating the subject NP 
to the context of use. 
The imperative vocative has been seen to be equally 
context-oriented. Possible vocatives come from two small 
subclasses of NP's - personal names and other forms of 
address - which, like the subject NP's, are syntactically 
detached from their predicates, but stand in no weaker 
position than subjects as possible agents of the actions 
specified in the sentences. We have noted the other 
similarities and differences between these imperative 
elements not only with regard to their structural 
configurations and functions, but also in relation to the 
unique role that intonation plays in using the phrases 
(especialyýou as a subject) to separate imperatives from 
other sentences as a separate mood category. 
The compositional analysis of the phrases has revealed 
that the current proposals about the various categories of 
English complex expressions fail to make correct predictions 
about the semantic nature of imperative subject NP's. It has 
been demonstrated that it is the semantic functions of the 
categories that delimit them into minimum units. Those of 
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imperative subjects were found to be again different from 
those of other sentences in the language. Certain -basic 
categories were identified in each complex subject NP, and 
they combine by means of the rule of functional application. 
The semantic TYPES to which imperative subject and 
vocative NP's belong were established and they reflect the 
fact that the noun phrases are not quantified into 
intensional contexts. Both as categories and as semantic 
TYPES, all these NPs reflect the fact that unlike declarative 
subject NP's, they cannot enter into functional relationships 
with the predicates of the sentences. The present analysis 
sees this as the most significant feature that distinguishes 
the imperative as a unique sentence type. It underlies the 
form of the verb as well as other more apparent aspects of 
the construction. 
In addition to the syntactic and semantic features of 
the NP's, I have also examined their semantico-pragmatic 
characteristics and the role of the addressee as the agent of 
the action specified in the sentence. With regard to 
semantico-pragmatic factors, I have identified some semantic 
relationships in the deployment of subject NP's in the 
sentences and established the basis for the apparent, 
dominant role that you plays as a subject NP in imperatives. 
The claim that you deletion paved the way for the so-called 
zero-subject was found tu be unacceptable. Certain factors 
that warrant the existence of a zero-subject in the 
imperative and its relationships with other subject NPs have 
been proposed. 
As for the notion of agent-of-action, it was discovered 
that a distinction must be made between the simantic 
organization of the imperative (which calls for the presence 
of an addressee and semantically marked him or her out as the 
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intended agent=of-action) and the pragmatic facts of life 
that may prevent such an agent from carrying out the action. 
It has also been seen that a clear distinction must be made 
between the organization and expression of the sentence on 
the one hand, and, on the other, the action (or the lack or 
it) that is subsequent to it. 
From a close examination of all the various aspects, we 
have been able to learn more about the nature of tie 
imperative sentence itself, especially with regard to the 
relationship between the subject and the predicate of the 
sentence, its orientation towards extensional contexts and 
not intensional contexts, and how the syntactic categories of 
subject and vocative NPs in the sentence are structured to 
reflect these features. 
0 
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Footnotes to Chapter Three 
1. It is in place here to say that Chomsky's proposals on 
this issue emerge from his theories on Government and 
Binding. Since he treats the thematic function of a subject 
NP in relation to the rest of the sentence and its derivation 
from D- and S- structure etc., he is thus addressing some of 
the questions raised by the notion of the grammatical 
relation of subject. 
2. INFL (inflection), he says, shows whether a clause is 
finite or infinitival. However, it may, at the level of LF 
be a mood indicator. This is an aspect I would like to 
return to in the next chapter. 
3. The grammatical relations in question here are those 
associated with syntax: concord and other agreement features 
between subject and predicate elements in the sentence. 
4. It may be argued that "the girl in the corner" is 
transformationally derived from "the girl who is in the 
corner". However, neither the present approach nor GPSG 
accepts such a thesis about transformational derivations and 
so expressions are being treated as they appear on the 
surface. 
5. It is thus the case that we may regard the features 
[QUA] and (MOD) as referring to adjectives and modifiers 
which are not used predicatively. (See Quirk et al, 1972: 
258). 
6. What we are beginning to see is that it is the same 
semantico-pragmatic conditions that govern all the NP's that 
occur as subjects, irrespective of their structural 
configurations and lexical choice. I shall examine this in 
detail in Section 3.3 below. 
7. These expressions also show that the range of 
contructions that can function as vocatives may not be as 
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narrow as it is generally thought. 
8. The expression "the man in the street" has acquired 
something of an idiomatic meaning - "the ordinary man". 
However, the plural form "the men in the street" has not got 
this sort of meaning and so it is a possible imperative 
subject. 
9. The symbols used for marking intonation patterns in 
these examples are the same as those used in O'Connor and 
Arnold (1973). They are to be interpreted'as follows: 
(3.2.26)(a) "High Fall" 
(3.2.26)(c) "High Head" 
° (3.2.26)(c) stress mark 
(3.2.27)(a) "Rise-Fall" 
See O'Connor and Arnold (Ibid. ) for details. 
10. Although this rule is quite unsuitable for the 
prediction of the subject-predicate relation in an imperative 
sentence, it is quite adequate for doing the compositional 
analysis of these phrases. 
11. It may be the case that all vocatives in all sentence 
types belong to the same category since they are, by nature, 
related to the contexts in which the sentences where they 
occur are used. 
12. Q, Q, P and F respectively refer to modal logic notions 
of Possibility, Necessity, Past and Future. The issue of 
whether or not the imperative refers to the future (see 
Bolinger (1977)) will be discussed in the next chapter. 
13. Schmerling fails to take into consideration the fact 
that the spiritual healer has to have the deaf person in 
front of him or her before he or she can pronounce the rele- 
vant sentence. Furthermore, it is necessary, in this sort of 
event, for the healer to be in a position to judge whether or 
not s(he) has achieved the desired result. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
VERB PHRASES IN IMPERATIVES 
4.0 Introduction 
Verb phrases in imperatives have something like a dual 
nature. On the one hand, there is no reason to suppose that 
they may not have the same range of structural variations 
with regard to verb complementation as other sentences. On 
the other, so distinctive are the forms of their verbs and 
their exclusion of modals that they indeed pose a major 
problem for analysts. The task in this Chapter therefore is 
to find out 
(a) what the syntactic behaviour of be, do and negation 
is in the VP's; 
(b) what the semantico-pragmatic characteristics of the 
VP's are, and, 
(c) whether or not they are susceptible to a composi- 
tional semantic analysis like their subject NP's. 
I hope the examination of these issues here will not 
only lead to the resolution of the current problems about the 
description of imperative VPs (see Chapter One, Section 3), 
but will also enhance our general understanding of these sub- 
structures of the construction. 
i 
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I intend to take up the problems as they are listed 
above, as far as possible. Before this though, it seems 
desirable to examine the general notion of verb phrase in 
relation to the imperative in view of some of the problems 
raised by the subjectless varieties of the sentence. 
4.1 The Notion of Imperative Verb Phrase 
In Chapter Two (Secton 2.1) 1 pointed out that it is 
unacceptable to characterize the imperative as a mere clause 
type. By using a number of criteria, I demonstrated that it 
is a full sentence, fit to be contrasted with other sentences 
like declaratives and interrogatives. 
(4.1.1) All of you salute your national heroes. 
We may also note that although we can separate the 
imperative VP from its subject NP in (4.1.1), this is not 
quite obvious with regard to the forms without such NP's, and 
this is a situation which tends to blur the distinction 
between the VP-and the S-structures in the construction. 
(4.1.2)(a) Keep in touch. 
(b) The men keep in touch. 
The problem with these examples is the fact that the struc- 
tural shape of a subjectless imperative in (4.1.2)(a) is not 
different from that of the VP in (4.1.2)(b). Thus, the 
structure of the former, without any intonation marking, 
could well be the VP of the latter, the declarative construc- 
tion. The postulation of a zero-subject does not change the 
fact that the structure in (4.1.2)(a) looks like a possible 
declarative VP. It is therefore necessary to find out what 
linguistic factors, other than intonation, can separate 
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the imperative VP from those of other sentences. 
(1) THE IMPERATIVE VP AND IMPERATIVE S COMPLEMENTATION 
One such factor is probably the contraint that restricts 
imperatives to occurring only as main clauses in complex 
sentential structures. Different varieties of declaratives 
can occur as main clauses and as subordinate clauses. 
Imperatives cannot occur in subordinate positions even when 
such positions may not involve any adverbial functions. 
This situation seems to lend support to the characterization 
of the imperative as a clause type, apparently complementing 
the subjunctive which occurs only in subordinate positions in 
complex sentences. (See Huddleston, 1984: Chapters 1 and 
11). 
The issue I want to examine here is the nature of the 
constraint that prevents the construction from occurring in 
such positions. It will be contended that it has to do mainly 
with the general nature of the VP's. The imperative verb 
phrase is such that it cannot be in a construction which 
occupies a subordinate position in a larger sentential 
structure. If this can be demonstrated, it would be 
reasonable to conclude that it is inappropriate to expect the 
sentences to behave, for example, as declaratives. 
Secondly, it will enable us to understand certain syntactic 
and semantic characteristics which are unique to the VP's, as 
we shall see later. 
The examination of the subject NP in the previous chapter 
shows that it is not grammatically linked with its VP (see 
Section 5.1 below). Therefore, the VP is most. likely to 
possess almost the same degree of independence. There is no 
better element than the head of the VP to exhibit this 
grammatical independence. Current grammatical theories have 
1 
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not gone 'beyond* simply claiming that in structures like the 
example in (4.1.1), the section from the verb salute to the 
end constitutes the VP and that the verb itself is 
"tenseless". We would like to see what such a VP can 
generally do which declarative VP's cannot do. 
(2) THE IMPERATIVE VP AND THE NOTION OF COMMAND 
In the examples in (4.1.3), 
(4.1.3)(a) (John) may go there 
(b) (John) is to go there 
(c) (John, ) go there 
we notice that the verb do can co-occur with the verb in 
example (4.1.3) (c) but not with those in the others. 
(4.1.4)(a) *(John) do may go there. 
(b) *(John) do is to go there. 
(c) (John, ) do go there, 
However, as an auxiliary, it is possible for do to replace 
may in (4.1.4) (a), although the meaning of the sentence would 
change. 
(4.1.5)(a) (John) does go there 
(b) (The men) do go there 
What is noticeable in the imperative VP in (4.1.4)(c) and the 
declarative ones in (4.1.5) is that even though the 
grammatical function of do is the same in all of them -- 
i. e., the expression of emphasis -- it seems to share the 
notion of COMMAND-with go in the former but expresses that 
of CERTAINTY with goo in the latter. This seems to show that 
despite the apparent similarity in form between the VP in the 
imperative and some of those in the declarative as we have 
seen in the examples in (4.1.2), the interpretation of 
dö is not the saue in all of them. 
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With regard to the example in (4. '1.4)(b), it appears no 
placement of do in its VP can make it grammatical. and so beco- 
me a declarative like each of those in (4.1.5). It can be 
argued that what we have here is a feature which appears to 
support the claim that the imperative VP has some grammatical 
independence from its subject NP and other structures. It 
seems to be the only structure which can accept do when the 
main verb is the copula verb be. 
(4.1.6)(a) (The men) there today 
) 
(b) (The girl) 
will 
) be there today 
*does) 
(c) (Everybody) do be there today 
This feature of the imperative VP also separates it from 
the subjunctive construction that is often compared with it 
in relation to do. (See Culicover, 1976). 
(4.1.7)(a) It is necessary that he be consulted 
(b) *It is necessary that he do be consulted. 
It does appear that it is the notion of an order or a 
command which the imperative VP possesses that enables do to 
co-occur with be where other sentences cannot have it with 
the verb. Where this notion is shifted from the verb and 
placed in other elements of the sentence as in the examples 
in (4.1.7) where it is conveyed by the adjective, necessary, do 
would then be unable to co-occur with be. It is this factor 
that prevents it from co-occurring with the subjunctive verb 
in (4.1.7) (b). Therefore, the ability of the imperative VP 
to retain its sense of order or command all the time is 
another mark of its grammatical autonomy. This is also 
partly responsible for the non-occurrence of the construction 
in subordinate positions in complex sentences, as we can see 
in (4.1.8). 
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(4.1.8)(a) *It is necessary for, John, go there. 
(b) *What I want is all of you go there. 
(c) *He says the boy behind the table 20 there. 
(d) *I have decided that (you) coo there. 
All this will however change when we bring in the 
elements that can grammatically integrate the imperative VP's 
with their own subject NP's in the sentences, thus stripping 
the VP's of their autonomy. These elements include the for- 
to complementizer, modals and the expression is to. 
(4.1.9)(a) It is necessary for John to go there. 
(b) What I want is for all of you to go there. 
) 
(c) He says the boy behind the table 
will 
) go is to 
there. 
(d) I have decided that you should sit down. 
What we have seen therefore is the fact in these 
subordinate positions in the sentences, the structures had to 
be converted into FULL declarative VP's before the sentences 
could become grammatical. For example, the vocative NP in 
(4.1.8)(a) has become a prepositional complement in 
(4.1.9)(a), and the optional subject you in (4.1.8)(d) has 
changed into an obligatory subject in (4.1.9)(d)ß in order to 
achieve the integration between them and the VP's that have 
now lost their structural disjunction from the subject NP's 
in the senter_ces. 
(3) THE IMPERATIVE VP AND THE PRINCIPLE OF EXTRACTION 
The last aspect of the VP in the imperative which I want 
to consider is the fact that it does not allow-any extraction. 
There is thus no fronting of any element. 
(4.1.10)(a) (You) stop dancing! [IMPERATIVE] 
(a. ') *Dancing, (you) atop: 
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(b)- He may be dancing. 
(b') Dancing, he may be. 
(c) (You) be the king! 
(cam) *The king, (you) be! 
(d) You are the king. 
(dam) The king, you are. 
[DECLARATIVE] 
[IMPERATIVE] 
(DECLARATIVE] 
As we shall see in the next chapter, it is however possible 
for VP adverbs to occur either before or after the verb in 
the imperative, as long as they remain part of the VP of the 
sentence. This occurrence should not therefore be seen-as 
an example of extraction, from the VP in. the sentence. 
(4.1.11)(a) (You) repair to your divided city. 
(b) (You), to your divided city, repair. 
We might therefore conclude from all the aspects 
discussed above that the VP in the imperative is a unique and 
separate entity, both structurally and semantically. One 
crucial consequence of this state of affairs is that because 
the constituent is unique, its head, the verb, is also 
unique. Therefore, it is not the base-form of this verb that 
separates the VP from other VP, s; rather, it is its 
relationships with do and be as well as its notion of command 
and its resistance to the fronting of any of its verbal 
complements, as we have seen above, that mark it out as 
unique. ' I shall return to the. phenomenon of the structural 
detachment between the subject and the VP in the imperative 
in the next chapter. 
To summarize, I. would like to say that the general 
notion of VP in the imperative must be one that recognizes it 
as a unique entity which pcssesses certain unique features. 
All this reflects the unique nature of the imperative 
sentence type itself. We must therefore be prepared to have 
an analysis of these constituents which, while capturing their 
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nature, must be differentiated from those that characterize 
other sentence types, in line with our intention to do the 
syntax and the semantics of the sentence type in a way that 
can expose its true nature. I shall now consider in turn 
the various aspects of the VP, under the broad headings of 
syntax and semantics, in order to expand on the ideas I have 
introduced above. 
4.2 Syntax 
A) Be, Do and Negation 
In addition to the observations about be and do in the 
previous section, I intend to examine their syntactic beha- 
viour here, to begin with, in order to show that the current 
proposals about them with regard to the imperative are inade- 
quate. In the present system, the question of Do-Insertion 
does not arise. It is base-derived. However, it is not that 
sort of do that exists in the "initial structure" of Pullum 
and Wilson (1977), which may be deleted. Also, we are not 
saddled with the problem of deciding whether or not the 
imperative has an AUX constituent. This can be seen from 
fact that both do and be are base-derived (see Gazdar et al, 
1982). However, there is a subcategorization problem raised by 
their placement in imperatives and other sentences. Davies 
(1981) fails to resolve this problem, as noted above in 
Chapter One (Section 3), but it can be resolved by the speci- 
fication of the syntactic features of the verbs which may be 
in the' same environment as these verbs in the sentences. 
I also intend to show that the provision of a uniform 
description for both do and be by Davies is inadequate 
because it fails to capture the real nature of these two 
verbs in the imperative. it will be much clearer, as 
already noted in Section 1.3 above, to devise PS rules to 
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predict the various imperative structures. It should have 
been possible for such rules to capture the situation presen- 
ted by the imperative and so rule out sentences like those in 
(4.2.1). These sentences are not blocked by the "condition" 
that do should be allowed to occur in front of be only in 
imperatives, as proposed by Davies (Op. cit. ). 
(4.2.1)(a) Do be polite! 
(b) *Not do be polite! 
(c) Do not be rude! 
(d) *Not do be rude! 
In all the examples in (4.2.1), the condition that do be 
allowed to occur in front of be in -THAT, -TO complement is 
met. But the condition is grossly inadequate since it does 
not, for example, cover the relationship between do and not 
in the imperative. I examine the verbs in turn. 
(i) Be. 
The problem that be raises as an imperative verb is 
quite complex. First, it must be made clear whether be only 
occurs in the sentence as an auxiliary, as Akmajian et al 
(1979) have claimed, or not. Second, it must also be inves- 
tigated whether or not the imperative verb system actually 
involves the progressive aspect, as the following examples 
seem to indicate. 
(4.2.2)(a) Be running after me. 
(b) Be jumping up! 
(1) BE AND IMPERATIVE MAIN VERB 
The above-mentioned analysts have also characterized be 
in examples like those in (4.2.2) as an auxiliary. In this 
sense, therefore, they are claiming that the present 
progressive occurs in the imperative, although they have 
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rejected the past progressive in the construction. The issue 
raised with regard to the nature of be is whether or not it is 
the same type that occurs in all evironments in the impera- 
tive, i. e., whether the type that is followed by present 
participles as in (4.2.2) is not different from the one that 
is followed by adjectives, noun phrases, adverbs and preposi- 
tional phrases as in (4.2.3), 
(4.2.3)(a) Be brave! 
(b) Be a man! 
(c) Be there at Five. 
(d) Be at your desk when I arrive. 
(e) Don't be rude! 
(f) Do be a persuasive salesman. 
or there should be two types of be: the one, a main verb, 
traditionally known as a copula, like those in (4.2.3), and 
the other, an auxiliary, the type that usually features in 
the progressive aspect as in the examples in (4.2.2). What 
complicates this problem is the issue about the role of the 
progressive in the imperative. 
The general theoretical stance on this issue in the 
literature, which usually reflects what obtains in the 
declarative construction, appears to be clear. Only as an 
auxiliary verb can be combine with a main verb to form the 
progressive aspect. It is in this sense perhaps that 
Akmajian et al have characterized be as an optional element 
in the imperative. (See Chapter One, Section 3). On the 
contrary, it will be argued here that 
(a) only one type of be occurs in the imperative, 
(b) the entities that occur after this be in the 
sentences are complements, and, 
(c) the present progressive aspect cannot occur in the 
imperative construction. 
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(2) BE AND GERUNDS 
The claim I intend to make here is that the 111U-words" 
which occur after be in imperatives, unlike those in other 
sentence types, are gerunds, and so are NP's. In English 
syntax, it is the case that gerunds and infinitives can 
function as subjects, as-the following examples show. 
(4.2.4)(a) To work is to pray. 
(b) To get there is the problem you face. 
(c) To love is something she fears! 
These NP's can also convert into gerunds, as the following 
examples show. 
(4.2.5)(a) Working is praying. 
(b) Getting there is the problem you face. 
(c) Loving is something she fears! 
We can notice in the following examples that infinitives 
and gerunds also occur as objects in imperatives. In this 
respect, both constructions can occur as objects to a host of 
verbs, as demonstrated by the examples in (4.2.6) and (4.2.8) 
below. 
(4.2.6)(a) Be singing. 
(b) Be joyful. 
(c) Be a good boy. 
(d) Continue to run. 
(e) Don't try to break it. 
We thus have in the imperative a system in which be can 
have complements which are as varied as nouns like' a good 
boy and gerunds like singing, as well as adjectives like 
joyful, as some of the examples in (4.2.6) show. According 
to this characterization therefore, this be in the imperative 
cannot be an auxiliary verb. It is thus a copula, a main 
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verb in the manner that continue and try are main verbs in 
(4.2.6). 
Independent support for our proposal is provided by the 
relationship between this verb and do. We have already 
observed above that do can only occur as the first element of 
the imperative verb in every imperative sentence that has it. 
And do is a auxiliary. It is in this manner therefore that it 
occurs in the following examples in relation to be as the 
main verb. 
(4.2.7)(a) Do be mindful of them each day. 
(b) Do be returning the proceeds to her at the 
end of the day. 
Another evidence in support of the occurrence of the gerund 
as a complement to be in the imperative VP is the fact that 
be is not the only possible imperative verb that can govern 
it in that environment. We also have verbs like keep, stop, 
continue, and others. 
(4.2.8)(a) Keep on singing. 
(b) Stop singing. 
(c) Continue singing. 
(3) BE AND THE PROGRESSIVE ASPECT 
Finally, as I shall explain more fully in the next 
section, the imperative construction makes a distinction 
between these two sentences, 
(4.2.9)(a) Run! 
(b) ? Be running! 
each of which commands the commencement of an action: the 
former, the commencement of the process of running; the 
latter, the commencement of the process of continuing the 
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effort of running. In neither of these cases does the cons- 
truction refer to the period from the past up to the time of 
speaking, since the role of be there as a main verb is to 
emphasize the new idea: the continuation of the action in 
question. (See Chapter Twos Section 2.2 : (3) and (4) above). 
All that we have seen above shows clearly that the 
progressive aspect does not occur in the imperative VP, 
contrary to the claim of Akmajian et al; the verb accepts a 
number of complements -- gerunds and infinitives functioning 
as NP's, ordinary noun phrases, adjectives and locative 
adverbs -- doing so as a single, main imperative verb. 
2 
(ii) Do 
Although there is a considerable amount of agreement on 
the nature of the verb in the imperative, this is not the 
case with regard to do, a verb which has an enormous 
syntactic capability (see Egbe, 1981). There is no problem 
here about Do-Insertion as we have seen in the other analyses 
(see Chapter One, Section 3), since it is predicted by rules. It 
is however doubtful as to whether or not it behaves in the 
imperative as Davies (1981: 313) has claimed it does. The 
only restriction on the behaviour of do, according to her, is 
that it should not occur in front of be and have except in 
imperatives. Since this restriction only affects the occur- 
rence of do in other sentences, it thus gives the mistaken 
impression that the only feature that marks the behaviour of 
do in the imperative is its ability to occur before be and 
have there. Davies offers no reason for this feature, and so 
has failed to account for the syntactic nature of this verb 
in the imperative. Furthermore, her claim about treating the 
verb as a "main" verb tells us nothing about the syntactic 
relationship between it and other verbs in the imperative 
other than that it puts them in -THAT, -TO complement position. 
It is mistaken to describe do in these terms in her account 
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which thus overlooks an important aspect of the verb in the 
imperative, i. e., its relationship with not and n't. 
Secondly, to see do in this way would also overlook its role 
as a bearer of emphasis in the imperative. The point is if 
do is simply a main verb like sit and send, why should it 
constantly co-occur with negation and bear the emphatic 
stress in the imperative! Since do has these relation- 
ships, my argument is that contrary to Davies 's proposal, it 
cannot function as a main verb in the imperative for it is not 
predicted by. rules in the same way as other verbs (see (4.2.26)). 
As I have observed in Chapter one, it is more realistic 
to treat do as a "periphrastic verb" than as a main verb. 
The reason is that even if n't was seen as no more than a 
morpheme attaching to do to form don't, the fact remains that 
not cannot occur in the imperative without it, (and not 
conversely) as the following examples show. 
(4.2.10)(a) Do not cancel the orders. 
(b) *Not cancel the orders. 
(c) Do cancel the orders. 
We can also notice that don't always occurs in a pre-subject 
position in imperatives like the following. 
(4.2.11)(a) Don't you drive like that again! 
(b) Don't drive like that again! 
(c) *You don't drive like that again! 
In view of the above facts, it is clear that do, in the 
imperative, cannot be characterized as a main verb. 
It is indeed not correct to say at all that do has any 
verb in a -THAT, -TO complement in the first place. 
Similarly, it is not the case that don't cannot be considered 
along with do as Schmerling (1980) seems to be suggesting. 
What appears to be significant about do, syntactically, in 
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the imperative are 
(a) its relationship with the elements that can occur 
AFTER it in the sentence, and, 
(b) its relationship with negation-and the consequence 
of this for the VP. 
These are the issues that will be examined with regard to do 
in this Section. However, for the sake of orderliness in 
presentation, I would like to take up problem (b) in full 
under negation below. 
(1) DO AND ITS COMPLEMENTS 
As for problem (a), the claim I am making is that in all 
imperative sentences, do and don't occur before the subject 
NP's which are of two kinds: you and the so-called zero- 
subject. In other words,, 
_ 
ONE of these subject elements 
(see the FS -rules in (4'. 2.26) below) is likely to interpose 
between do (or do not or don't) and the main verb in the 
sentence. 
(4.2.12)(a) Sit up! 
(b) <> sit up! 3 
(c) You sit up! 
(d) The girl in the corner sit up! 
The examples in (4.2.12)(a) and (4.2.12)(b) are the same 
except that I have tried to represent the zero-subject with 
the sign <>. (4.2.12) thus contains imperatives without do. 
However, the presence of do imposes certain limitations, as 
the following examples indicate. 
(4.2.13)(a) Do sit up! 
(b) Do <> sit up! 
(c) *<> do sit up! 
(d) *Do you sit up! 
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(e) *You do sit up! 
(f) *Do the girl in the corner sit up! 
(g) ? The girl in the corner do sit up! 
These examples show clearly (i), that do selects as its 
immediate sister not a V, as Davies has suggested, but an S, 
and (ii), that the subject element in this S-category is the 
zero-subject as in (4.2.13) (b). 
The choice of the zero-subject is not surprising since 
it helps, structurally, to separate imperatives of this form 
from interrogatives of the same form. This is so 
because interrogatives do not have such a zero-subject. 
(4.2.14)(a) Do <> sit up, 
Sall of you)! 
j 
all 
j 
(b) Do all of you sit up? 
Thus, only vocatives (third person NP's) can occur in these 
forms in the imperative. Even elements like all of you which 
have the potential to be subjects in the imperative (see 
Chapter Three) can now only function as vocatives, as 
(4.2.14) (a) indicates. Their appearing in their usual 
subject position in the sentence (in front of the VP) would 
structurally turn the construction into an interrogative, as 
(4.2.14)(b) shows. I should briefly add here that the 
presence of negation in the imperative does alter this 
situation, as we can see in (4.2.15)(c). 
(Do not) all of you 
(4.2.15)(a) (Don't ) <> sit up, 
Kate 
! 
(b) Don't all of you sit up? 
(c) Don't anyone go: 
The second case (where you must occur as subject) 
involves don't and takes the following form. 
(4.2.16)(a) Don't you sit up again! 
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(b). *Don"t the girl in the corner sit up again! 
This is separated from an interrogative of the same shape not 
only by the presence of don't instead of doe= but also by the 
nature of the intonation pattern that it has. (See Chapter 
Three, Section 3.2). When the subject IMP' is you; for example, 
the shapes of both types of sentences are similar, as the 
examples in (3.2.28) above and those in (4.1.17) below 
show. 
(4.1.17)(a) Don't you sit up! 
(b) Don't you sit up? 
As we shall see in the next section, there are more 
factors at work here than I have identified so far. As for 
the role of intonation in the structures, a falling contour 
marks the imperative, in addition to the emphatic stress on 
don't, while a rising one marks the interrogative. 
(2) DO AND THE MAIN VERB IN THE IMPERATIVE 
The issue that is now raised has to do with the 
relationship between do and the main verb in the sentence. 
The question is whether do is really an auxiliary to it or jr, 
functioning on its own in another capacity. As for the first 
part of the question it may be argued that do cannot be 
subordinate to the main verb as, for example, m is in the 
following examples, 
(4.2.18)(a) Mike ma call tomorrow. 
(b) Henry m not call but Sam may. 
where (i), as in (4.2.18)(a), it is in the same clause as the 
main verb, call, and (ii), it can also function as a pro-form 
for the main verb, as we can seein(4.2.18) (b). 
It is not the case however that do can function as a 
pro-form in the imperative, even though it can do so in the 
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declarative. 
(4.2.19)(a) Mike plays football but Sam doesn't. 
(b) Sam doesn't play football but Mike does. 
(c) *Do open the door, John, but Mike, don't. 
(d) *Open the door, John, but Mike, don't do so. 
(e) *Don't you say that again, Kate, but Mabel, 
do. 
The constraint on do here cannot be linked with the 
structural shapes of the imperatives; it seems some 
semantico-pragmatic issues are involved. It would appear 
that after you have related an order or command to a certain 
person, you cannot extend or nullify such an order with 
respect to another person, as in the imperatives in (4.2.19), 
without having to repeat the full verb. Thus, the forms that 
repeat the full verbs are in order. 
(4.2.20) Don't you say that again, Kate, but Madel, 
please keep quiet. 
We shall return to the other issues raised by these sentences 
in the next section. (See Chapter Two, Section 2.1 above). 
It is the case therefore that the do that occurs in the 
imperative is syntactically different from the one that 
occurs in the declarative. As we have seen above, it is 
neither in the same clause with the main verb in the sentence 
nor can it function as a pro-form for it. (See Huddleston, 1978). 
(3) DO AND BE 
Our discussion of do and be does clearly show"th&t they 
behave differently in the imperative. Whereas be operates as 
a main verb within the VP, do (for imperatives in which it 
occurs) functions as the carrier of emphasis, where it is (at 
times) modified by negation in front of the entire imperative 
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construction. 
(4.2.21)(a) Do wait for your turn please. 
(b) Don't you lift it up again please. 
(C) Somebody, do open the window please! 
(d) You be orderly please! 
(e) The boy in the corner be prepared to run. 
(f) *Be turning over the pages for me please. 
(g) Be a good boy and stop that noise! 
Another area of difference between the two verbs is the 
type of complement they take. As the examples in (4.2.21) 
show, be, as an ordinary verb positioned in the VP, takes a 
host of entities as complements - adjective, gerundive, NP 
and PP - whereas do, as pointed out above, has the imperative 
S only as its complement. 4 
What we have observed about these two verbs has 
accounted for one phenomenon in the verb system in the 
imperative, i. e., the fact that do always occurs BEFORE be in 
the construction. This has to do with what they can accept 
as complements and the segment of the imperative where they 
must function. Therefore, there is no question of treating 
these verbs in the same way as Davies (1981) has proposed. 
Similarly, the rules that have been proposed elsewhere to 
predict them (see Emonds, 1976; Culicover, 1976, and Akmajian 
et al, 1979) cannot correctly apply to their behaviour in the 
imperative, in spite of their TG theoretical assumptions. 
(4) TENSEHOOD AND FINITENESS IN THE VERBS 
One nagging problem with regard to the verbs in the 
imperative, as we have seen in Chapter One, is the question 
whether or not the imperative has TENSE. Associated with this 
is the issue of finiteness. What the position had been was 
the division between those who argued that the imperative ý"ýý61 
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both AUX-less and tenseless on the one hand, and on the 
other, those who held that it had an AUX constituent but was 
tenseless (see Section 1.3 above). This problem is 
particularly difficult to resolve because the base-form of 
the verb gives us no clue whatsoever as to what the situation 
really is. Furthermore,, the situation is complicated by the 
tendency of some analysts to relate it to' the' bare 
infinitive. 
The idea of aspect occurring in the imperative has 
already been rejected in the present analysis. Therefore, if 
we are to consider the question of AUX, it will only have to 
do with the verb do. In view of the fact that do occurs in a 
unique position in the imperative, we are left with two 
choices: 
(a) either it is characterized as an auxiliary 
or Gs. a verb that functions as a periphrasis 
in the imperative construction, or, 
(b) it would be characterized as a unique imperative 
verb. 
The issue to examine now is how to provide an acceptable 
justificaton for the choice of the one over the other. 
Whichever alternative is chosen should be able to make it 
posible to resolve the the part of the problem that relates 
to tensehood and finiteness. 
The choice of alternative (b) would have the significant 
implication of postulating do in impcratives. This 
would, as it were, turn do into a super verb which dominates 
an entire imperative S which might thus be said to elaborate 
it. This do would then be the head verb of the imperative 
construction and also the carrier of the emphatic stress as 
well as of negation. Thus, since in this sense do would be a 
182 
full verb, it could be said to have put the construction in a 
subordinate position, turning the imperative into an essen- 
tially complement construction. 
The main weakness in the above description of do is the 
fact that it cannot explain why or when this do cannot occur 
in the imperative. If its role is so central to the verbal 
system of the construction, -one would expect it to occur in 
all tokens of the sentence. ' As for its relationship with 
emphasis and negation, it may be pointed out that this can 
also be performed by a do that is a periphrasis. 
It is objections like those above that make alternative 
(a) a much better description of the do that occurs in the 
imperative. In the first place, as an auxiliary, do may or 
may not occur in an imperative, since many such sentences 
without 'it occur. Secondly, as an auxiliary, it is easier to 
associate it with the rest of the verb in the construction 
and so it simply serves as a means by which negation (both 
affixal and non-affixal) can relate to the main verb in the 
construction, as we shall see in the next Section. Thirdly, 
as an auxiliary, it can be seen as a verb which occurs in 
order to carry the strong stress that is at times desired in 
the imperative. This not only separates the relationship it 
has with negation from the one it has with intonation, but 
also takes in its train the fact that both negation and the 
emphatic stress are optional elements in imperatives. When 
do is not present, the main stress falls on the main verb. 
Finally, in the sense of alternative (a), do can still be an 
auxiliary verb in the imperative just as it usually is in 
other sentences, except that in the imperative, it occurs in 
front of the subject NP; it is used to convey a strong stress, 
and it regularly co-occurs with negation, as it has been 
demonstrated above. 
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From what we have seen so far with regard to do, it is 
quite obvious that it is not FINITE when it occurs in the 
imperative. A finite verb, as we know, must be capable of 
being specified in relation to number and person concord. 
Such a specification is generally known not to exist in the 
verbal system in the imperative. As for TENSE, what is clear 
is that the imperative does not refer to past times. It 
refers to both present and future times, as we can see in the 
examples in (2.4.22). 
(4.2.22)(a) Pick up those papers now! 
(b) Return them to me next week! 
(c) *Leave them there yesterday! 
It is however necessary to distinguish between TENSE and 
TIME. If TENSE : is _ an - element that must be morphologically 
marked on the verb, as it usually is in other sentence types 
in English, it can be said that none is marked in this way on 
the verb in the imperative VP. It must thus be concluded 
that the imperative is TENSE-NEUTRAL. The fact that it does 
not refer to the past is not symptomatic of any idea that it 
has tense which is non-past. This is rather due to certain 
semantico-pragmatic factors which will be discussed in the 
next chapter. Do therefore is tense-neutral. 
(iii) Negation. 
(1) PLACEMENT OF NEGATION IN THE IMPERATIVE 
Negation in the imperative occurs in the following 
manner'. 
(4.2.23)(a) Don't 
(b) Don't 
(c) Don't 
(d) Do no 
switch off the light. 
you sit on the table again. 
*John 
? somebody cry again. the lady in a red gown 
t stand up yet. 
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( you 
(e) *Do not ( John shut the window. 
j 
somebody 
You 
(f) Somebody don't (do not) 
The man wearing a hat 
sit down there all day! 
From the examples in (4.2.23), it is clear that some of the 
constraints on do also apply to negation in the imperative. 
These are as follows: 
(a) It can occur before the zero subject or you as a 
subject, as in (4.2.23)(a) and (4.2.23)(b) 
respectively. It cannot occur before other subject 
(or vocative) NP's as (4.2.23)(c) indicates. 
(c) A feature which it does not share with do is the 
fact that when it occurs in the form of a non- 
affixal negation (i. e., not), it accepts only the 
zero-subject just after it, as in (4.2.23)(d), but 
cannot have any overt subject NP in that position 
as we can see in (4.2.23)(e). 
(c) As we can see in the example in (4.2.23)(f), 
negation cannot occur after subject NP's of all 
sorts, a feature which it shares with do. 
(2) NEGATION PLACEMENT IN OTHER SENTENCES 
As we shall see soon, these aspects of negation have 
certain semantic consequences with regard to its scope of 
application in the sentence. This distribution of negation 
in the imperative stands in clear contrast to what we have in 
other sentences, as the following examples show. 
(4.2.24)(a) He has not been sleeping. 
(b) He has been not sleeping. 
(c) He is not sleeping. 
(d) You don't see such things nowadays. 
(e) Will you not go to sleep? 
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(f)- Who won't go to sleep yet? 
(g) Cant you go to sleep now? 
In these examples, negation occurs in a variety of positions. 
The fact that this is not the case in the imperative 
construction demonstrates clearly that the rules that can 
predict the examples in (4.2.24) cannot predict those in 
(4.2.23). 
B) Phrase Structure Rules. 
It is in place here to work out the phrase structure 
rules that can capture the situation presented by both the VP- 
and the S-structures that are possible in the imperative 
sentence type. As pointed out in Chapter Two, Section 4, the 
rules will be set out to relate to varieties of imperative 
sentences which will be classified into subsets (i), (ii), 
(iii), etc. 
5 
It must however be pointed out that the provision of 
these rules is necessary even though there is really no 
grammatical cohesion between the subject and VP elements in 
the sentence. The reason is that since the construction 
psychologically represents a sentence structure, as I shall 
argue in the next chapter, a surface, monostatal analysis 
like the present one must provide syntactic rules that 
correlate with the situation. The structure is therefore 
being treated as if the usual subject-predicate relationship 
existed in it. 
One difference between the role of PS rules and that of 
the rules of semantic compositional analysis is the fact that 
whereas the former can characterize structures solely on the 
basis of their appearance, the latter does not do so. 
Thus, it is a surface compositional analysis that can reject 
the treatment of the imperative as a single S-constituent 
because imperatives do not denote truth-values. 
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I shall first of all introduce the PS rules for the S- 
structures along with example sentences which they predict 
and then go on to provide expansion rules for the VP's along 
with their example verb phrases, and then give examples of 
tree diagrams for a number of imperative sentences. I shall 
then go on to discuss the issues that are raised by the PS 
rules drawn up for the S-structures. 
(1) IMPERATIVE PS RULES FOR S-STRUCTURES 
It is necessary to indicate the relations between some 
of the features under the Feature Co-occurrence Rule (FCR). 
This is stated in the rule in (4.2.25). 
(4.2.25) If an S is [IMP], its AUX and Head V are also 
[BSE]. 6 
FCR: [IMP] [+BSE] 
The PS rules' and their example sentences are as follows: 
(4.2.26) (i): S IMP =====> (NP) V 
A U11 
-NEG 
(a) (All of you) stand up! 
S IMP VV 
+AUX] 
-NEGj 
(b) Do stand up. 
S IMP Vv 
+AUX 
+N EG 
(c) Don't drink it fast. 
(iv). S IMP =____> V NP V 
AU 
[++ 
X 
NEG 
(d) Don't you drink it fast again. 
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MS [AU] V[ ADV 
]V +NEG 
(e) Do not step backwards. 
(vi): SI_IMP => ADV (NP) V 
LNEG 
(f) Never say die! 
W) Certainly, (you) get there before noon. 
(Vii): S IMP ADV VV 
+AUX 
+NEG 
(g) Certainly don't go late. 
In these rules, negation [NEG] is expressed in two ways. 
First, it is used in relation to affixal negation which 
occurs in don't in the imperative. It is captured by the use 
of the feature [+NEG] stated in the Rules. Second, the non- 
affixal negation, not, is generated as an adverb. The notion 
of negation is still represented by the feature [+NEG], 
except that it is now marked on the node ADV. This will thus 
exclude other adverbs from occurring under the node, while 
enabling not to be generated as a full word. The advantage 
of this approach, therefore, is that it not only successfully 
distinguishes between imperatives with affixal and non- 
affixal negation with regard to structure but also-allows the 
distinction between not and never, with regard to syntactic 
behaviour, to be made. 
(2) IMPERATIVE V-EXPANSION RULES 
We can see that in each of the rules in (4.2.26), V 
stands out as a distinct syntactic unit. It represents the 
verb phrase (VP) in the construction. Its expansion takes 
the following forms. 
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(4.2.27)(i) "V =____> V 
(a) smile 
(ii) VV NP 
(b) touch it 
(iii) VVV [INF] 
(c) try to walk 
(iv) VVS 
(d) say what happened 
(v) VV NP V (INF] 
(e) use it to walk 
Thus, the verbs that occur in imperatives take the same 
complements as they do in other sentences. Although the 
scope of the imperative VP expansion is basically the same as 
those of the other sentences, it would be a mistake to think 
that this VP is not different from those of the other sen- 
tences. As pointed out above, the major difference is the 
fact that unlike, for example, the VP in the declarative, the 
one in the imperative cannot combine with its subject NP to 
form an actual, syntactic s-constituent which is liable to a 
compositional analysis, as we shall see in the next section. 
However, as argued in chapter Two, it will be very mislea- 
ding to regard the VP as the entity that is the imperative 
itself. What the VP has turned out to be is an element that 
is syntactically independent of subject NP's. As a verb 
phrase, it must of course be open to modification by adverbs, 
do and negation. 
Examples of tree diagrams for constructions predicted by 
the rules in (4.2.26), which subsume those in (4.2.27), are 
as follows. 8 
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(4.2.28) (a) 
IMP 
AUX 
NEG 
NP 
IMP 
G 
s 
i_ 
NE 
Det N 
IMP 
-AUX 
-N EG 
All N PP stand up 
I %ý. <> of you 
(b) 
IMP 
+AUX 
-NEG 
v VP 
CAU =ý t NEGJ 
Do 
-NEG 
stand up 
(C) 
1 IMP 
+AUX 
+N EG 
AUx £ IMPJ 
tNEG 
Donut rIMP NP ADV 
A 
drink it fast 
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(4.2.29)(a) 1S IMP 
+AUX 
+NEG 
V NP VP 
+AUX L IMP 
+N EG] 
Donut N rVMPý NP ADV 
N drink N fast 
I you I it 
I 
MP C I 
AUX 
r+AUX ENEG] LIMP] 
Do not I 
T. ý 
ADV 
M ýl A 
step backwards 
IMP 
(c) .S 
-AUX 
-NEG 
VP -. ADV NP 
IAUX IMP - N EG 
Never N. V NP 
IMP 
-AUX 
-NEG 
ou 10 se it Y 
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(d) S 
IMP 
+AUX 
+N EG 
AUX EIMP 
ADV GNEGJ 
Certainly don týv ADV 
MP] 
go late 
To summarize, it could be said that in this section, 
there have been attempts not only to examine the individual 
elements that occur in the imperative VP but also to demon- 
strate that the entire VP constitutes a unit that is syntac- 
tically disjuncted from the subject NP. The discussion of be 
and do has revealed their syntactic behaviour in the 
sentence, and that of negation has shown Its -di'striý 
bution. Phrase Structure rules for some varieties of 
imperatives have been proposed, and it has been argued that 
such rules must be provided for the sentences in a one-level 
analysis like the present one, even though the imperative 
does not form a syntactically integrated constituent 
structure. 
4.3 Semantics 
A) Semantico-Pragmatic Characteristics of Imperative VP's. 
The problems to be examined here revolve around the 
questions (a) what the scope of negation in the imperative 
is, (b), what exactly is the semantic relationship between 
do, negation and the main -verb in the VP, and (c), what 
factor determines the selection of subjects for imperative 
VP's containing negation. I begin with (a). 
(1) THE SCOPE OF NEGATION IN THE IMPERATIVE 
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The treatmetit of negation in the previous section was 
concerned with structural matters, but here I shall discuss 
issues which could not be captured by PS rules. It is 
pertinent to examine the scope of negation in the imperative 
in view of its placement in the sentence. I shall therefore 
try to determine whether or not the imperative subject always 
lies within this scope, and the semantic implications of the 
situation that is presented, especially with regard to the 
recalcitrant problem about imperatives and propositions. 
Negation occurs in the imperative in the following forms 
and positions, apart from its occurrence in the tag of the 
sentence, as Rules (iii) - (v) above indicate. 
(4.3.1)(a) Don't waste your talents. 
(b) Don't you waste your, talents. 
(c) Do not waste your talent. 
(d) *The boy in the corner don't waste your 
talents. 9 
It is difficult to claim in the imperative that both the 
subject and the predicate of the sentence lie within the 
scope of the negation that it contains. The point is that 
with regard to sentence meaning, there is no link between 
the subject and the rredicate and so there is no sentence-wide 
idea which don't or not may be said to negate as they do in 
the exarples in (4.3.2). (See Chapter Five, Section 5.2 (C)). 
(4.3.2)(a) You waste your talents. 
(b) You do not waste your talents. 
(c) The boy in the corner wastes his talents. 
(d) The boy in the corner doesn't waste his talents. 
Consequently, it can be claimed that the imperative subject NP 
lies outside the domain of the negative element i'n the sentence. 
However, there appears to be a counter example: the sentence 
in (4.3.3). 
193 
(4.3.3) Don 0t you waste your talent again. 
However, this sentence, by incorporating the adverb again, 
clearly expresses the presupposition that the addressee has 
been wasting his talents before. But this does not in any 
way suggest that this sentence is actually negating any one 
of the propositional functions, 
(4.3.4)(a) x wastes his talents. 
(b) x does waste his talents. 10 
Thus, the difference between the examples in (4.3.1) and the 
one in (4.3.3) consists in the presupposition which the 
latter expresses but the former do not. It is not the case 
therefore that any entire sentence is negated in both groups. 
If negation in the imperative does not have the subject 
NP within its scope, then it must be semantically posited in 
the predicate of the sentence. Here, it has to do with the 
verb of the sentence. The question that arises therefore is 
whether it negates only the verb or the verb and its 
complements. ll Let's begin with the following declaratives. 
(4.3.5)(a) Sam loves Susan. 
(b) Sam does not love Susan. 
A translation of the sentences into intensional logic gives 
us the following. 
(4.3.6)(a) ^Love'(Susan')(Sam'). 
(b) - ^Love'(Susan')(Sam'). 
It is the case that both the subject of the sentence Sam and 
the direct object of the verb Susan lie within the scope of 
the negation in (4.3.6)(b). However, in the imperatives in 
(4.3.7) and their translations in (4.3.8), it is not even 
possible to convey positive propositions as in (4.3.6)(a), 
let alone trying to negate them as indicated in (4.3.6)(b). 
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(4.3.7) (a) Call Sam. 
(b) Somebody call John. 
These cannot translate as follows: 
(4.3.8)(a) * ? x["Ca11'(Sam')(x)]. 
(b) *"Call'(John')(Somebody'). 
The reason for this is two-fold. (i), with regard to the 
example in (4.3.8)(a), it has been pointed out in Chapter 
Three (Sections 3.2 and 3.3) that the agent is always present 
in the context of use and that the sentence has to do with 
the current index. Therefore, it is NOT the case that the 
speaker can utter an imperative for which the subject may be 
represented by a variable, especially in view of the great 
effort that goes into specifying the referent of the subject, 
where it is not pragmatically self-evident in the context of 
use who the referent is. Therefore, we cannot have a case 
where the negative element relates to a propositional 
function in which the referent of the subject NP is uniden- 
tified, contrary to what is normally required by the impera- 
tive construction. 
(4.3.9) Ax["Call"(Sam")(x)], or 
* I)x['[ "Call' (Sam') (x)] ]. 
(ii), a fundamental principle of Montague Semantics 
characterizes an argument as an element that can be within 
the domain of a functor. Consequently, such an argument is 
said to have the property of that functor. If, as it will be 
demonstrated in Section 5.1 below, the subject NP has no 
structural link with the predicate and so with the verb of 
the sentence, it cannot be said to have the property of the 
predicate as a functor. 
The crucial thing here is that the object NP CAN validly 
function as an argument to the verb. This means therefore 
that the verb must be separately modified by any element 
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which can do so before it can function as a functor to the 
object NP. Among these modifying elements are do, negative 
elements and, as we shall see in the next chapter, non-sentential 
adverbs. It can therefore be claimed that in the imperative 
construction, the verb is fully determined, semantically, 
before it can act as a functor to the object NP. 
12 
(2) NEGATION AND THE VERBS IN THE IMPERATIVE 
The issue to resolve now is how to determine the manner 
in which the negative elements relate to the verb, in view of 
the presence of do in the sentence whenever any of them 
occurs. It is not one of the conventions of both GPSG and MS 
to entertain the idea of Do-Insertion into a sentence 
structure, where there is no auxiliary verb, in order to give 
"support" to the negative element that occurs in the 
sentence. On the contrary, all the elements that occur in 
the sentence are. base-derived, and so do has been 
characterized as a modifier of the verb. (See Dowty, 1979: 
348-350). I agree with this position. It would appear 
however that the negative elements that occur in the 
imperative do not modify the lexical verb directly, rather, 
they modify do which in turn modifies the lexical verb. 
(4.3.10)(a) Don't forget to call me at Five. 
(b) Do not forget to call me at Five. 
(c) Don't you again forget to call me at Five. 
There is thus/no difference in the semantic roles of n't and 
not, even though the former attaches to do while the latter 
takes the position immediately after it. 
(4-3.11)(a) *Do you boy not forget to call me. 
(b) *Do frequently not call me. 
(c) *Do at home not forget to call me. 
But the following are grammatical. 
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(4.3.12)(a)- Do not now raise the issue again. 
(b) Do not at once send for them. 
(c) Do not here draw a conclusion. 
It is therefore reasonable to come to the conclusion that the 
negative elements (both n't and not) are inseparable from do, 
which they modify. 13 
(3) NEGATION AND SUBJECTS IN THE IMPERATIVE 
As pointed out in the previous section, there are some 
restrictions on the types of NP's that can occur as subjects 
in imperatives containing negation. This has to do not only 
with the structural configurations of the NP's but also their 
Person. For example, the following sentences sound odd. 
(4.3.13)(a) *Don't the boy who arrived late yesterday 
make that noise again. 
(b) *Don't the girl in the class sing it again. 
(c) *The boy who arrived late yesterday do not 
make that noise again. 
(d) *The girl in the class do not sing it 
again. 
It is not due to the fact that the NP's are rather long. 
Even much shorter ones also sound odd. 
(4.3.14)(a) *Do not somebody open the door! 
(b) *Don't the boy there open the doorl14 
(c) Don't you boys open the door! , 
There must therefore be a basic principle which 
constrains the occurrence of subjects in imperatives with 
negation. What we are seeing here is the case where not all 
the subject NP's that can occur under Rule (i) can do 
so under Rule (iv). This has two implications: (a), that in 
addition to identifying the referent in relation to the 
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context of use, as was argued in the previous chapter, there 
is also another requirement which is imposed by negation; 
(b), it is clear from this state of affairs that even though 
there are no structural relationships between the subject NP 
and the predicate of the imperative, there are semantico- 
pragmatic ones, as we shall see soon. ' 
The type of subjects that co-occur with negation in the 
sentence are the zero-subject and the second person pronoun, 
you or NP's like all which can accept of you post-modifiers. 
(4.3.15)(a) Don't <> open the door. 
(b) Don't you open the door. 
It does appear that the occurrence of these elements as 
subjects in these imperatives depends on the idea of a prior 
identification of the referents. The crucial point here is 
the degree of specificity in the reference to the 
individuals in question. (See the chart in (3.3.14) in 
Chapter Three). It is however the case that an individual 
who has previously been associated with an action by the 
speaker is deemed to have reached the highest level of 
identification by him or her. It is this fact that limits 
subjecthood to only the zero-element and you in the imperative 
that contains negation. It is an aspect of the nature of 
language that you cannot tell an individual not to swim or 
not to jump down if you do not (before speaking) associate 
that individual with such an action, or if s(he) is not about 
to do so. It is this fact that justifies the occurrence of 
you, thus creating a context of two parties: the speaker and 
the addressee as we shall see in the next chapter. It also 
justifies the use of the zero subject since an individual in 
the process of performing an action could already have been 
uniquely identified by the situation that s(he) has thus 
created. 
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The full descriptive NP's and the indefinite NP's cannot 
function in such sentences since their semantic nature 
clearly shows that they are being identified or associated 
with an action for the first time. 
(4.3.16)(a) The boy holding the rope jump down! 
(b) Somebody jump down and pick it up. 
I 
jump down (again)! (c) Don't 
ýYou) 
It is the same factor that warrants the occurrence of 
the adverb of frequency, again, in imperatives containing 
negation as in (4.3.16)(c). It shows that there is even the 
possibility that the addressee could already have performed 
the action in question before the imperative with negation is 
uttered. This thus provides independent justification for 
the above claim. Under these circumstances, therefore, we 
cannot possibly have an imperative like 
(4.3.17) *Don't somebody come in again! 
Finally, the situation created by negation thus supports the 
claim in Chapter Three that when the zero-subject occurs in 
the imperative, it might be doing so as an alternative to 
You. The only exception to this is the class of imperatives 
that are captured by Rule (v). These are those with do not. 
(4.3.18) "Do not *you 
°say that a. \gain! 
It would appear however that the needs of intonation and 
stress placement, as indicated in (4.3.18), make the presence 
of you just after not obtrusive and so unacceptable. 
In sum, it may be said that the examination of the 
various aspects of the semantic nature of the imperative has 
revealed that the subject NP does not lie within the scope of 
the negative elements that occur in the sentence. Negation 
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is thus a semantic limitation on the verb. Similarly, no 
propositions are expressed by the verb phrase component of 
the sentence even though it is syntactically detached from 
its subject NP. It is thus the case that the semantic nature 
of the predicate is such that negation attaches directly to 
the main verb through the auxiliary verb do. 
It was also noticed that not all imperative subject NP's 
can occur in the imperative which has a negation. The choice 
is usually between you and the so-called zero-subject since 
negation presupposes that the referent is already well 
identified. Thus within the NP's that can occur in the 
imperative, only a small subset made up of these two elements 
can be related to the notion of previous identification that 
can provide the level of identification which negation 
generally requires in subject NP's. One of the implications 
of this state of affairs is that in imperatives involving 
negation, there is semantico-pragmatic relationship between 
the subject and the predicate of the sentence. 
B) Compositional Semantics of Imperative VP's. 
The aim of this sub-section is to find out how far 
the imperative predicate is susceptible to -a compositional 
analysis. It will also show that its semantic structure'is 
different from the type that is usually associated with 
declarative VP not only with regard to some of the categories 
it has, but also with respect to the fact that it is suscep- 
tible to factors having to do with the context of use of the 
sentence. It is this facility which it possesses that 
enables it to form a psychological sentence structure, and a 
credible semantic relationship, with its subject NP. It is 
therefore the case that previous analyses of the imperative 
in English (see Huntley, 1980 and 1984; Hausser, 1979; 
Schmerling, 1980, and Lewis, 1972) which fail to account for 
all these aspects, are grossly Inadequate. 
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(1) CATEGORIES 
It is true, as the previous chapter shows, that the 
occurrence of "non-basic" categories may vary from one sen- 
tence type to another. This thus supports the idea that the 
rules of the grammar of natural language are best formulated 
if they are in accordance with the differences that exist 
between sentence types. While this has been the case with 
the subject NPs, it is certainly not so with regard to 
most of the individual elements that occur in the imperative, 
including elements like adjectives, and prepositions. Also, 
the manner in which verbs dominate their object NP's do not 
seem to vary from one sentence type to another. What seems 
to vary in the case of the imperative is the outcome of such 
a relationship, i. e., the imperative VP. Therefore, most of 
the "basic" categories for verbs and their complements that 
already exist in the literature (see Montague, 1974), and 
which are originally devised for declaratives, also hold good 
for imperatives. (See example (3.3.1) in Chapter Three). 
It must however be made clear that whereas T-phrases in 
Montague Semantics are categorially. defined to combine with 
TV- as well as IV-expressions in order to form verb-object 
relationship and subject-predicate relationships 
respectively, they cannot be so in the imperative. There is 
no subject-predicate relationship in the imperative which can 
be subjected to a compositional analysis. It is for this reason 
therefore that I have set up a separate category of NPs, 
Tim, to represent possible imperative subject NP's. 
The NP's that can function as subjects in the imperative 
construction constitute only a subset of the WP's in Lnglish. 
Furthermore, they can also function as objects-to verbs in 
the construction just as much as those which. cannot be sub- 
jects, as the following examples show. 
201 
(4.3.19)(a)- Consult the man in the corner. 
(b) The man in the corner listen to me! 
(c) Give this to a man. 
(d) *A man listen to me! 
We can see that whereas the man in the corner can occur 
both as an object and as a subject, a man can only 
occur as an object but not as a subject in (4.3.19). Yet, 
the category T covers both types of NP's in Montague 
Semantics. The complication that must thus be resolved is 
how to integrate the two types of NP's as entities that can 
function as complements to verbs and also separate them 
according to whether or not they can occur as subjects in the 
construction, and, while doing all this, making sure that 
none of them is categorially defined to combine with IV- 
phrases. 
Leaving aside the issue of IV-phrases for the moment, I 
believe the best way to resolve the problem is by putting the 
NP's in two different categories which would then be 
associated with specific functions. Although such 
functions would overlap with regard to the ability of the 
NP's to occur as complements to verbs, they would also 
separate the NPs that can be subjects from those that 
cannot. As a consequence, the Category T must be dropped 
completely as inadequate for the situation presented by the 
imperative. 
The Category Tim would still remain as one that 
comprises NP's that can function as subjects in the 
imperative. Then, Tum may be regarded as the one that is 
constituted. by NP's that can function as complements to verbs 
in the imperative. One of the implications of this is that 
NP's like somebody belong to the two categories. But then this 
is what it usually does in English, as we can see in the 
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the following examples. 
(4.3.20)(a) Somebody clean the floor. 
(b) Tell somebody. 
As a member of Category Tim, somebody occurs in (4.3.20)(a) 
as a subject, but it is a direct object in (4.3.20)(b) as a 
member of category Tum. 
Another implication of the classification is the fact 
that an NP like boyq which can only function in the 
sentence as a complement to the verb, would simply be a member 
of Category Tum only. 
(4.3.21) (a) Ask a boy to clean the table. 
(b) *A boy clean the table. 
(c) Tell your son to apply for it. 
(d) *Your son send a reminder at once. 
(e) Persuade this boy to go to college. 
(f) *This boy stand up. 
The final implication of the arrangement is that it does 
not in any way affect the normal verb-complement relationship 
which, as pointed out above, does not vary from one sentence 
type to another. Thus, the usual relationships still obtain, 
e. g., transitivity and predication. 
On the question of IV-phrases of Montague Semantics, 
my argument is that they are simply inapplicable to. the 
imperative constuction. The imperative predicate exhibits 
such a level of uniqueness in many respects that it must 
belong to a category that can reflect this fact. One of 
these aspects is the need for it to be a suitable fragment 
with which the subject NP can relate semantically. Conse- 
quently, since the subject NP, as already pointed out, refers 
to the context of use, it is not surprising that the VP also 
has an aspect of this feature. The evidence for this comes 
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from (i), the fact that all the verbs have to do with 
actions, things to be performed, (ii), the sort of relation 
to time which they all have, and (iii), the morphological 
shape of the verbs which leaves no doubts about the semantic 
relationship between the VP and the subject NP. 15 
Another reason why there must be a separate category for 
the imperative predicate is that unlike IV-phrases, it cannot 
function as a real predicate to its subject for reasons which 
will be discussed in Section 5.1 below. So, while the 
Category IV works for declaratives, it cannot work for 
imperatives, otherwise it will be impossible to separate a 
declarative predicate from an imperative one, from the point 
of view of form. 
(4.3.22)(a) The youngest girl here sits down. 
(b) The youngest girl here sit down. 
The imperative predicate might therefore be regarded as 
a member of the Category IVlm. It would thus be of the 
logical TYPE <s<e, t}> -- a function from the context of use 
to a set of individuals. Since the symbol s stands for the 
context of use, it is not a category. Therefore, Vim is not 
categorially defined to combine with any other category. 
This is in consonance with the real nature of the imperative 
predicate, which, as pointed out above, does not really form 
a unified syntactic category with its subject NP. 
As a non-basic category, Vim would, for example, be the 
result of'the operation of the rule of functional application 
involving categories TV and Tum. 16 Consequently, TV must be 
urn i defined to take T as an argument to yield IVm. 
The various elements of the imperative predicate that 
have been introduced so far may be represented in the 
following TABLE. 
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TABLE ONE 
Category 
IVim 
TV 
Tum 
Semantic TYPES 
<s<e, t» 
«s«s<e, t»t><s<e, t»> 
<s<e, t» 
(2) FORMATION RULE 
Expression 
open the door 
sit to then 
that chair be polite 
tell her what you want 
etc. 
open 
touch 
kickl7 
hold 
etc. 
o aeboy 
this girl 
your son 
a table 
etc. 
The formation rule for the example which I have chosen 
will thus be one of functional application like the type in 
(3.3.10) in Chapter Three. 
(4.3.23) If x is a semantic TYPE <Tum, IVlm> and 
y is a semantic TYPE Turn, then the function 
i 
xý (y ') will yield the semantic TYPE IVm. 
The Rule in (4.3.23) can predict only imperative predi- 
cates which contain transitive verbs and their direct 
objects. Other rules will be required to predict other 
structures which the predicates may also have. For example, 
separate rules will be needed for the verbs be and try to. 
Note that the logical TYPE for Tum is the same as in Montague 
Semantics and so category names are used in the following 
diagrams instead of logical types. (See example (3.3.1). 
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(4.3.24)(a) kick'the ball IVim 
kick TV the ball Tum 
the T- m/CN 
ball 
CN 
(b) clean the table IVi° 
clean TV the table T 
the Tý/CN to le CN 
For the examples in (4.3.25), the predicates are members 
of Category IVlm without involving the Rule in (4.3.23). 
(4.3.25)(a) stop IVim 
(b) smile IVim 
A significant aspect of the present proposal is the fact 
that it is able to identify the predicate of the imperative 
as an element which is suited to function with the rest of 
the sentence. It might be argued that since it is related to 
the context of use as the subject NP is, it can therefore be 
categorially defined to combine with Tlm-phrases to form the 
unique sentence structure, the imperative. 
The above argument is flawed on many grounds. First, 
the subject NP and the predicate are not related to the 
context of use in the same way. While the referent of the 
subject NP has to be present in the context of use, the 
action in the predicate, as pointed out above, does not have 
to take place in that context. Its real connection with the 
context is the fact that it is MENTIONED in it. Second, if a 
compositional analysis were provided for the imperative as 
suggested above, it would be impossible to describe the real 
nature of the construction, i. e., the semantico-pragmatic 
relationships between the two main segments that make it up, 
especially the fact that they are independent entities being 
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correlated by the processes of identification and specifi- 
cation, as will be explained in the next chapter. Thirdly, 
there is no new insight to be gained by providing such an 
analysis which the approach that has been pursued here has 
not revealed. Finally, I would say that the analyses of the 
subject and vocative NP's as well as that of the predicate 
have made clear what they all have in common. However, while 
it is the role of surface syntax to represent the imperative 
as if it were a single unit, it is that of semantics to 
reveal the fact that, in relation to the external world, such 
a union does not exist in the sentence. 
In sum, I would say that this subsection has revealed 
the semantic nature of the imperative VP. The logical TYPES 
of the categories that constitute it have been established, 
and the NP's which can appear as complements of the verbs 
have been identified. The VP itself has been characterized 
as an entity which has to do with the context use, but which 
has no compositional relationship with its subject NP. 
4.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, many aspects of the verb phrase in the 
imperative have been examined. The idea of a unique 
imperative VP has been established on the basis that it 
cannot occur in a clause that is in a complement position in a 
sentence; it carries a strong sense of order or command, and 
it does not allow any extraction of any of its parts. 
In the main section for syntax, the verbs have been 
discussed and PS rules provided. With regard to certain 
elements that occur in the VP, be has been found to occur 
only as a main verb, accepting a host of complements 
including the gerund. There is thus no aspect in the 
construction. Do occurs in the initial positions in 
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imperatives which have it, bearing the emphatic stress, and 
at times, the affixal negation. Also, along with negation 
which as a word occupies a fixed position after it, it 
behaves in a way that limits the types of subjects that can 
occur in the imperatives which contain it to you and the 
zero-subject. On the whole, the verbs have been characterized 
as non-finite and tense-neutral. The PS rules cover all the 
structures, capturing not only the constituent structure of 
the VP, but also the various surface forms of the imperative. 
With regard to semantics, it has been demonstrated that 
since there is no assertion linking the subject NP and the 
VP, the subject NP is outside the scope of negation in the 
construction. Negation is thus limited to the VP only, 
where, along with do, it is a semantic modifier of the main 
verb. The compositional semantics of the VP identifies it as 
an entity which cannot serve as a functor to the subject NP. 
It is thus a unique VP, capable of containing as objects 
or complements both noun phrases that can Lunction as 
subjects and those which cannot, and also capable of having 
some relationships with the context of use. 
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Footnotes to Chapter Four 
1. As a result of this, I shall henceforth be using the 
term "imperative verb" to refer to any member of this class 
of verbs in the language. 
2. Since be remains a copula in all its uses in the 
imperative, these complements that it takes may properly be 
described as "predicates". It thus cannot be an auxiliary 
and still be able to have such "predicates". Any complements 
that may occur in such circumstances will be governed by the 
main verb to which it is an auxiliary. 
(1) Jim is examining them. 
(2) Mabel may also be going there. 
3.1 am using the symbol <> to represent the zero-subject. 
4. Be, like do, has become an interesting verb to study in 
the generative approach to grammar. The functions of this 
verb have traditionally been divided between being a 
"linking" verb and being "helping" verb. In the former role, 
it would, for example, have an NP or an adjective as its 
complement. In the later role, it would, for example, be an 
element in the formation of the progressive aspect. Recent 
developments in generative grammar have been inclined towards 
regarding be as a main verb. The principle behind this is 
simple enough: it simply colapses the two roles I have 
mentioned above by getting rid of the latter. Where there is 
controversy is the manner to bring this about. We have seen 
(in Chapter one) the attempts of those who want to treat be 
along with do in some form of Raising Transformation. There 
has also been the more recent attempt of Gazdar, Pullum and 
Sag (1982) to use feature specification system to identify 
the sort of elements that can occur after it as well those 
that occur after certain other verbs. According to this 
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method, in the instances in which the verb has NP's, PP's and 
Adj's as complements, it would have the feature specification 
[+PRED]. Their functions in aspect and passive constructions, 
for example, have different feature specifications (see 
Gazdar, Pullum and Sag, Op. cit.: 598-599). 
What we have observed about be with regard to the 
imperative is not whether or not it takes an NP or an 
adjective as a "linking verb" or as a "predicate", but 
whether or not the progressive aspect is relevant to the 
imperative sentence in English. My proposal above is that it 
is not, and so the so-called "-ing" word that occurs in the 
imperative is just a gerund, an NP. In conformity with GPSG 
approach to the relationship between be and NP's in such a 
position, the verb must be subcategorized with the feature 
[+PRED] in the imperative. This feature thus holds good for 
all its functions in the construction, as, the examples in 
(4.2.3) demonstrate. 
5. It must be reiterated here that varieties involving tags 
are not being included. (See Chapter One, Section 2 above). 
6. As stated in Chapter Two, Section 2.4, the Feature [IMP] 
is an abbreviation for [MOOD IMP]. (Also, see footnote 12 in 
Chapter Two). Since all imperatives have their main verbs in 
the base-form, [IMP] appropriately subsumes this syntactic 
aspect of the verb. This fact is thus captured by the FCR in 
(4.2.25). [IMP] is also used as a devise that captures the 
basic structural shape of the imperative, which is one of 
Subject NP + VP. This excludes vocatives since they can 
occur in different positions in the sentence. The so-called 
zero-subject occurs in the same position as lexical subject 
NP's and so the structure stated above holds for many varie- 
ties of the construction. Since [IMP] is a sub-classifica- 
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tion of sentence mood, it is linked with the subject-predicate 
relation in the imperative also. Thus, in the imperative 
where the relation is not expressed by aspects like modality 
and concord, as I shall explain in Chapter Five, the feature 
[+BSE] appropriately represents this fact. Just as [IMP] 
relates to the base-form of the imperative verb, so can the 
features [DECL] and [INTER] (for declaratives'and interrogatives 
respectively) be said to relate to [+FIN] (see Gazdar, 1982) 
in their main verbs. 
7. It must be recalled that GPSG allows neither an under- 
lying element like the do in Pullum and Wilson (1977) nor the,,. 
deletion of any entity as in TG, and so Rule (i) in (4.2.26) 
cannot be regarded as a case where do is underlying or deleted. 
Rules (i) and (iii) become (vi) and (vii) respectively through 
the operation of the meta-rule relating to Sentential Adverb 
Placement (SAP). (See Gazdar et al, 1982 and 1985). 
8. Syntactic features have been left out of the , 
following -PM's 
for the sake of simplicity. They will however be included in 
the next set of PM's which will actually include examples 
that contain do. 
9. The noun phrase "the boy in the corner" is not being 
treated as a vocative in this example. 
10. Mccawley (1981) examines the problem of deciding which 
propositions in declarative sentences not or n"t may be said 
to negate. He notes that quantifiers, among other things, 
may bring in some complications. His examples of such cases 
include the following (p. 16). 
(1) Some people aren't afraid of dying. 
(2) Some people are afraid of dying 
None of the sentences, he observes, is a negation of the other. 
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Here, the subject NP's are clearly within the scope of the 
negation in the sentences, and so they are able to influence 
the interpretation of the sentences in relation the presence 
or absence of n't. But in imperatives, there are no such 
propositions involving the subject NP's for not or nit to 
negate and so the subject NP's in these sentences lie outside 
the scope of operation of these negative elements. 
11. The fact that this question arises at all is due to the 
uniqueness of the imperative construction. As we shall see 
soon, the imperative does not express any proposition that 
may be said to be true or false. It has been pointed out 
already that there is no propositional function for not to 
relate to in the sentence. It might be expected that the 
predicate of the sentence made enough sense to serve as a 
sort of "proposition" that not could validly negate. It is 
therefore necessary to examine the role of negation in this 
part of the construction in order to make clear the element 
or a set of elements to which it may directly attach itself 
in the construction. (See Lee, 1974, and Hoepelman, 1979). 
12. The verb is the most significant element in the 
predicate. Therefore, it does not appear to make any 
difference where these verb-modifying elements are placed in 
it. Thus, as we shall see in Section 5.1(B) below, non- 
sentential adverbs may occur either before or after the verb 
in the predicate. That this is not true of the negative 
elements in the sentence is perhaps due to the influence of 
do, which, as a periphratic verb, must occur BEFORE the main 
verb. 
13. The idea of negation relating to the verb only is not 
without. a parallel in the grammar of English. In a way, this 
is what is done by prefixes like dis- and de-. 
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(1) Positive 
obey 
mobilize 
Negative 
disobey 
demobilize 
It is therefore the case that the following sentences have 
the same meaning. 
(2) Do not disobey her. 
(3) Do not not obey her. 
It can thus be claimed that only not can occur before not 
after do in the imperative. If we pursue this paralellism 
between these two sentences further, it may be argued that 
whereas the first not in (3) relates to do directly as I 
have claimed above, the second seems to be close to the verb 
obey, from the way the sentence is uttered, almost like the 
way in which dis is related to its stem obey in (2). If this 
is correct, it is the case therefore that the negative 
element that modifies do cannot be separated from it after 
all, and so the "do not" in both sentences are identical. 
14. I would say that even with you alone as subject, the 
sentences in (4.3.14)(b) and (4.3.14)(c) would still be odd 
as imperatives. 
(1) *You do not open the door! 
(2) *you don't open the door! 
15. See Chapter Five, Section 2, below for a discussion of 
the role of action and its relation to time in the impera- 
tive. The phenomenon by which the VP is interpreted as an 
action to be performed by the addressee is also discussed. 
In this matter, the base form of the verb plays a crucial 
role. 
16. As we saw in the previous section, there are numerous 
ways in which the predicate is constituted. Some of these do 
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not involve the rule of functional application. I am however 
limiting myself to cases involving only this rule in the 
present analysis. 
17. As stated above, it will suffice for the purpose of the 
present analysis to cover the cases of transitive and intran- 
sitive verbs here. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE IMPERATIVE SENTENCE 
5.0 Introduction 
All the evidence in'the present analysis so far suggests 
that the imperative is fundamentally different from all other 
sentences in the language, contrary to some of the views 
expressed by Davies (1981). In brief, the areas of 
differences are as follows: 
(a) SYNTAX: The imperative, as we have seen in 
Chapters Three and Four, contains two syntactically 
disjuncted parts -- what I have all along called 
subject and predicate, each of which is solely but 
adequately organized syntactically for the 
linguistic function of the sentence. As a result, 
these two main parts of the imperative do not 
exhibit features like concord, tense and modality. 
(b) SEMANTICS: Both subject and vocative NP's of the 
construction relate to the context of use. Whereas 
the VP is semantically organized to specify an 
action or a course of action, both the subject and 
the vocative are similarly specified as the only 
possible agents of such an action. 
(C) PRAGMATICS: We have been able to see why. the 
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imperative can afford to drop its subject NP and 
yet remain a full sentence. The complex 
relationship between it and the external world is 
the one factor that underlies most of the 
idiosyncratic grammatical characteristics that the 
sentence is believed to have. It is this aspect 
that most generative grammarians have 
fruitlessly sought to explain away in their 
accounts (see Chapter One). Yet we cannot fully 
understand the sentence until adequate attention 
is given to it. 
There are certain aspects that must not be overlooked. 
For example, it is the case that the imperative cannot occur 
in the forms of the following sentence structures: the cleft 
sentence, the pseudo-cleft, real passive and topicalized 
sentences. 
(5.0.1)(a) Open the door! 
(b) *It is open the door! 
(c) *What open is the door! 
(d) *The door open by you! 
(e) *The door (you) open! 1 
The notion of the imperative as "a poorly elaborated clause 
type" and a "primitive relative to indicative clauses", first 
mentioned in Chapter Two, Section 2.1 in a quotation from 
(Schmerling, 1982: 203), in the context of the sentences in 
(5.0.1), would appear to be borne out. But this is rather 
misleading. It is based on the unproven assumptions that all 
sentences must be similar to the declarative, and that the 
greater the structural varieties that a sentence type 
displays, the "richer" it must be. 
As we have seen in Chapter Two, the consequences of 
these views are unwelcome. For example, they have led to the 
virtual equation of the imperative with a clause-type, the 
infinitival clause type. As I have observed in Chapter 
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Three, there is also a suggestion that the construction is 
probably quantified into intensional contexts like the 
declarative construction. There is nothing wrong if all this 
was the case. But the features which we now know that the 
imperative lacks suggest very strongly that the construction 
is simply different from the declarative. What seems quite 
obvious now is that the old desire to seek generalizations in 
sentence structures and. functions is still strong., and appears 
to be standing in the way of an adequate analysis of the 
imperative. 
For the present study, however, the ungrammaticality of 
the structures in (5.0.1) and the fact that there are certain 
grammatical characteristics of other sentences which the 
imperative lacks are an index of its uniqueness rather than 
of its weakness. From the point of view of our intention to 
provide a separate analysis for the sentence in line with the 
suggestion of McCawley (see Chapter Two, Section 2.3), I shall 
proceed, in this final chapter, to examine the following 
aspects of the sentence. 
(i) how to characterize the relationship between the 
subject and the predicate of the sentence; 
(ii) how the imperative relates to adverbs, especially 
sentence adverbs, which occur in it; 
(iii) the sort of semantical object that it is, and, 
(iv) how to provide an appropriate model theoretic 
interpretation for it. 
I shall treat both syntactic and semantic as*well as 
semantico-pragmatic matters as usual. Almost all of these 
issues have been introduced in the previous chapters. The 
ensuing discussions will thus take them to their logical 
conclusions. 
217 
It is hoped that these problems which have remained 
recalcitrant in the literature on the imperative will be 
finally laid to rest, or removed as obstacles to our 
understanding of the construction. 
I shall first of all discuss aspects of syntax and then go 
on to semantics and pragmatics after that, keeping as far as 
possible to the order in which the problems have been set out 
above. 
5.1 Syntax 
A) Subject and Predicate. 
The subject and VP elements in the imperative were 
treated in Chapters Three and Four respectively. It is 
therefore necessary to discuss them together in this chapter. 
We can see that there is an aspect of the sentence which the 
phrase structure rules in the previous chapter cannot 
capture. This is the relationship between the subject and 
the predicate of the sentence. Until now, I have only taken 
it for granted that the "subject" of the imperative is 
syntactically disjuncted from its predicate. The question 
that is raised is if this is the case, why and how are such 
. lements still subject and predicate. This is an interesting 
question which bears on the controversy about what is what in 
the sentences of natural languages in both generative and 
non-generative grammars. We can see this, for example, in 
Chomsky, 1981; Dowty, (1982a) and (b), and Perlmutter, (1982) 
in recent times, and also in Sandmann, (1954); Halliday, 
(1967); Strang (1968), and Keenan, (1976) for the earlier 
period. The main concern has always been the syntactic and 
the functional roles of these elements of the sentence. 
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With regard to their functional roles, the subject- 
predicate relationship has been described as that of Topic- 
Comment (as pointed out in Chapter Three), Theme-Rheme and 
Given-New. Almost all of these distinctions have appeared in 
generative grammars (we have already seen how Chomsky has 
made use of some of them). 
As for the syntactic aspects, certain distinctions have 
also been made. The fact of the English word-order and the 
incidence of certain structural configurations have led to 
the following distinctions being made: grammatical, logical 
and psychological subject-predicate relationships. (See 
Lyons, 1968; Johnson-Laird, (1968); Clark and Clark, (1968); 
Hornby, (1971), and Chafe, (1970). 1 
(5.1.1)(a) Sam is reading a book. (Grammatical Subject) 
(b) Sam is examined by the doctor. (L ogical 
(c)' Sam, the doctor examined. (Psychological 
What is significant here is the fact that some of these 
notions relate directly to the imperative sentence. Also, 
they can be theoretically accommodated by the one-level, 
compositional approach that the present analysis is based 
upon. I shall therefore try to extend some of them to the 
imperative construction. 2 
My contention in Chapters Three and Four is that both 
the subject and the predicate elements of the imperative are 
each fully integrated structurally, hence they are. susce- 
ptibie to the rule of functional application. But this is 
not true of the imperative construction as a single syntactic 
unit as I have suggested in Chapter Three (Section 3.0). The 
difference (and a very significant one it is) is that whereas 
this rule also works across these elements in the declara- 
tive, it cannot be so in the imperative. The reason for this, 
219 
I believe, is the fact that the imperative subject- 
predicate relationship is a psychological, rather than a 
grammatical one. This is evidenced by the situation in the 
imperative in which, as pointed out in the introduction, 
there are, in,. these elements, no grammatical features like 
concord, tense and modality which could have established 
grammatical relations between them.. What is there surely is 
the operation of the general English word-order: SVO. Thus, 
it is the case that in nearly all varieties of the 
imperative, this word-order is maintained. The subject 
occurs before the predicate. 
(5.1.2)(a) The boy in the kitchen set the table. 
(b) -Somebody set the table. 
(c) You set the table 
(d) Set the table, -won't you! 
Barring the dubious case of the Let-construction, the only 
exceptions I know of are cases where don't occurs before the 
subject you. (See Chapter Four, Section 4.2, for "VP 
Fronting"). 
(5.1.3) Don't you set the table in this way again! 
It is this state of affairs in the imperative that 
warrants the claim that the imperative has a psychological 
subject-predicate relationship -- subject plus predicate 
constitutes a sentence, with the subject occurring before the 
predicate. 
It is perhaps in place here to comment briefly on how 
features of concord, tense, modality, voice and aspect 
grammatically unify subject and predicate elements in the 
sentence. It is insignificant to ask whether or not 
these features are syntactic or semantic. For one thing, 
they usually appear in syntactic characterizations, as we can 
see in the survey in Chapter One. For another, it is not 
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theoretically worthwhile to try to split up, for example, the 
role of may or will, as they have been used in the analysis of 
the imperative, between syntax and semantics. What is 
relevant here is the fact that what occurs in any one of 
the two elements (subject and predicate) has a definite 
consequence for the other, as TABLE ONE shows. 
TABLE ONE 
Sentence Grammatical Feature and Function 
Concord: 3rd. person singular 
John sings. Tense: Present. 
Involveme nt: A habitual event by John. 
Tense: Present. 
John can sing. Modality: Ability - John has the ability to sing. 
Concord: 3rd. person singular. 
The song has been Tense: Present. 
Voice: Passive, 
sung by John. Aspect: Perfective - John has 
completed the singing. 
Concord: 2nd. person, singular 
or plural. 
Were you singing? Tense: Past. 
Aspect: Progressive. 
Will you sing? Tense: Present. 
Modality: Futurity or volition. 
Certain general patterns are discernible in the table. 
It seems to be the case that each sentence must choose at 
least two of the features. Secondly, the sentences show a 
choice between displaying concord or modality as a regular 
feature. (See Quirk et al, 1973, and Palmer, 1974 and 1979). 
It has been noted in Chapters Two and Four that the 
imperative has its verb in the base-form. It is however 
not the case that this base-form does duty for all the 
other features already noted in the predicates of the other 
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sentences in TABLE ONE. The imperative does not seem to need 
them. The absence of these features in the sentence, coupled 
with the fact that the subject NP regularly occurs before the 
predicate, as we have seen above, points to the fact that 
although the general configuration of the construction is 
that of a sentence, there is no structural cohesion between 
its two major parts. 
In addition to our separation of the imperative from 
mere clauses and verb phrases in Chapter Two, it can be 
argued that the characterization of the construction as a 
sentence is fully motivated by the fact that it has the usual 
structures that make up a sentence in natural languages, i. e. 
subject and predicate, although they are not grammatically 
linked as we have seen above. The question that is thus 
raised is whether or not a case of sentencehood based on a 
psychological subject-predicate relationship is as real as 
one based on a relationship in which features like those in 
TABLE ONE obtain. I have no answer to this question except 
to say that from what we have seen so far, it can be said 
that the nature of each of the two main constituents of the 
construction is fully adapted to the situation that it 
presents. While the subject NP is oriented towards the 
context of use, the VP is organized in a way that brings the 
idea of a subsequent action out clearly, thus giving us the 
notion of a unique type of a sentence. We shall see the 
semantic consequences of this state of affairs in the 
imperative below. 
In the light of what we have seen about the nature of 
the subject-predicate relationship in the sentence, the 
notion of GIVEN-NEW (see Halliday, ' 1967)' becomes particu- 
larly relevant. This notion appears to capture the sort 
of situation which the imperative presents. As Hornby 
'(1972) has pointed out, this idea has a psychological 
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reality from the viewpoint of. the listener. Applying it to the 
imperative, we will find that this sort of reality also 
exists. In the context of use, the referent of the subject 
NP is only a listener, initially. In this sense therefore, 
we can see the subject as GIVEN. Since what is actually 
being introduced, especially from the point of view of the 
listener, is the predicate, it is thus NEW to him or her. 
There is nothing unscientific about the notion of Given- 
New. On the contrary, it has both cognitive and pragmatic 
implications. For example, whereas the listener/addressee 
cannot see the predicate in the imperative in (5.1.4)(a) as a 
"comment" about himself, 
(5.1.4)(a) You boy wait for her. 
(b) The boy is waiting for her. 
since the idea it presents in the context of use is "new" to 
him, this is not the case in the declarative in (5.1.4)(b). 
Here, the idea of "is waiting for her" will not be "new" to 
referent of "the boy", if he hears the sentence, because it 
is he that is already doing the waiting. In this case, 
therefore, the predicate is a real "comment" on the subject. 
The above suggestions relate to an aspect which the 
protagonists of the Performative Hypothesis who discussed the 
imperative have ignored. While they were concerned with the 
role of you and had no doubts that the addressee was (and 
still is) the agent of the action mentioned in the sentence 
(see Chapter One, Section 1.2), they failed to consider the 
nature of the relationship between the subject and the 
predicate of the sentence. They thus failed to identify an 
aspect of the construction which separates it from all other 
sentence types, while concentrating on the illocutionary 
force of the sentence as part of its 'structure even 
though it is not usually verbalized in the ordinary 
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imperative sentence. As we shall see in Section 5.2 below, 
such an illocutionary force only serves as the motivation for 
the uttering of the sentence. 
From all we have seen above, it is pertinent to 
incorporate the notion of Given-New in our account of the 
imperative. 3 We probably cannot fully understand the nature 
of the sentence type until we can be certain about the 
relation between the subject and the predicate of the 
sentence. All this is in line with the following 
observation: 
Although the notion of psychological subject-predicate has been almost completely ignored by students of the 
generative-transformational approach to grammar, it is 
clear that any complete understanding of lanquage 
structure and function will have to include this notion 
as it relates to various aspects of word order. (Hornby, 1972: 641). 
To summarize, we can say that one significant aspect 
of the imperative sentence is the nature of the relationship 
between its subject and predicate. It has been observed that 
the kinds of grammatical relationships that we find in other 
sentences are absent in the construction. In light of this 
as well as the significance of word-order in the sentence, it 
has been contended that the imperative subject-predicate is 
psychological in nature with regard to grammar. 
B) Adverbs. 
Some adverbs have been identified as those which cannot 
occur 'in imperatives. These are the so-called negative 
preverbs. (See Chapter One, Section 1.3). Here, I take a 
look at adverbs in imperatives from a broader perspective. I 
shall consider both sentential and non-sentential adverbs and 
then establish their general characteristics. The aspects 
that have to do with the notion of negation will be taken up 
in Section 5.2 below under semantics, where it will be 
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explained why negative preverbs cannot really occur in these 
constructions. 
(1) SENTENTIAL ADVERBS 
Gazdar et al (1982) propose a rule for Sentential Adverb 
Placement (SAP) thus (p. 607): 
(5.1.5) SAP: <[-VVJ> 
CNUL +FIN C+AUXj 
< [- V ADV V], 
v 
Aqi[ADV` 
This rule, they claim, covers varieties of English that 
permit adverbs only after the first auxiliary. 
(5.1.6)(a) Joe has probably not found it. 
(b) Joe may possibly have been here before. 
(c) Joe will certainly have given it up. 
(d) *Joe may have probably left there. 
They observe: 
A less restricted variety also exists, in which such 
adverbs may occur after an auxiliary verb (although the deeper they get in the V, 
the 
worse they sound). (Ibid. ). 
What happens in interrogatives is quite similar, as the 
following examples show. 
(5.1.7)(a) Can Joe possibly find it? 
(b) Will she certainly arrive tomorrow? 
(c) Who will probably call for supper? 
Again in the imperative construction, it is all 
different. The rule in (5.1.5) cannot be generalized to this 
construction because it has certain characteristics which are 
not captured by the rule. Let's continue with sentential 
adverbs for the moment. The placement of these adverbs in 
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imperatives is quite restricted. Where they do occur in 
these sentences, they seem to be constrained to occurring in 
sentence-initial positions only. They also sound as if the 
sentences in which they occur were each a part of a 
discourse. 4 (See Michell, 1977). 
(5.1.8)(a) Alternatively, allow her to play until she 
is tired. 
(b) Preferably, get the papers typed yourself. 
(c) Obviously, you do the cooking, while I do the 
washing up later. 
In imperatives, the occurrence of adverbs like these in 
post-subject positions is not possible unless their scopes do 
not extend over the entire sentence in each case. 
(5.1.9)(a) *You, alternatively, allow her to play 
until she is tired. 
(b) *The girl in a red gown, preferably, get the 
papers typed yourself. 
(c) *Somebody there, obviously, do the cooking 
while I do the washing up later. 
There is certainly no chance of these adverbs occurring 
deeper in the sentences. As for their placement in sentence- 
final positions, our examples suggest that this too is 
ungrammatical. 
(5.1.10)(a) *Come here, certainly. 
(b) *You speak to her, possibly. 
(c) *Don't do that again, obviously. 
(d) *Listen to him, alternatively. 
It is interesting to note why these adverbs appear to be 
possible in sentence-initial positions, but bizarre in 
sentence-final positions. In this regard, the fact that they 
do not occur even immediately after the subject NP's, as the 
226 
examples in (5.1.9) show, is significant. The reason for 
this is probably what we have noted above: i. e., the 
disjunction between the subject'and predicate elements in the 
imperative construction. 5 In initial positions, these 
adverbs are able to relate to both segments of the 
construction, thus unifying them to some extent. It is not 
unreasonable to postulate that they are probably aided in 
this task by the fact that they appear to have some 
conjunctive relationships with the sentences that could have 
occurred just before they could have been uttered in a 
discourse. But in sentence-final positions, they would have 
two disadvantages. First, they would be unable to extend 
their scope over the subject NP's. Second, they would lose 
the ability to relate directly with any previous sentence. 
It is therefore correct to say that sentential adverbs 
occupy a fixed-position in the imperative, unlike what they 
do in other sentences. This is the sentence-initial posi- 
tion, -and this characteristic of the imperative can be 
captured by the rule in (5.1.11). 
(5.1.11) s [iMPJ ----> ADv ,8 
This rule is of course the result of the operation of 
a meta-rule on a rule like the one in (4.2.26) (i) (see 
Chapter Four, Section 4.2) in accordance with the principles 
of GPSG. 
(2) NON-SENTENTIAL ADVERBS 
With regard to non-sentential adverbs, the imperative 
presents a very different picture. Since these are adverbs 
that directly modify the verbs of their respective sentences, 
they occur either immediately before the V's of the sentences 
or anywhere after then. 
(5.1.12)(a) Softly clean the top of it. 
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(b)" Wake him up 
(c) Don't immedi 
aren't in a 
(d) *Immediately 
aren't in a 
entl . 
Lately clear them up if you 
hurry. 
don't clear them up if you 
hurry. 
It is by no means surprising that these adverbs should behave 
exactly as they do in other sentences. As we have 
demonstrated in the previous chapter, it is the grammatical 
cohesion which the imperative VP possesses that has enabled 
these adverbs to have the same freedom of occurrence in it as 
they have in other sentence types. 
(3) NEGATIVE PREVERBS 
Negative preverbs are to all intents and purposes non- 
sentential adverbs. Consequently, the reasons for their 
inability to occur in imperatives, from the point of view of 
syntax, must thus be found in the VP's of the sentences. As 
their name suggests, these adverbs (hardly, scarcely, almost, 
etc. ) are expected to occur in preverbal positions in the VP 
of a sentence. 
(5.1.13)(a) They scarcely drink port, even when it is 
available. 
(a') *They drink scarcely port, even when it is 
available. 
(b) He hardly knows what to ask for. 
(b') *He knows hardly what to ask for. 
(c) She never misses her lessons. 
(c') *She hisses rarely her lessons. 
(d) We barely understand the results. 
(d') *We understand barely the results. 
As we can see in the examples in (5.1.13), there seems to be 
no syntactic constraint in the structure of each Vp to 
prevent them from occurring in-post-verbal positions as other 
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non-sentential adverbs do. Neverthelessl it seems highly 
probable that their preference for preverbal positions has 
to do with their semantic nature. Similarly, their inability 
to occur in the imperative at all may' be attributed to the 
same reason. The whole situation therefore points to. 
significant elements in these sentences'and the adverbs 
themselves which it is the business of an adequate analysis 
of any one of these sentential structures to account for. As 
pointed out in Chapter one, it is not enough to say, as 
Davies has done, that it is all due to meaning relations in 
the imperative. It is necessary to point out clearly not 
only what actually obtains in"this construction, but also 
what is in the nature of these adverbs that make them so 
special, as we shall see below. 
The rule for Non-Sentential Adverb Placement in English 
imperatives, after the operation of the appropriate meta- 
rule, would look as follows: 
(5.1.14) S [: IdP ----> VP 
VP ----=ý- ADV VP 
(for structures where the adverb occurs in 
front of the verb). 
(5.1.15) S [IMPJ ---- y VP 
VP ---- VP ADV 
The translations into intensional logic reveal that there is 
no semantic difference in the predictions of these two rules. 
(4) DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SENTENTIAL AND NON-SENTENTIAL 
ADVERBS 
A brief comparison of sentential and non-sentential 
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adverbs shows that they are clearly distinct with regard to 
the positions they occupy in the sentences. This situation 
does not appear to be affected at all by the presence of the 
so-called zero subject . 
in the sentence. Thus, we can say 
that the adverbs in the following sentences do not occupy the 
same positions, i. e., sentence-initial positions, even though 
they seem to do so. 
(5.1.16)(a) Certainly, be ready to welcome him in the 
school premises. 
(b) quickly be ready to welcome him in the 
school premises. 
It is the case therefore that whereas certainly occurs BEFORE 
an S-category, cuickly occurs before a V-category. This is an 
important aspect of the imperative that has been ignored in 
important studies on adverbs in imperatives in generative 
grammar. (See chapter One, Section 1.3). This rather 
invisible contrast in the placement of these adverbs thus 
ensures that their various scopes of operations are not 
suppressed by the absence of superficial subjects in the 
sentences. 6 Thus, both adverbs can occur together in the 
same imperative construction with the sentential adverb 
placed in front of the non-sentential one, but without any 
suggestion that the former may be modifying the latter. 
(5.1.17)(a) Certainly quickly be ready to receive him 
in the school premises. 
(b) quickly, certainly, be ready to receive 
him in the school premises. 
Thus, whereas manner adverbs can lie within the scopes of 
sentential ones as in (5.1.17)(a), the converse is not 
possible. 
Another important difference between these classes of 
adverbs in the imperative is their relationship with do and 
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don't. There is a case (as pointed out in the previous 
chapter) where a part of the verb in the imperative occurs 
before its subject. 
(5.1.18) Don't you play with it again. 
Quite significantly, the non-sentential adverbs fail to occur 
before the subject NP's, along with don't. They however 
still have the freedom to occur in different places within 
the VP of the imperative. 
(5.1.19)(a) *Stuui 
(b) *Don't 
(C) Don't 
(d) Don't 
(e) Don't 
d don't you play with it again. 
stupidly you play with it again. 
you stupidly play with it again. 
you play stupidly with it again. 
you play with it again stupidly. 
With regard to do, it is interesting to note that the 
adverbs cannot occur before it. This further confirms the 
status of do as the element that occurs in front of the 
entities that make up the imperative VP in which it occurs. 
(See Chapter Four, Section 4.2) above. 
(5.1.20)(a) *Quickly do jump down! 
(b) Do quickly jump down! 
(c) Do jump down quickly! 
As for sentential adverbs, the presence of do and don't 
seem to make no difference whatsoever with regard to their 
placement. However, their co-occurrence with do in some 
instahces sounds somehow strange. 
(5.1.21)(a) Preferably, dont you bother to apply for 
the job again. 
(b) ' *Certainly, don't ycu try to answer me back 
again! 
(c) ? Obviously, do be prepared to go there. 
(d) ? Alternatively, do send him a cheque. 
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To summarize, it may be said that the syntactic 
behaviour of adverbs in imperatives does support the claims 
I have made not only about the uniqueness of the sentence as 
a syntactic mood category, but also about the relationships 
between some of its constituents. Thus, sentential adverbs 
occupy a position in the front of the construction; other 
adverbs occupy various positions within the VP, and in con- 
formity with the grarmatical cleavage between the subject 
and the predicate, sentence adverbs cannot occur within the 
VP of the construction as they do in declaratives. 
5.2 Semantics 
A) The Semantic Nature of the Imperative. 
The aim of this sub-section is to examine many aspects 
of the semantics of this sentence type as part of the attempt 
to determine the sort of semantical object that it is. I 
shall be concerned with the ways in which it relates to 
certain other objects: the concept of time and the semantic 
role of negative preverbs,. and the semantic function of the 
construction, all of which have been matters of controversy 
and uncertainty in previous analyses of the sentence. (See 
Chapter One). 
(1) THE CONCEPT OF TIME 
In section 5.1(A) above, I argued that imperatives do 
not syntactically express the concept of time through tense- 
marking on the verb. It has been pointed out elsewhere (see 
Chapter One, Section 1.1) that they do not accept past time 
adverbs. Yet, although future time adverbs may be absent in 
some of the sentences, it is generally believed that they all 
refer to such times. (See Grice, 1975). It is therefore 
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pertinent to find out what conveys this strong idea of 
futurity in all the sentences whether or not they contain any 
future time adverb. 
It appears we are not simply dealing with futurity in 
imperatives. It has been contended above (see Chapter Three, 
Section 3.3) that the sentences refer to the "current index". 
If this is true, then we must also consider the notion of the 
sequence of times. The points at issue therefore are which 
element in the imperative actually has to do with the future 
time,,, which relates to the current time and how. The 
specification of the subject, i. e. the identification in 
semantic terms of the potential agent, does not refer to any 
future time, no matter how such a time is expressed. 
(5.2.1)(a) The boy who will represent us ... 
(b) The girl to run first ... 
The ideas expressed in the post-modifiers in these examples 
(see Chapter Three) do refer to the future but this has 
nothing to do with the futurity which is usually part-of 
the general meaning of each imperative sentence. 
(5.2.2)(a) The boy who will represent us come forward. 
(b) The girl to run first go and get ready for 
the race. 
This therefore takes us to the second parts of the sentences, W 
their predicates. The question is whether or not they refer 
to the future. In other words, are they different from the 
following forms which occur in declaratives. 
(5.2.3)(a) ... will come forward. 
(b) ... will go and get ready. 
(c) ... is to come forward. 
(d) ... is to go and get ready.? 
There are two aspects to clarify here. First, the 
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imperative VP is. different in form from those in (5.2.3) 
because it does not have the elements will and is to which 
these other ones have. Second, unlike those in (5.2.3), the 
imperative VP does not make any reference to the future 
directly. Rather, it relies on natural sequence of events to 
determine what has to do with the future. In this sense 
therefore, the future is indeterminate, unless it is 
specifically mentioned by the use of future time adverbs. 
Therefore, the concept of future time in imperatives can 
extend from a split second to any subsequent time, so long as 
the time of uttering the sentences occurs before the 
performance of the action mentioned in it. Thus, the. 
sequence is between the uttering of the sentence and the 
performing of the action specified in it. It is therefore 
possible for the action to be performed in the context of 
use, without breaking the above sequence on the one hand, 
and, on the other, the action may never be performed at all, 
which still does not technically violate the sequence. 
Nevertheless, the general use of the sentence lies between 
these two extremes. 
The conclusion to draw therefore is that there is 
nothing in the elements that occur in the imperative (apart 
from the instances where time adverbs are used) that 
specifically refers to the future, it is pragmatic reality 
which requires the agent of an action and the action itself 
to be mentioned BEFORE the former may be expected (or not 
expected) to carry out the latter. It is this aspect of the 
construction that conveys the notion of futurity in the 
sentence. It is necessary therefore to realize that with 
regard to futurity, two different concepts are involved: the 
sequence of time brought about by the fact that ': he sentence 
must be uttered before it can possibly be complied with, and 
the mere reference to the future that the occurrence of a 
future time adverb occasions. Since the first concept is a 
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basic feature of imperatives in the sense that they all have 
it, we can then see that any time adverb that occurs in it 
must be the type that can semantically be interpreted as 
referring to a period AFTER the utterance of the sentence. 
This thus explains why a past time adverb cannot occur in the 
sentence. 
(5.2.4)(a) Go there now! 
(b) Go there tomorrow! 
(c) *Go there yesterday! 
It is interesting to note how completely the idea of 
sequence of times is veiled in the imperative. For example, 
the use of "now" in the examples in (5.2.5), one declarative 
and the other imperative, shows that there is a distinction 
to be made between what is actually happening at the time of 
speaking and what is not yet happening at the time of 
speaking. 
(5.2.5)(a) Kate is getting out of her car now. 
(b) Kate, get out of your car now! 
In (5.2.5) (b) the adverb "now" thus spans the period 
from the time of speaking to the time the action is expected 
to be performed but the action is subsequent to the uttering 
of the sentence. In the declarative in (5.2.5) (a) however, 
the time the action in question covers includes the time of 
speaking. This thus indicates how sentence types can modify 
the meanings of words that occur in them. 
It is therefore my contention that the imperative is 
set in the present even though the base-form of the verb is 
not said to express this. The sentence simply sets, at the 
current index, the conditions for the realization of the idea 
expressed in it. As pointed out in Chapter Three, the 
emphasis here is on the conditions, not on the realization or 
performance. The conditions are the parameters set out in 
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the sentence itself -- e. g., who the agent is, what the 
action is, and any other thing about these matters. 
(5.2.6)(a) John, hold my hand quickly. 
(b) You boy bring me the bell. 
(c) Stay here until he comes back from work. 
(d) The girls who won three prizes prepare for a 
civic reception in the town hall next week. 
(e) Buy a few more shares next year when they 
are floated again. 
(f) Build your house on the moon if you want 
to avoid noises. 
I have tried to 2englhen.:: the time lag that may reasonably 
occur between the uttering of each sentence and its possible 
performance. I have thus gone from the one that may be 
undertaken in the context of use, as in (5.2.6)(a), to the 
one that may be attempted in the remotest (if ever) future, 
as in (5.2.6)(f). Other sentences fall in between. Yet, the 
linguistic resources of the imperative are so rich that even 
the performance that will take the longest time to come about 
has no overt adverbial time specification. But in spite of 
the enormous differences in their relations to time, they all 
share two features, namely, the current laying down of the 
conditions (when the sentences are uttered) and the sequence 
of times that must subsist between it and the possible 
performance of the actions mentioned in the sentences, no 
matter how long or short it may be. 
(2) IMPERATIVES AND OTHER ADVERBS 
The adverbs I have in mind here are the so-called 
negative preverbs, which cannot occur in the sentence. In 
particular, it is necessary to consider the semantic factor 
that relates to their non-occurrence in the construction. It 
can be argued that this is due to the tendency of the 
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construction to restrict negative elements to the verb only. 
But negative preverbs have to do with both the verb and other 
elements in the sentence simultaneously. For example, 
(5.2.7)(a) Mabel scarcely saw the train before it 
left. 
(b) The students barely followed what their 
teacher was saying. 
(c) She almost completed her course before she 
got married. 
There is a strong sense of comparison in each of these 
sentences which is engendered by these adverbs: 
(i) the bit of the train which Mabel saw and the much 
larger portion of it which she did not see; 
(ii) the bit of what the teacher said which the 
students understood and the bigger portion which 
they did not understand, and, 
(iii) the large part of the course which she did and 
the little bit that she did not do. 
These adverbs thus inevitably relate to both the subject 
and the predicate of the sentence in which they occur up to a 
level that fully assumes the existence of a propositional 
relationship between them. Consequently, it can be claimed 
that it is the existence of such a relationship that makes 
possible the notion of comparison noted above. This is'a 
basic aspect of their meaning which effectively excludes them 
from occurring in the imperative construction. It can thus 
be concluded that the adverbs seem to require those 
characteristics of sentences which have no place in the 
imperative. Thus, a sentence type in which the subject NP 
is precisely identified (as a possible agent) and in which 
the action is then again specified (with no previous link 
between both units of the sentence as I have argued in 
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Section 5.1 above) cannot accommodate adverbs which require 
such links as a matter of necessity. 
(3) SEMANTIC FUNCTION 
It is in place here to ask what now can be said to be 
the semantic function of the imperative construction. The 
current proposals on this issue which have been found to be 
grossly inadequate for various reasons (see Chapters One and 
Three above) may be recapitulated as follows: 
(a) that it expresses a proposition (see Huntley, 
1980 and 1984); 
(b) that it is a means of making a proposition come 
true or it is 4 means to bring about a state of 
affairs in which it is true (see Schmerling, 1982). 
(c) that it expresses both denotation 
conditions in which an entity has 
being a hearer who is intended to 
"propositional content" (request) 
imperative come true (fulfilled) i 
time (see Hausser, 1979). 
and fulfilment 
the property of 
make the 
contained in the 
it a subsequent 
(d) that it functions as a paraphrase of the 
corresponding performative, possessing the same 
meaning, truth value, etc., at an index (see Lewis, 
1972). 8 
The examination of the imperative so far reveals-that the above 
proposals are vague in certain significant aspects. As for 
proposal (a), I have argued that the imperative could not 
possibly express a proposition or have a truth value the way 
that declaratives, for example, do. In this regard, it is 
necessary to note the significance of the semantic function 
of the subject NP (which is the identification of the 
referent of the subject or the vocative NP as an agent) as 
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well as that of_the predicate (which is the Bpecification of 
the action to be performed by the agent). Furthermore, it 
must be realized that there is no "propositional function" 
which involves both the subject NP and its predicate in the 
imperative, and this perhaps explains the inability of those 
who advocate the presence of such an element to represent it 
successfully. As has been pointed out earlier, it is not the 
case that the subject of the imperative construction has the 
property (or is in the domain) of its predicate. 
Against this background, therefore, it does not serve 
any useful purpose to relate the imperative to intensional or 
oblique contexts, as proposal (b) seems to suggest. It is 
perhaps more realistic to refer to a future time with regard 
to fulfilment, and to other matters involved, almost as 
proposal (c) has done. The only objection I have here is 
the attempt of (c) to characterize such a future fulfilment 
as if it was dealing with sentence types other than the 
imperative. 
It is significant though that in this regard the idea of 
a "request" was raised. But no attempt was made to 
distinguish between "propositional content" and this 
"request" in proposal (c), although it had been careful 
enough to explain the distinction between the "form" and the 
"use" of a sentence. However, we must distinguish the role 
of "request" and other illocutionary forces from that of 
propositions. Whereas the former belongs to the study of 
speech acts, the latter is related to the study of sentence 
forms. It is however the case (see Chapter One, Section 2) 
that whereas all sentence types may be indistinguishable with 
regard to their ability to be involved in different speech 
acts, they MUST be separated with regard to propositions. 
Speech acts studies might refer to the "propositional content" 
of the imperative because they are not concerned with 
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the form of the sentence, and above all, they never attempt 
to specify how such propositions are organized in the 
sentence. 
The notion of an addressee or a hearer that is generally 
put forward is well motivated. However, the relationship 
that proposal (c) claims it has with the verb in the sentence 
must be rejected. As we pointed out above (Section 1.6), 
Hausser has given the imperative a semantic analysis that 
does not separate it from a declarative and so it fails to 
capture the essential semantic difference between the two 
sentence types. This in effect makes it no different from 
proposal (d) which argues clearly that the sentence must 
first be turned into performatives (which are full 
declaratives) before they are semantically interpreted. 
It may be pointed out that the imperative VP represents 
"a unit of meaning", but I doubt very much if this should be 
seen also as the "propositional content" of the sentence. 
Why it cannot be such a thing is illustrated by the following 
constructions. 
(5.2.8)(a) Sam plays tennis daily. 
(b) *Plays tennis daily. 
Both constructions obviously have "meanings". But whereas we 
can provide a model theoretic interpretation where there are 
states of affairs (possible worlds) in which the example in 
(5.2.8)(a) may be TRUE or FALSE, no such thing can be done 
for the example in (5.2.8)(b), even though it exhibits the 
features of tense and concord. The reason for this is that 
there is no entity in any possible world that can be said to 
perform the action mentioned in the sentence. Similarly, 
since the imperative VP does not grammatically attach to the 
subject NP of the sentence of which it is a part, as pointed 
out in Section 1 above, it cannot, as it stands, be 
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associated with a model-theoretic interpretation. 
It is therefore necessary to find out how the notion 
of "propositional content" of the imperative is conveyed even 
though the sentence can neither be related to a "propositional 
function" involving the subject and the predicate of the 
sentence, as we have seen above,, nor can it be said to express 
any truth. value. The predicate alone cannot be said to ex- 
press the notion either. 
In the light of the situation that the imperative 
presents, what needs to be done in order to represent it as a 
unique grammatical mood category is the determination of the 
conditions that have to do with the semantico-pragmatic 
relationships which the construction has created. Consequen- 
tly# a compositional analysis of the whole of a sentence as 
a single syntactic unit must be rejected as misleading since 
the characterization of the sentence as a unique mood 
category must recognize the fact that its subject-predicate 
relation is a psychological one only. 
9 Therefore, any 
analysis that seeks to account for the nature of the 
imperative on the assumption that they are grammatically 
unified must be doing so in the face of what we have seen 
in the last two chapters 'to the effect' that the subject and 
VP of the sentence are separately organized both syntacti- 
cally and semantically. 10 
In sum, it can be said that our ei. =inaticn of the 
various' aspects of the imperative sentence has revealed that 
its semantic nature is unique. In all its forms, it involves 
a sequence of times between the production of the sentence 
and the performance of the action specified in it. It is this 
aspect of the sentence that conveys the notion of futurity in 
it. It is this fact too that prevents it from accepting past 
time adverbs. Liven when the action is to be performed in the 
241 
context of use, the token of the sentence must be used before 
the performance of the action indicated can take place. It 
is thus not the case that the imperative is formed to convey 
futurity as such. The sentence has been found to be 
semantically set in the present time or at the current index. 
Consequently, it has been contended, that a categorial and 
semantic interpretation of it must concentrate on the 
conditions that surround its organization in the context of 
use, which can reveal aspects of its possible fulfilment. 
The examination of the semantic role of the so-called 
negative preverbs has revealed that they cannot'occur in the 
imperative because they cannot relate to both the subject NP 
and the VP of the sentence, as they usually do in other 
sentences, because of the absence of any grammatical link 
between these two entities of the sentence. It has been 
pointed out that it is the incidence of this grammatical 
disjunction between the main parts of the imperative that 
prevents it from expressing any truth value. It is thus of 
great significance that a semantic analysis of the sentence 
takes this into consideration and so avoids providing a 
representation that is based on the wrong assumption that the 
entire sentence is a single syntactic unit. 
B) Model Theoretic Interpretations 
(1) THE NATURE OF THE MODEL. 
In Chapter Two (Sections 2.3 and 2.4), I identified the 
features of the Model for the interpretation of aspects of the 
imperative. I argued that such a model most contain 
references to (i), the speaker; (ii), the addressee; (iii). 
the place or situation; (iv), the time, and (v), the object 
named, all of which have to do with the context of use. An 
important aspect to note here is the fact that the use of 
these entities and notions of the Model for the imperative 
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must be differentiated from their use for other sentence 
types. I briefly state the reasons for this. 
We have noted that the subject and the predicate ele- 
ments of the sentence are grammatically detached and so there 
is no imperative sentence which can be related to the fea- 
tures of the Model as a single unit. Both the subject and 
the predicate are therefore seen as separate units even 
though they are semantically and pragmatically inter-related 
in certain respects as we shall see soon. 
It is generally agreed that imperatives do not raise the 
issue of truth (see Chapter One, Section 1.4) and so, in a 
surface compositional analysis of the constructions, there is 
no reason to represent a Model as a set of possible worlds. 
Such a view of a Model is suitable for the declarative. 
Thus, after observing that truth and entailment conditions 
are the "central concerns of syntax and semantics" in decla- 
rative sentences, Montague says this in a footnote: 
In connection with imperatives and interrogatives truth 
and entailment conditions are of course inappropriate, 
and would be replaced by fulfilment conditions and a 
characterization of the semantic content of a correct 
answer. (Montague, 1974: 248). 
It is for this reason, therefore, that it is inappropriate to 
set about doing, in the case of imperatives, the conventional 
Model-Theoretic interpretations in which a set of intensions 
are propositionally characterized as "true" or "false" (1 or 
0), as noted in a quotation from Dowty (1981) in Chapter Two, 
Section 2.4 above. Consequently, such interpretations will 
not be provided in the present study. However, the issue of 
propositions and the imperative will be discussed in Chapter 
Five, Section 5.2 C. 
It is thus the case that the need to relate the 
elements that make up the sentences to the context of use 
will involve references to indexical aspects of sentence 
interpretation that will be on a level which the interpreta- 
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tions of other sentences are not likely to demand. 
Finally, as a result of all the above factors, we do not 
have to identify a single syntactic category to represent the 
imperative sentence in the same way as t represents sentences 
which can express propositions in Montague Semantics. Simi- 
larly, as it has been argued above, it will be inappropriate 
here to attempt to translate into intensional logic entire 
imperative sentences because (a) they do not constitute 
structures which involve intensionality in any form and (b), 
the psychological nature of the grammatical relation between 
the subject and the predicate of the sentence cannot allow it 
since it has no syntactic relevance; for, such a translation, 
according to MS, must have a syntactic motivation. ll 
The essence of this interpretation therefore is the 
specification of the manner in which any token of this 
sentence is organized by the speaker and interpreted by all 
those in the context of use without any ambiguity; an aspect 
of the sentence type which reflects its adequacy with respect 
to both syntactic and semantic matters. 
It is the nature of this organization, which constrains 
both the structural configuration and the semantic interpre- 
tation of the sentence, that should be seen as the factor 
which determines the "fulfilment conditions" of the sentence. 
Therefore, these conditions call for more than just the 
carrying out of the action at a time subsequent to the utte- 
ring of the sentence. Hausser (1979), as noted in Chapter 
One above, allows his "denotation conditions to rest on this 
aspect only, and so fails to consider the care with which the 
speaker encodes the sentence with reference to the context of 
use, and does not identify the elements in the sentence that 
help it to "place" the execution of the action (wherever 
possible) in a later period. The ability of the addressee to 
execute the order or carry out the action specified in the 
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sentence may depend on future states of affairs as much as on 
the present. (See Searle 1975, and Leech, 1971). The proba- 
bilities are so many that one wonders whether or not the 
speaker of an imperative would have considered all of them 
before he or she uttered the sentence. In any case, there is 
usually no evidence of this in the sentence other than the 
precise identification of the intended agent and the speci- 
fication of the desired action. Consequently, what to regard 
as fulfilment conditions must be contained in the sentence 
itself, no matter what happens with regard to the subsequent 
execution of the action. Thus, for example, the claim that 
nobody would utter a command which he or she knows cannot be 
complied with (see Searle, 1975, and Sadock, 1974) may be 
true in some contexts but false in others. As such ideas are 
not usually reflected in the imperative sentence itself, they 
constitute neither the "denotation" nor the "fulfilment" 
conditions of the constuction. Therefore, my contention is 
that we should examine the sentence itself, its form and its 
context of use (which are discernible in it) in order to 
identify its strategies for conveying its meanings. 
(2) SEMANTICO-PRAGMATIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE 
SUBJECT/VOCATIVE AND THE PREDICATE 
Since these Models naturally vary from one instance to 
another, it is necessary to identify them as they are con- 
veyed in each token of the construction. In this regard, it 
is necessary for us to determine how we can handle the two 
parts of the sentence in each case. The point to note is 
that whereas the referent of the subject NP must be unambi- 
guously identified within the context of use, this is done 
without any regard to the predicate which may contain a 
specification of an action that may or may not be confined to 
the context, as the following examples show. 
(5.2.9)(a) The boy who has my briefcase please open it. 
(b) The boy in a blue jacket please ask your 
friend to call on him tomorrow. 
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(c) Drive the car to the next stop. 
The briefcase mentioned in (5.2.9)(a) may be seen as an 
object in the context of use, but the friend of the addressee 
and the next stop mentioned in (5.2.9)(b) and (5.2.9)(c) 
respectively are certainly not in the contexts of use. (See 
Chapter Four, Section 3 above). It is therefore necessary to 
rely on the lexical contents of the sentence for guidance. 
In view of all this, we can say that the imperative raises 
one crucial issue, i. e., the nature of the semantico- 
pragmatic relationship between its subject and predicate. It 
would appear that this problem must be resolved before we can 
determine how to treat these two elements of the sentence in 
our model theoretic interpretations. 
What is now clear is the fact that it is the speaker 
who, by using the imperative, identifies some individual(s) 
and then specifies some course of action. It would appear 
that the semantico-pragmatic feature of the sentence in 
question is the phenomenon by which the juxtaposition of 
these two elements (the identification of an individual and 
the specification of an action) informs such an individual 
that s(he) is being (or has been) introduced into a speech 
event as an agent to perform the action in question. 
12 As I 
have pointed out in Section 5.1 above, there is nothing in 
the sentence to show that some agreement had been previously 
reached between the speaker and the addressee to the effect 
that the latter would play this role. - The speaker must also 
be understood to intend the same message as the addressee has 
got. What conveys this message therefore may be the great 
care that goes into the identification of the referent of the 
subject NP and the clear-cut manner in which the action is 
specified just after it. This probably explains why anything 
which is not part, or a modifier, of the verb cannot occur 
between the subject IJP and the main verb in the sentence as 
we saw in the previous chapter. 
13 
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Let's now examine some of the things that happen in the 
external world in these matters. 
(5.2.10)(a) Sam, 
(b) Sam, 
(c) Sam, 
(d) Sam, 
(e) Sam, 
(f) Sam, 
have you seen her yet? [INTERROGATIVE] 
why; I say why this mess? 
you cant do this to me. [DECLARATIVE) 
I have a story to tell you. 
don't do this to mel [IMPERATIVE] 
stop itl 
We can pick out the similarities and the differences between 
the sentences in (5.2.10) with regard to the relationships 
between the vocative and the rest of the sentences. Although 
they do not fall into subject-predicate relationships, they 
can be used to illustrate the point at issue. 14 
(a) In each of them, the attention of some individual, 
Sam, has been attracted by the speaker. 
(b) Also in each of them, some piece of information 
immediately follows the invocation of Sam. 
(c) Again in all of them, Sam is being incorporated 
into the rest of the sentences for one reason or 
the other. It is from here therefore that the 
differences begin to emerge. 
(d) In the examples in (5.2.10)(a) and (5.2.10)(b), all 
that is required is for the addressee to give a 
verbal answer in each case. (See Karttunen, 1977). 
(e) In those in (5.2.10)(c) and (5.2.10)(d), he is 
apparently being requested first and foremost to 
listen. Whatever action he might take later would 
be entirely his own choice. Indeed, he might 
simply instruct someone else (possibly using an 
imperative sentence) to act in (5.2.10)(c). 
(f) However, in the imperatives in (5.2.10)(e) and 
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(5.2.10)(f), Sam is being directly called upon to 
act. In the former, he is to refrain from doing 
something while in the latter, he is to halt what 
he has been doing or what has been happening. 
As I have pointed out earlier, what this action should 
be is the choice of the speaker, not that of the addressee. 
It is for this reason therefore that the imperative construc- 
tion must be characterized as a sentence, type in which the 
speaker addresses or identifies an individual (or a group of 
individuals) and then specifies an action or a course of 
action with a view to making such an individual (or a group 
of individuals) understand that s(he) is (or they are) to 
perform the action in question. As I have already pointed 
out in Chapter Three and earlier in the present chapter, 
there is no guarantee whatsoever that such addressees are 
dosiidus, or capable, of performing such actions. 15 (See 
Rescher, 1966). 
The scope of the material to cover in the Model inter- 
pretation therefore may be restricted to the identification of 
the referent of the subject. This is so because as we have 
seen above, it is this entity that must be determined in 
relation to the context of use. The referent of the vocative 
is also similarly interpretable in relation to the context of 
use, as pointed out in Chapter Three. But since names and 
other forms of address are themselves unique designations, 
they do not have to be further identified in order to avoid 
any ambiguity as in the case of subject NP's. 
(3) MODEL THEORETIC INTERPRETATIONS 
The Model Theoretic interpretations I intend to propose 
here are special because they relate to the aspects that are 
crucial to the semantic organization of the imperative and 
also because they do not treat a set of intensions like those 
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for declaratives. This is in line with the ideas contained 
in Montague (1970c) referred to in Chapter Two, Section 2.4 
above, and Montague (1974) mentioned above. They probably 
represent the type of interpretations that can be related to 
imperative sentences as they really are, in their surface 
forms, and they bring out aspects of "fulfilment conditions" 
raised by Montague (1974) with regard to the semantic nature 
of the constructions, which are not known to denote truth. 
values. The interpretations of the imperative here relate to 
the states of affairs which are captured by the ways in which 
the subject NP's are used to identify their referents. I 
would like to represent the Models that explain them as 
functions from the Contexts of Use to a set of individuals, 
as stated in (5.2.11). The referring expressions (the sub- 
ject NP's themselves) are represented as d, i. e., Speakers' 
Descriptions 16 
(5.2.11) <s, e>17 (See Chapter Three, Section 3.3) 
It is in place here to explain the features of the Model with 
which the elements - s, d, and e- work. 
TIME: With regard to time, it has been pointed out-that the 
imperative relates to the present world; the subject and 
vocative NP's are set at the current state of affairs, and so 
none of these elements refers to intensional contexts or 
possible worlds. 
PLACE: The role of place here has to do with the location in 
which both the speaker and the addressee are present. Such a 
place must of course be at the current index. 
OBJECTS NAMED: These are objects which are named in any 
part of the sentence. They may be located anywhere as long 
as they form a part of the "mutual knowledge" between the 
speaI. er and the addressee. It must not be forgotten though 
that it is not always the case that the imperative must be 
complied with in the location in which it is used. 
ADDRESSEE: This entity of the Model perhaps needs no expla- 
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nation. However; I would like to reiterate the point made in 
Chapter Three (Section 3) that in cases involving figures of 
speech in the imperative, the "addressee" could be anything 
that the speaker cares to place in the positions of subject 
and vocative-NP's in the sentence. So, it is the positions 
which such NP's occupy that are significant here. 
PROPERTY: This is a term used in MS. But with regard 
to the characteristics I want to refer to here, the term 
VIRTUE may be better. The point here is the fact that I have 
no intention to spell out, in the present study, whether or 
not these characteristics relate to the referents of subject 
NP's in the same way as properties relate to NP's in MS. 
Nevertheless, what PROPERTY or VIRTUE should refer to in the 
imperative is the individuating quality which the speaker 
uses to pick out the referent of the subject NP. 
18 
NAMES: Names here include other forms of address, all of 
which distinguish one person from another, particularly in 
the context of use. 
SPEAKER: The speaker is the central figure in the Model 
from whose position other elements are mainly decided. Apart 
from being the speaker of the sentence, s(he) must have some 
knowledge which s(he) shares with his or her addressee. It 
is such knowledge that s(he) uses to identify the addressee 
in the context of use of the sentence. (See McCawley, 1970). 
The roles that all the above elements play in the Models 
are quite variable. Therefore, the precise nature of the 
Models themselves and the particular elements which are rele- 
vant in each sentence depend on the sentence concerned. What 
is cerainly common to all of them however is the relationship 
between the main segments of each Model which is represented 
in the function in (5.2.11) above. 
Let's first of all try to represent this function by a 
simplified diagram as follows: 
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(5.2.12) 
Box C stands for the situation that obtains in the Context of 
Use. Here, the regular entities are the speaker and the 
audience. But the situation is such that the speaker must, 
as pointed out above, have knowledge of some virtue or 
quality to distinguish any member of the audience. This is 
uaually selected from the immediate context (e. g., the 
clothes that the addressee is wearing, the position s(he) is 
occupying in the audience) to any action that the person in 
question or any person that can be linked with him or her may 
have performed anywhere. Since the speaker is the repository 
of all such pieces of information, we can see how the union 
formed by him or her and the audience provides an appropriate 
context for the creation of the next major segment, Box D. 
This second segment is thus the Speakers Description of 
the potential agent of the action to be spelled out soon 
afterwards. The description used by the speaker is thus 
taken from the pool of knowledge about the audience which 
s(he) possesses. 19 It is this Description therefore that 
leads to Box R which stands for the Referent. Whenever this 
identification fails, i. e., when it cannot pinpoint a 
particular person or group of persons in the audience as the 
case may be, it is usually the case that the speaker either 
improves on the description or switches to another one which 
may now pick out the person originally intended or a new 
person altogether. 
It is thus being contended that the composition of, and 
the relationships between, C, D and R are parts of the semanti- 
co-pragmatic conditions for the production of the imperative 
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construction in English and other natural languages. These 
factors also demonstrate that there is no justification in 
relating the imperative to infinitival clauses (see 
Culicover, 1976 and Huntley, 1984). They may be set out in 
detail as follows: 
(1) an imperative must have the Referent of the subject 
NP unambiguously specified. This lack of ambiguity 
must be obvious to at least the speaker and the 
addressee, whether or not it is verbally conveyed. 
(2) The Speaker's Description of the Referent must be 
such that at least one member of the audience would 
be able to relate to it. Those who cannot relate 
to it would thus regard the sentence as not 
applying to them. 
(3) The Speaker's Description must be as simple and 
short as necessary. The piling up of Virtues will 
thus progressively diminish the degree of 
20 acceptability of the sentence. 
(4) The need for the unique identification of the 
Referent cannot be replaced by the use of 
vocatives for they are only optional additions to 
almost all varieties of imperatives. These are 
particularly the cases in which you- and zero- 
subjects are present. It would appear that they 
cannot occur in structures with full speaker's 
Descriptions, except, of course, you. 
(5.2.13)(a) *Kate, the lady who spoke a short while ago, 
tell us what you hope to do, please. 
(b) *Samson, the man in the car, stop it! 
(c) You, the boy looking at me, come here! 
(5) Finally, in addition to observing any or all of the 
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above conditions, the action to be performed by the 
Referent must be indicated. As we saw in the 
previous chapter, the verb must be in the base form 
since the syntactic mood category of the sentence 
already makes it clear that the performance of the 
action is a subsequent thing. Thus, as we have 
observed in the previous chapter, the essence of 
the "predicate" of the sentence is the 
. "pronouncement" of the action to be performed, not 
any link that the action may have with the 
subject. 21 In semantic terms therefore, the 
imperative may be seen as a "Referent + Action" 
sort of creation, where the action is cast in the 
base-form of the verb (with the complements, where 
appropriate, occurring in their usual positions 
after the verb). 
We can see these conditions at work in the demonstration 
of the operations of the Models that will now follow. 
MODEL ONE: (1) Members of the Audience: V. W, X, Y and Z. 
(2) ''Virtues" (in the knowledge of the 
spea ker): 
(a) the boy who came yesterday 
(b) the boy who is wearing a red shirt 
(C) the boy in the corner. 
(d) the girl to tell a story 
(e) the boy sitting down 
(f) the girl who arrived early 
(g) the boy to clean the windows 
(h) the girl leading the team today 
(i) the boy looking at the ceiling 
(j) the boy who found the purse 
(3) Location: A room 
(4) The distribution of the Virtues 
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among the members of the audience and 
the rest of MODEL ONE: 
MODEL ONE 
ONE . TWO THREE. FOUR FIVE 
V 
Vý 
.x 
C 
d 
e 
f 
7 
9 
Y 
.h 
.i Z 
.7 
In a sense, we may say that columns ONE and TWO of the 
above Model, in relation to the location in question, 
represent the Context of Use in this case. It is in place 
here to make some comparison between this model and the ones 
that are used for declaratives in MS. Thus, unlike such 
model theoretic interpretations, there are no variables and 
so no functions for the assignment of values to them. (See 
Montague, 1973; Halvorsen and Ladusaw, 1979, and Dowty et al, 
1981). Again, unlike Hausser (1981), I am not making 
distinctions like "a speaker-context", "a hearer-context" 
(p. 198), since there is only one context in which each and 
every one of the members of the audience already shares some 
knowledge with the speaker. There is no question then of the 
speaker trying to bring the addressee into his or her context 
as such, in the sense that Webber (1979) has used these 
terms; what we have here is a case of the speaker trying to 
link the addressee with a token of the imperative as I have 
explained above. 
-a 
_b 
If 
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The arrows in column TWO show a possible distribution of 
the virtues among the members of the audience in column ONE. 
As in real life, it is not the case that some of these 
virtues are not shared by some members of the audience. 
Column THREE then represents the inventory of the Virtues 
which constitutes the pool of knowledge that the speaker 
holds about the audience at the time of speaking. 22 Column 
FOUR contains the selection that the speakers makes from the 
inventory and it is this that thus identifies the Referent in 
column FIVE. 
We can see clearly that MODEL ONE fully justifies the 
conditions that are set out above. For example, we can see 
why the stacking of virtues is rather odd. What the speaker 
does is to examine his or her inventory in order to pick out 
a single virtue that UNIQUELY identifies the Referent. For 
example, b is a unique identification and so it is this 
virtue that-the speaker would choose as a possible subject NP 
of an imperative. Secondly, where the speaker wants to make 
a subset of the audience the Referents, he or she would 
choose the virtue that uniquely identifies such a subset, 
e. g., c. S(he) will only have to plura ize the first noun of 
the expression. The above Model covers Group One NP's. 
Lets now consider those in Groups Two and Three. The 
Virtues in this case are as follows: 
(a) Somebody among you 
(b) Nobody among you 
(C) Two of you 
(d) All of you 
(e) The tallest of you 
(f) Division Five 
(g) Everybody 
(h) *riy son 
(i) Kate 
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(j) *Your daughter 
(k) Member of Division Five 
An audience is still involved and, in this case, it is 
made up of the following members: R, S, T, U and V. Other 
features are the same as above. The Model is follows: 
MODEL TWO 
. ONE . TWO THREE. FOUR FIVE 
a 
Rb 
c 
Sd 
e 
Tf 
9 
U 
VJ 
K, 
The strongest justification for this interpretation must 
be its ability to resolve the identification of all classes 
of referents through the use of Speaker's Descriptions. For 
example, Virtue e presupposes that one person is the tallest 
in the audience and so it is possessed by only one of the 
members. 
(5.2.14) The tallest of you come here. 
On the contrary, b, d and , for example, are shared 
by every member since they do not identify any particular 
person. But there is an interesting side to b and E. We can 
see that whereas only one member is eventually identified by 
e, all the members of the audience are identified by h and 
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Furthermore, there is one difference between a and b. It is 
the fact that whereas the Referents of g are required to 
perform the action in question, those of b are told NOT to 
perform the action in question. This thus independently 
supports our claim above that in imperatives, negation re- 
lates only to the action (i. e., the verb and its complements) 
specified in the predicate. Thus, where the same Referents 
and action are involved, it will all come down to whether or 
not they are to perform it. 23 So, it is either that every- 
body (as a unity as it were) performs the action as demanded 
by (5.2.15) (a) or does not do so, as demanded by (5.2.15) (b). 
It is so because no single individual, in an audience, is 
identified as "everybody" or as "nobody", and yet, no indivi- 
dual is exempt from orders like those in (5.2.15) in such an 
audience. Thus, MODEL FOUR applies to (5.2.15). 
(5.2.15)(a) Everybody go out! 
(b) Nobody go out! 
With regard to Virtues c and f, the situaton is not so 
straightforward. There is no single individual who could be 
identified with any of them: Two of you and Division Five. 
However, we can also see that these descriptions are based on 
certain relationships between the members of the audience. 
Therefore, in the first example, if the Referents are not 
also pointed to by the speaker, any two members wi 11 fit the 
description. We may well attribute this phenomenon to the 
mutual knowledge (or some background knowledge) that every 
person there possesses. This sort of knowledge is however 
d iffereft from the type ordinarily needed for the identifi- 
cation of the referents because -it does not relate to any 
person as a Virtue. This is however unlike the second exam- 
ple where certain members can directly identify with the 
description "Division Five" as individuals. In such a con- 
text, therefore, it is only after the description has been 
identified with individually by those concerned as k that 
they can come together to form the unit that is Division Five. 
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(5.2.16)(a) 
-Two of you leave there at once. 
(b) Division Five stand over there! 
As for i, j and h, we have different situations. i, as 
a "rigid" designation, directly identifies the Referent, 
i. e., the bearer of the name. j proves that you cannot 
address the imperative to a person other than the Addressee or, 
indeed, the Hearer, which again supports the claim that s(he) 
must be present in the Context of Use. Thus, the Referent 
is not linked with the inventory of Virtues because s(he) is 
not in the Context of Use. h is starred because of its 
connection with the speaker. It would thus appear that the 
speaker must be completely detached from the subject NPs 
that s(he) creates, probably because of the need to hold the 
connection between the speaker and the inventory of Virtues 
which s(he) possesses as a feature of the speech event, the 
imperative. in all cases. This does not appear to extend to 
the vocative in the example, probably because a name can 
identify the speaker's daughter without giving it away that 
she is his or her daughter. 
For the interpretation of you boy and you, the Group 
Four subject NP's, I shall use the next Model. However, the 
fact is that expressions like You and you present a 
rather complex situation. In the first place, they may be 
used in a context where there is an audience of more than one 
person. Secondly, they may occur in a context where the 
audience is just one person. Let's now look at the Model for 
the first case. The members of the audience are represented 
by N, 0, P and Q. The Virtues, including one name, are as 
follows: 
(a) The boy who bought a pen. 
(b) Some of you 
(c) You boy 
(d) You 
(e) One of the boys standing 
(f) *Alfred 
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Other features remain the same as before. 
MODEL THREE(A) 
. ONE . TWO THREE. FOUR FIVE . 
i1 :b 
. 
Pd' 
e. 
.Qf 
In this case, there are two approaches: the speaker may use 
either Virtue a or any one of c and d, reinforced by pointing 
to the person in question. If the former option is adopted, 
the speaker cannot again use any Virtue with a form like that 
of a thereafter to refer to the same individual without some 
oddity, especially if the second imperative sentence follows 
immediately on the first one. 
(5.2.17)(a) The boy who bought it keep it for the time 
being. 
(b) The boy who bought it sit down please. 
There is no question of repeating the NP for the sake of 
emphasis or for the purpose of enabling the addressee to hear 
it clearly, in which case such a repetition could have been 
justified. What happens now that the Referent has been 
identified by the first approach is the automatic creation of 
a sub-context in which s(he) would be referred to by the 
speaker or any person in the Context of Use in one of two 
ways: (i) by the use of you, and (ii), by the use of the 
zero- subject. In this case, the other members of the 
audience cannot relate the imperative sentence to themselves 
at all even though you and the zero-subject could be given a 
plural interpretation. 
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If the second approach, the use of c or d is adopted, we 
would then have a situation in which there are only two 
people in the Context of Use, namely, the speaker and the 
addressee, where either you or the zero-subject must be used, 
as MODEL THREE(B) shows. 
MODEL THREE(B) 
. ONE . TWO THREE. FOUR . FIVE 
a 
d 
Finally, we would like to examine the case of the zero- 
subject more closely. As we have already observed, it always 
invloves a Context or a Sub-context with only two people: the 
speaker and the addressee. Let's represent this addressee 
with N. The Virtues are as follows: 
(a) The boy who can play the piano 
(b) The boy to fly the kite 
(c) The boy writing on a blue paper 
(d) The boy sitting in front of me 
(e) The boy with a bow tie 
MODEL FOUR 
. ONE . TWO THREE. FOUR FIVE 
b 
As we can see in MODEL FOUR, the situation presented by 
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the zero-subject'is such that every Virtue in the inventory 
of the speaker (for the purpose of identifing the Referent of 
the subject NP) relates only to this single individual. 
Therefore, whichever of them is used will inevitably identify 
him or her. Since s(he) is the only addressee, each of these 
Virtues is thus a unique identification, and all of them thus 
provide a unique identification for him or her. Similarly, 
not using any of them also provides him or her a unique 
identification. It is the choice of this last option that 
thus creates the so-called zero-subject. This is also true 
where there are several persons who, as a single group, 
thus have the same reference capability as in the case of one 
person. 
The point to note now is that what follows the 
identification of the Referent of the subject NP is the 
specification of the action to be carried out. As explained 
in the previous chapter, the verb-object relationship is 
unchanged and the performance of the action may not be 
restricted to the context of use. But the entire predicate 
is related to the context of use in the sense that it is in 
such a context that the action is first mentioned in 
connection with the person(s) to carry it out. As I have 
endeavoured to explain above, in this construction, the 
juxtaposition, in semantic terms, of a Referent and an 
intended Action, executed in the appropriate intonation 
pattern, conveys the message that such a Referent is expected 
to perform the Action in question. This is the essence of the 
imperative construction. Whether or not the Action is 
carried out is an aspect of life which the imperative itself 
does not, and cannot, take care of since that eventuality 
post-dates it. 
This interpretation has certain consequences which I 
will now comment upon. 
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(a) It makes the point that if necessary, the speaker can 
always identify the referent of the zero-subject. 
(b) It explains the general. notion that this subject is 
contextually determined. It is simply not the case that the 
context makes clear who the addressee is; it is just that it 
is redundant to use any descriptive or identifying options 
since none of them makes any contrast between the Referent 
and somebody else. 
(c) It further explains the claim in chapter Three that 
the subject NP does not need to be you for zero- 
subject to occur eventually. The fact is that in a context 
in which there are only the speaker and the addressee, you or 
the the full descriptive NP may be used, as MODELS THREE and 
FOUR show. We have already seen that the use of you is quite 
complex, since the pronoun can occur as a subject NP in the 
context of a large audience just as much as it may also occur 
in this case of a one-member audience. 
(d) It makes the point that there can be no imperative 
without a Referent, the intended agent of the action stated 
in the predicate of the sentence. The corollary of this is 
that the vocative NP, wherever it occurs in the imperative, 
only duplicates the identification of the Referent, and so it 
is not a substitute for subject NP as a way of referring to 
the agent-of-action. 
C) Fulfilment Conditions and Propositions 
(1) FULFILMENT CONDITIONS 
It is in place here to discuss the aspects of fulfilment 
conditions and propositions. I shall start with fulfilment 
conditions. After that, I shall examine the other aspect: 
the issue of the propositional content of the imperative. 
But first, I comment on the question that is immediately 
raised: what is the difference between them? A full answer 
to this question, I would say, is beyond the scope of the 
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present study because it raises the philosophical issue of 
what should be regarded as "meaning", or "sense" in a sen- 
tence. (See Chapter One, Section 1.6). So, what I intend to 
discuss here is my representation of the "fulfilment condi- 
tions" of the imperative in the present study as well as the 
motivation behind the notion of the propositional content of 
the imperative. I shall also identify some of the limita- 
tions that exist in attempts to describe it. I should also 
say that if propositions relate to truth values, and impera- 
tives do not raise the question of truth but have certain 
fulfilment conditions, it can be reasonably concluded that 
"propositions" are not the same as "fulfilment conditions". 
The two notions must also be distinguished from "felicity 
conditions" -- the conditions for the proper USE of sentences. 
The present approach provides an interpretation of the 
entire imperative sentence in stages, on the basis of the 
claim that the meaning of a sentence is the sum total of the 
meanings of its parts. The significant aspect of the denota- 
tions of the parts of the imperative consists not in the 
denotations of its individual lexical items but in the deno- 
tations of its subject and predicate elements (see Chapters 
Three and Four). It is these elements that distinguish it 
semantically from all other sentences. It is they that give 
the imperative sentence the following logical TYPES. 
(5.2.18)(a) <s, e> [Tim) (subject NP's) 
(b) <s<e, t>> [IVlm) (VP'S) 
These logical TYPES do not constitute a unit which is suscep- 
tible to the rule of functional application, as (5.2.19)(a) 
shows, unlike those of the declarative, as in (5.2.19) (b), 
(5.2.19)(a) *IVlm/Tlm . Tim 
(b) IV/T .T=t 
which is in line with the general belief that imperatives 
do not denote truth values (see. Dowty1s Subject-Predicate Rules 
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in (3.1.5)(a)). This semantic organization of the imperative 
thus represents aspects of its "fulfilment conditions". 
These conditions may be set out, informally, as follows: 
(a) the referent of the subject NP of the imperative 
must be identified in relation to the context of 
use (as in (5.2.18) (a); 
(b) the action indicated in the the verb phrase must be 
specified in the same context. (see (5.2.18)(b)); 
(c) The link between the subject and the predicate must 
be such as identifies the former as the intended 
agent of the latter. 
(d) the action must take place only after the token of 
the sentence has been used. 
Conditions (a) and (b) have been discussed in Chapters 
Three and Four respectively. All have also been discussed 
in different subsections in the present chapter. I must add 
here that with regard to (a) and (b), the realization of 
concord (see Section 5.1 above) is not illogical if the 
speaker is certain about whether or not the agent is a single 
person, where the subject NP is not you. After all, number 
concord is known to have been used in imperatives in Middle 
English--. for example, "bringap" for singular "bring". 
11 Finally, the aspect of "compliance" at a subsequent time 
(Condition (d) above), upon which the issue of proposition is 
based, is conveyed not by the parts that make up the sen- 
tence, but by the limitations imposed on human psychology and 
actions by the incidence of TIME and SPACE. The identified 
agent can only perform an action specified in the predicate 
of the imperative only after the sentence is uttered, not 
before, as pointed out above. The action can naturally take 
place either in the context of use, or outside it, and the 
imperative has both options. Therefore, the above analysis, 
which captures the fundamental semantic organization of the 
r 
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sentence type, thus identifies aspects of its fulfilment 
conditions. "Fulfilment" in this sense refers to the seman- 
tic organization of syntactic categories in a way that makes 
the situation described above possible. Sentential struc- 
tures that conform to these conditions, as reflected in the 
semantic TYPES in (5.2.19) (a), must thus be regarded as 
imperatives. 
(2) THE PROPOSITIONAL CONTENT OF THE IMPERATIVE 
As for proposition, it may be said that what obtains BEFORE 
the action is performed represents a state of affairs which I 
may here refer to as (i), for the sake of convenience, and 
what obtains AFTER it is performed represents another state 
of affairs which i may also refer to as (ii). What makes 
the issue of propositions controversial, it appears, consists 
in the fact that only a declarative sentence can be used to 
describe the states of affairs (i) and (ii). We can see this 
in the following case. For the state of affairs (i), we take 
the following description: 
(5.2.20) The carpet is dirty. [DECLARATIVE] 
and for the state of affairs (ii), we may have the following 
description: 
(5.2.21) The carpet is clean. 
On the assumption that we are talking about the same carpet, 
and that (ii) is brought about by someone who is given the 
order: 
(5.2.22) (The boy in the corner) clean the carpet 
we can see that the function of the imperative in (5.2.22) is 
to change the state of affairs described by (5.2.20) into the 
one described by (5.2.21). This is as a result of the action 
of the addressee or of the referent of the subject NP, and 
hence s(he) or they must be characterized semantically as 
2 agent(s), as I have done above. 4 
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The issue of truth and falsehood arises not in relation 
to the imperative in (5.2.22) because it does not make any 
assertion about 'a state of affairs but in relation to the 
declaratives. in (5.2.20) and (5.2.21). The more relevant 
declarative-here is of: course the one in (5.2.21). The 
issue therefore is whether they represent WHAT THE ADDRESSEE 
UNDERSTANDS when s(he) hears the imperative sentence in 
(5.2.22) or not. Let's illustrate this with an example. If 
one tells a boy, 
(5.2.23) Kick the ball over there 
it does appear that one ENVISAGES a state of affairs that will 
follow the action of kicking the ball, and the boy too knows 
not only the act of kicking the ball but also the result of 
performing the act. It is for this reason that both the 
speaker and the boy concerned may be "surprised" if, for 
example, the result of the boy trying to "hit" (or actually 
"hitting") the ball with his foot is one in which it simply 
"evaporates", as it were; rather than one in which it rolls 
on the ground or passes through the air, which represents 
accurately what is "understood" when the order in (2.2.23) is 
given. Similarly, in the case of the carpet, it may be said 
that an idea similar to what is stated in the declarative in 
(5.2.21) must be in the mind of the speaker and also must be 
understood by the adressee when the imperative in (5.2.22) is 
spoken. This phenomenon has been identified in a variety of 
ways (see Ransom 1977; Hausser, 1979; and Huntley, 1982 and 
1984). While Ransom speaks of modality in sentences as an 
aspect of their meaning, Hausser attempts to capture the new 
state of, affairs through a formula (see Chapter One, Section 
1.6 above) and Huntley (very much like Schmerling, 1982, as 
we have seen Chapter Three above) discusses the propositional 
content of the imperative broadly in terms of the new state 
of affairs that is brought about when complicnce is achieved. 
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The general feeling is that the new state of affairs 
(like the one in (5.2.21) that is attributed to the impera- 
tive presents a set of intensions which can be characte- 
rized propositionally as true or false. (See Chapter Two, 
Section 2.4). Thus, at the state of affairs (i), as repre- 
sented, for example, by the Context of Use ONE above, x 
(representing the boy in the corner) is not in the set of 
individuals denoted by a function in which y (representing 
clean the table) is a predicate. The individual represented 
by 
.K 
may however be said to become a member of the set after 
he cleans the carpet i. e., in the state of affairs (ii), 
certainly at a time later than that at which the order is 
given, and possibly in the same Context of Use. If this is 
the case, the "new" state of affairs which follows the per- 
formance of the action can be captured by a formula, y(x), 
the intension of which is a function from a set of indices 
(represented here by the state of affairs (ii)) to truth 
values. This kind of intension is thus the proposition which 
the imperative is believed to have. For Model Interpre- 
tations of such intensions, see Dowty et al (1981: Chapter 
Six, and Dowty (1982a). 
(2) LIMITATIONS 
The identification of imperatives with propositions as 
stated above is however not without certain limitations. The 
main one is the failure to relate the surface form of the 
imperative to the set of intensions which is associated with 
the sentence. The intensions involved can only be based on 
declaratives as-the example in (5.2.21) shows. It is probably 
for this reason then that the rigour and discipline of a 
surface compositional analysis is not strictly adhered to 
with regard to the representation of the so-called propo- 
sitional content of the imperative. It is probably for this 
reason too that most analysts either avoid the surface 
fora of the imperative when they discuss its semantic inter- 
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pretation (see Huntley, 1980 and 1984, and Schmerling, 1982) 
or resort to analysing declarative-like structures which are 
derived or paraphrased from imperatives (see Section 1.5 
above). 
Another problem is its inability to distinguish clearly 
between what Dowty (1977: 67) calls "tenseless future" like 
(5.2.24)(a) The men depart tomorrow. 
(b) The plane arrives at 8 p. m. tonight. 
and imperatives with regard to the method of providing their 
semantic representations. Since the sentences in (5.2.24) 
have to do with future events or actions, their intensions 
will be characterized propositionally as true or false at the 
state of affairs envisaged. As we have seen above, impera- 
tives also have the similar semantic representations, and so 
the propositional analysis of the imperative has another 
limitation in that it fails to separate its semantic interpre- 
tation of the sentence from that of the "tenseless future". 
There is also the problem which relates to the treatment 
of subject NP's in sentences like those in (5.2.25). The 
semantic representation of the sentence in (5.2.25)(a) must 
include a semantic interpretation of the subject NP as it is 
specified but that of the imperative in (5.2.25)(b) cannot do 
the same for the subject NP in the sentence since its refe- 
rent will not still be "in the corner" at the state of 
affairs (or set of indices) that is relevant for the denota- 
tion of truth values, as we saw above. So, the analysis 
neither accounts for the fact that the property that an 
entity has in the context of use of the imperative may not 
persist up to the point that compliance is achieved, nor does 
it consider the problem of identification, with regard to the 
intended agent, that may thus be raised. 
(5.2.25)(a) The boy in the corner travels by plane 
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. every week. 
[DECLARATIVE] 
(b) The boy in the corner travel by train 
tomorrow please. [IMPERATIVE] 
Yet another drawback in the above account has to do with 
what really happens when the action mentioned in the impera- 
tive is not performed. As pointed out above, the imperative 
never takes for granted the idea that compliance will be 
forthcoming. Consequently, when there is no compliance, no 
new state of affairs is thus created, and so we are left only 
with the imperative sentence itself which is uttered and 
which, as pointed out above, does not "describe" any state of 
affairs. If this "situation" was "described", one might say 
any of these: 
(5.2.26) (a) It is not the case that the boy in the 
corner cleaned the carpet. 
(b) The boy in the corner refused to clean the 
carpet. 
(c) The boy in the corner has not cleaned the 
carpet as ordered. 
It is very doubtful whether all such descriptions can be 
said to apply to a single state of affairs, in which the 
action in question is not performed, for the purpose of 
identifying the propositional content of the imperative in 
question. This thus raises the question as to whether or not 
compliance and non-compliance with an order (i. e., the impe- 
rative) can reasonably be said to bring about opposite states 
of affairs. 25 
Similarly, after the action in question has been carried 
out, it is also possible to describe the new state of affairs 
in more ways than are stated in (5.2.21) above. Any of the 
following sentences might also be used to describe it. 
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(5.2.27)(a). The boy (in the corner) has cleaned the carper 
(b) The carpet is now shining because the boy (in 
the corner) has cleaned it. 
(c) The boy (in the corner) did exactly as he was 
ordered -- he cleaned the carpet. 
This thus raises the question of whether or not the determi- 
nation of the propositional content of the imperative as 
described above is not too narrow in scope to capture the 
. aspects of the situation that become relevant after the 
, performance of the action mentioned in the imperative. if 
the idea of performance is simply something that is "under- 
stood" at the time the imperative is uttered, and so does not 
.,: relate to the actual time it takes place later, the conclu- 
sion that will thus be drawn is that imperatives involve only 
propositions that are true, and this is counter-intuitive. 
The reason is that it may turn out that the action specified 
is not performed after all (or cannot be performed at all, as 
we have seen in Chapter Three, Section 3.3 above). This 
,. issue thus reflects the fact the intensions that are asso- 
%ciated with the imperative are not linked with any clear-cut 
sentence as in the case of the declarative in (5.2.25)(a), 
'. although there is no doubt about the idea in question. As we 
saw above, not all aspects of the relevant imperative sen- 
-tence itself are taken into account when the matter of truth 
values is considered. So, it is not clear how many of all 
the aspects that have to do with the imperative are called 
for in their propositional analysis. In particular, it is 
not cigar whether or not aspects like the following, 
(i) how the action is performed; 
(ii) the "current relevance" of the action that is 
performed, as can be indicated through the use of 
present perfective aspect as in (5.2.27)(a), and, 
(iii) the person who prompted the performance of the 
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action as well as the doer of the action, 
which normally form parts of the situation that exists after 
an action is performed, should be accommodated in one way or 
another in the semantic interpretations of "the state of 
affairs". that obtains after an imperative sentence is com- 
plied with. 
What remains to be said here on this topic is that while 
it is true that when one uses or hears an imperative one 
conceives of a definite meaning, that meaning can only be 
referred to in terms of a sentence structure which has a 
translation into intensional logic which reflects that of the 
declarative sentence. It is also true that the imperative 
raises many more questions than can be resolved by the 
characterization of their propositional content as functions 
from indices to truth values; or as functions which characte- 
rize a set of possible worlds, including the actual world 
(see Huntley, 1982). As I pointed out in subsection 5.2. A 
above, the situation that we have is one in which an approach 
that rigorously applies the principles of surface composi- 
tional analysis, where the meaning of an expression is 
believed to be a function of the meanings of its components 
and the syntactic rules that relate them together, must be 
distinguished from an analysis of the imperative which traces 
it up to the point where the question of whether or not the 
action specified in it is carried out is raised. The reason 
for this is that at this point, either a new sentence type 
becomes the focus of attention or there is no identifiable 
sentence structure to be represented by a set of rules; and 
none of these prospects satisfies the principle of surface 
compositional analysis. For another approach to some of the 
problems that relate to semantic interpretations of eaxpres- 
sions, see Barrwise and Perry (1981) and for criticisms of 
it, see ? odor (1985) end lartee (1985). 
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To summarize, I would say what we have seen about propo- 
sitions in connection with imperatives has to do with the 
description of the state of affairs that is created follo- 
wing the execution of the action specified in the imperative. 
This may be described by declarative sentences which may be 
predicated as true or false. Nevertheless, it creates a host 
of problems most of which stem from the fact that the set of 
intensions that is associated with the new state of affairs 
is not clearly demarcated as it would have been if there were 
a definite declarative sentence which describes the new state 
of affairs. 
5.3 Conclusion 
In this concluding chapter, many aspects of the entire 
imperative construction, as it psychologically constitutes a 
single unit, are examined. This thus complements the aspects 
discussed in the previous chapters. With regard to syntax, 
it is claimed that the notion of subject-predicate structure 
in the imperative in English is a psychological one because 
the factors that warrant this structure in the sentences of 
English are completely absent in the construction. These 
include number concord, tense, modality and aspect. What 
creates the notion therefore is the fact that the so-called 
subject NP always occurs before the verb phrase, the predi- 
cate. It is also found that this phenomenon has an enormous 
implication for the semantics of the sentence where we have 
seen that the identification of the referent of the subject 
NP is carried out independently of the specification of the 
action s(he) is intended to perform later. 
Also, the syntax of certain elements that have to do 
with the entire sentence is discussed. Sentence adverbs, in 
this regard, are found to occupy sentence-initial positions 
only, contrary to what they do in other sentence types. The 
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behaviour of the, other adverbs is somehow regular, except for 
the negative preverbs. It is contended that their inability 
to occur even in preverbal positions in imperatives is due to 
the absence of the usual grammatical links between the sub- 
ject and predicate elements in the sentences. It is pointed 
out that with an emphasis on the specification of the action 
to be performed rather than on the relationship between such .,. 
an' äctlon : and' the intended doer of it, there is no room, in 
the imperative, for any of these adverbs, which basically 
require such links to enable them to occur in other sentences. 
Appropriate Model theoretic interpretations are then 
proposed for the imperative sentence. They resolve a number 
of problems with regard to the determination of the type of 
semantical object which the sentence is. It is discovered 
that it should not be linked with the characterization of, 
for example, the agent of the action as a variable for which 
a value assignment function has to find external entities in 
some possible worlds. What underlies the uniqueness of the 
construction in this regard, as pointed out above, is the 
complexity in the identification of the referent of the 
subject NP and the specification of the action that immedia- 
tely follows it. These involve semantic as well as pragmatic 
factors, as reflected in the function (see (5.2.11) above) 
that summarizes the conditions that govern the semantic orga- 
nization of the sentence. 
It is thus demonstrated that for a surface compositional 
approach, an imperative involves a function from the Context 
of Use to a set of individuals. This thus identifies the 
Referent who becomes the Agent of the Action mentioned 
subsequently. This then establishes the Referent as the ONLY 
Agent of the Action that must be mentioned immediately after 
the process of identifying him or her. Therefore, the manner 
in which this relationship between the Referent and the Action 
is organized is unique to the imperative construction. 
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Finally, with regard to the 
imperative, two aspects are trea- 
set of "fulfilment conditions". 
tactic structure is organized in 
tions, it must bean imperative, 
plied ' with "at a subsequent time. 
interpretation of the entire 
ted. The first establishes a 
It is claimed that if a syn- 
accordance with the condi- 
and so it can only be' com- 
The second aspect examines its semantic function which 
involves its propositional content. The motive for the identi- 
fication of it is explained and the manner of doing so is 
illustrated. It is however noted that the whole question of 
propositions in relation to the imperative, as it is treated 
in truth-conditional semantics, is controversial because it 
does not directly involve the surface form of the imperative 
sentence, as a surface, compositional approach to the con- 
struction requires. It characterizes, propositionally, a set 
of intensions which themselves may be identified, verbally, 
by the use of declarative sentences only. The real nature of 
such intensions is therefore not very clear; for example, in 
one sense, since it has to do with a state of affairs created 
after a sentence has been uttered, it resembles future sen- 
tences but in another, where the subject noun phrase is 
specified in relation to the context of use of the imperative 
sentence itself, it cannot capture such a "property" (or 
"virtue") of the agent-of-action if the context of use is 
different from the one in which the action is performed. 
There is also the problem of how to characterize the situa- 
tion that obtains when, for example, the action in question 
is not carried out, or if it is, how it should be reported. 
Nevertheless, since the imperative conveys a meaning when it 
is used, a truth-conditional semantics will have to identify 
a set of conditions which it can regard attributively as 
true, when the action is performed, or false, when it is not. 
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Footnotes to Chapter Five 
1. The imperative, it was noted in the previous chapter, 
does not allow the extraction of any element from its VP. 
2. I have already, in Chapter Three (Section 1), excluded 
the notion of Topic-Comment as a description that could 
possibly apply to the imperative construction. 
3. Perhaps the only problem now, which will not be 
investigated in the present approach, is how to capture the 
notion by a set of rules. 
4. This aspect of sentential adverbs in imperatives is 
quite significant. There is no doubt about the 
grammaticality of the sentences in (5.1.8). They can still 
occur as full sentences even if they were uttered during 
conversations. The consequence of this is that they 
independently confirm the existence of the addressees in the 
contexts of use, since such conversations, wherever they 
occur, would be between the speaker and the addressee in each 
case. Indeed, in real life situations, imperatives do fre- 
quently occur in the middle of conversations as independent 
sentences as well as in structures like the following: 
(1) If you are in doubt, leave it. 
5. In declaratives, for example, where such a division does 
not exist, sentence adverbs can occur in both sentence- 
initial- and final positions as well as in medial positions. 
(1) Certainly, he will be here. 
(2) He will, certainly, be here. 
(3) He will be here, certainly. 
6. Of course, the comma is regularly used to mark off the 
sentential adverb from the rest of its sentence. This is not 
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usually done in the case of non-sentential adverbs. 
7. For the description of the forms in (5.2.3) (c) and 
(5.2.3)(d) as referring to the future, see Palmer (1965). 
8. For a survey of yet earlier proposals, see Chapter One 
(Sections 4 and 5). 
9. The fact that the subject NP cannot be an argument to 
the predicate without implying the existence of a truth value 
which the construction does not have demonstrates clearly 
that the sentence presents a unique semantic case. At the 
same time, the fact that each of the two segments can be 
given a compositional analysis, as has been done in Chapters 
Three and Four above, indicates that there is a break only 
in the grammatical relationships between the subject and 
the predicate elements of the sentence. 
10. The conception of the imperative as as a grammatical 
mood category (see Chapter Two, Section 4) must thus include 
the fact that the subject-predicate relation in the sentence 
is different from those of other sentences. It is one which 
does not form a grammatically unified whole as does, for 
example, the declarative. 
11. It must however be recognized that the fact that their 
relationship has been characterized as psychological in nature 
clearly means that their descriptions as "subject" and "pred- 
icate" have no fundamental validity; they are the product of 
custom and appearance as we have explained above. Conse- 
quently, they cannot be used as such in a Montague-style 
analysis where the syntactic features of a sentence have 
relavance for its semantic description. 
12. The elements in question here are the subject and the 
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predicate of the-imperative. Their referents might well be 
plural in number. 
13. It is quite interesting that in ordinary speech 
situations, not more than one person can utter an imperative 
sentence. It is thus the case that in the most unlikely but 
not impossible event of two or more persons uttering the 
same imperative sentence simultaneously, each of such 
sentences has its own individuality with regard to form and 
intonation features. What may be quite identical is the 
illucotionary force that is being conveyed. 
14. The choice of a vocative in each of the examples in 
(5.2.10) is delibrate. It enables me to give the same non- 
intensional interpretations to all the sentences, despite the 
categorial differences between them. 
15. The usual argument in this regard is based on the 
Gricean Principle - "Be relevant". As I have argued above, 
this argument itself does not claim that any use of a 
sentence in violation of this principle is unacceptable. To 
impose such a condition would amount to putting a limitation 
on extensions of uses which natural languages are open to. 
Thus, to call on the clouds not to drop as rain would be an 
example. At any rate, if the notion of relevance is indis- 
pensible in the uses we make of sentences, it is not 
impossible to find some for imperatives where the subjects or 
vocatives are inanimate objects: the utterring of the senten- 
ces has some psychological or emotional satisfaction for the 
speaker. Therefore, it is not the carrying out of the action 
only that can make the sentences "relevant"; it all depends 
on what the motivation of the speaker is. What is certain in 
all this is the form of the sentence used in such cases. 
16. One of tnere terms needs -r me explanation. "Speaker's 
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Description" refers to subject NP's in the imperative. It is 
a convenient term which captures the fact that the speaker is 
obliged to come up with that form of NP that can uniquely 
identify its referent in the Context of Use. In one case 
though this Description is suppressed. This is the case of 
the so-called zero-subject. Our interpretation must show why 
this sort of thing can take place. 
17. This formulaton must be distinguished from the type that 
is used for declaratives. Thus, it is neither a syntactic 
category nor a logical TYPE. It is a representation of the 
basis upon which the "fulfilment conditions" for the sentence 
can be determined, bearing in mind of course that whatever 
comes out from it is expected (in the nature of the 
construction) to carry out the action specified in the 
predicate. 
18. As a matter of fact, the discussions in chapter Three 
(Sections 3.2 and 3.3) explain how the NP's are organized. 
19. Although I have stated above that the speaker always 
shares this knowledge with the members of the audience as it 
is appropriate to each one of them, it is not impossible for 
this not to happen in some cases. Thus, a speaker may try to 
identify someone with a characteristic which s(he) may think 
that the addressee is aware of. It might well be the case 
that the addressee is not aware of it. Where the 
characteristic is taken from the immediate context, other 
members of the audience might come to the aid of the 
addressee by drawing his attention to the characteristic in 
question. 
20. Distinctiveness may be achieved in the description of 
the Referent not only by the whole phrase but also. by any of 
its contents. In English, it is usually enough to achieve a 
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contrast between these identifying descriptions just with one 
word. For example, the boy in the corner vs. the Loy beside 
the corner. 
21. As I have pointed out in Section 5.1 above, no such 
links exist. So, the emphasis in the predicate of the 
sentence is simply to "name" the action to be performed, as 
it were. This probably explains why all varieties of the 
imperative have their verbs in the base-form, as claimed in 
Chapter Four. 
22. I would like to stress that this pool of knowledge is 
by no means static. What may be said for certain is that it 
would be up-to-date at the time the sentence is used, and 
could still improve soon after that. 
23. The current proposal is thus able to capture the plura- 
lity that we find in the semantic interpretations of every- 
body and nobody. 
24. If it is held that the referent of the subject NP is not 
always the agent of the action specified in the sentence, it 
will be difficult to explain what brings about the state of 
affairs (ii), when it is deemed to exist. (See Chapter Two, 
Section 2.2 above). 
25. If compliance with an order is believed to create a new 
state of affairs, non-compliance with it may be said to leave 
the existing state of affairs unchanged. If this is to be 
characterized propositionally, it will have to be related to 
a sentence like the one in (5.2.20), which owes nothing to 
the imperative construction at all since it has to do with 
what has been obtaining well before the imperative sentence 
could have been uttered. 
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Conclusion 
In this part of the present study, I intend to look back 
at it in order to assess its contribution to the subject and 
identify some of the problems that remain. I shall first of 
all discuss the thesis as a unit before I go on to assess the 
main aspects that it contains. 
This study is an in-depth analysis of the syntax and 
semantics of the imperative sentence in English within the 
framework of generative grammar. It uses two linguistic 
models (i. e. Generalized Phrase Structure Grammar and Mon- 
tague Semantics) in a manner that is unique in itself, and so 
achieves a level of co-operation between grammatical models 
that is often wished for (see Aissen, 1985), but rarely found 
in modern linguistic analyses. The present study is the 
first to use these two models, as far as I know, in the study 
of the imperative in English in this way. 
This theoretical base of the thesis thus places it in a 
position to tackle one of the most recalcitrant problems in 
sentence analysis, the imperative. I have thus resolved a 
major problem in the study of this sentence type, i. e., the 
use of grammatical models which are rich enough to be sensi- 
tive to the particular phenomena that the imperative pre- 
sents. I have provided a detailed literature review which 
puts this problem in perspective as well as shows an alterna- 
tive way that can be used to resolve a number of other prob- 
lems. Prominent among the approaches in the current litera- 
ture is the use of TG to account for all sentence types on 
the basis that they all derive from common declarative-like 
structures but vary in surface forms as a result of the 
operations of transformations. 
The survey of the current approaches to the imperative 
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reveals that (a), some studies claim that the construction is 
peculiar because it does not conform to general gramma- 
tical rules, and (b), some take the opposite position and say 
that the sentence has many features in common with other 
sentence types, and (c), others take the middle line, partly 
agreeing, and partly disagreeing, with the two views above. 
There is nothing unusual in this state of affairs, except 
that none of these approaches tries to identify the constuc- 
tion fully as it really is, rather than examine it to the 
extent that it measures up to the declarative and declara- 
tive-like constructions. To pursue this last line of 
approach, one needs to use a very rich theoretical framework, 
and this is what I have done in the present study. I now 
take up specific aspects that are treated in the thesis, 
beginning with syntax. 
What was urgently needed for the syntax of the impera- 
tive, within the general generative approach, was a set of 
rules that could predict the various shapes in which the 
imperative appears in English. None, set out in clearly 
defined grammatical framework, existed before, so, using the 
general principles of Generalized Phrase Structure Grammar, I 
have provided such rules in Chapter Four. As indicated 
above, the rules relate to the structures as they really are, 
in their surface forms, rather than as they conform to, or 
depart from, the rules that predict declarative sentences. 
These rules are preceded by an analysis of possible 
imperative subject NP's. They give useful insights into the 
syntactic organization of the NP's. It is discovered that 
where such NP's are fully specified, they have definite 
structures, which include the possession of post-modifiers, 
if they are not pronouns. This explains (in line with the 
semantic interpretations of the NP's) why not all NP's in 
English can function as subjects in the imperative. It also 
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explains why current notions on the Relation of Subject fail 
to predict the case of the imperative subject NP's, as Chap- 
ter Three of the thesis shows. So, what is remarkable in the 
imperative subject NP's is the fact that they constitute a 
small subset of NP's, on the basis of their syntactic (as 
well as semantic) features. Although different structures 
occur in possible imperative subject NPs as modifiers of the 
Head N's, the above analysis shows that their presence in the 
constructions is significant enough to be given serious atte- 
ntion, especially in view of the fact that it is the impera- 
tive alone that picks almost all its subjects from a small 
subset of NP's. The account provided here also shows that 
the controversy about the syntactic nature of NPs can be 
reduced considerably if the analyses of such a topic are 
related to specific sentence types, as has been done here in 
the case of the imperative. 
The analysis of the VP's resolves a number of problems 
that relate to the structures. It identifies the nature of 
the imperative VP itself, and it is found that it constitutes 
a unique syntactic category. This is borne out not only by 
the manner in which it deploys elements like negation, do and 
be, but also by its relationships with the subject NP of the 
ccnstruction. It has thus been demonstrated that to try to 
account for do, be and not outside the unique syntactic 
structures in which they occur is grossly inadequate. So, 
not only does the problem of do insertion or of ensuring that 
it is placed in front of be not arise in this approach, but 
the syntactic roles of the verbs are also reflected by the PS 
rules 'for the surface forms and sub-components of the impera- 
tive. To take another example, from 'the examination of the 
syntactic organizaticn of the imperative VP, it is found that 
the imperative is TENSE-NEUTRAL, not tenseless as it is 
generally assumed. 
Apart from the provision of rules mentioned above, I have 
also examined other aspects of the imperative S-structure. I 
A 
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have identified the nature of the subject-predicate relation- 
ship as psychological, in view of the absence of elements 
like modality and aspect in the construction. This is an 
aspect that has been ignored in current generative accounts, 
in spite of the fact that it sheds light on many aspects of 
the construction. For example, it is observed that sentence 
adverbs generally tend to occur in sentence-initial positions 
in the imperative as a reflection of the unique nature of 
this relationship. The base-form of the verbs that occur in 
the imperative and the inability of the so-called negative 
preverbs to occur in it are also attributable to it. 
The aspect of the semantics of the imperative supports 
the syntactic one, a feature of the study that is made possi- 
ble by the theoretical base that it has. This aspect is a 
surface compositional analysis of the imperative, and it has 
been highly desirable, for a long time now, to provide it 
(see Mccawley, 1981, as well as chapters One and Two above) 
for the purpose of the semantic interpretation of the impe- 
rative. My achievements in this regard consist in the fact 
that by the extension of the rigorous principles of Montague 
Semantics, I have been able to identify the type of seman- 
tical entities that components of the imperative are. For 
example, I have identified the imperative subject NP as a 
function from the context of use to a set. of individuals, and 
the VP as an entity that has to do with the context of use in 
the sense that it captures the fact that a clearly identifia- 
ble piece of action is specified in the context of use, no 
matter-where the execution of it is to be located. Another 
example is that I have revealed the semantico-pragmatic 
nature of the imperative S-structure itself by showing how it 
relates to the context of use. I have also proposed that the 
identification of the referent of the vocative or subject 
NIP, followed by the specification of an action, creates 
between the referent and the action a link which may not have 
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existed before and the link is that the individual is to 
become the agent of the action in question. 
Within the above general framework, I have identified 
the essence of the semantic organization of the imperative as 
the precise identification of the intended agent-of-action 
and of the indended action itself. The present analysis 
thus resolves the problem of-the interpretation of subject 
NP's which is so central to the semantic organization of the 
imperative that an account which approaches it as a syntactic 
mood category, as the present one does, must treat it. I 
have therefore modified the conventional MODEL-THEORETIC 
INTERPRETATION and so make it one which involves (within the 
conventions of Montague, 1970c) the Context of Use of the 
imperative, in which a great deal of effort goes into picking 
out the referent of the the subject NP. 
By showing that possible imperative subject NP's and 
predicate phrases constitute unique semantic TYPES which do 
not enter into functional relationship with each other, I 
have been able to capture the fact that the imperative, as an 
S-category, does not denote truth values, unlike the declara- 
tive. With regard to the interpretation of the entire impe- 
rative sentence therefore, I have, on the basis of my seman- 
tic analysis of its major components, identified certain of 
its "fulfilment conditions" (see Chapter Five, Section 5.2 C 
above). One of these conditions relates to the ability of 
the sentence to convey the sense that compliance is a subse- 
quent matter, through its relation with the external world. 
This is the aspect that gives rise to the propositional 
analysis of the sentence, and so the fulfilment conditions of 
the imperative encompass more grounds than the aspect of its 
propositional content. 
I have also examined this aspect and noted the problem. - 
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that it raises. Among these are the problem of the reference 
of the subject NP, in view of the fact that the context of use 
of the sentence is at times different from the context in 
which it is complied with, and the problem of how this can be 
reflected in a state of affairs in which the referent of the 
subject NP may be said to acquire the property that the 
predicate of the sentence denotes. 
I would like to end this conclusion here by adding that 
a number of problems are still not fully resolved. In syn- 
tax, it is still necessary to account for the features of do 
in the sentence. The real nature of tags in imperatives needs 
to be probed more deeply in order to identify the properties 
of these elements more clearly. As for the semantics of the 
sentences, it still remains to give more substance to the 
propositional analysis of the sentences than is at present 
available in the literature. These problems are now easier to 
tackle in view of insights which the present approach gives 
into the nature of the sentence type. 
F- 
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